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I h MAR 2003 
Figures 0:1 and 0:2 show Turkish mosques i n the Greek 
Cypriot quarter of the old walled c i t y of c e n t r a l 
N i c o s i a . Figure 0:2 i l l u s t r a t e s the two main 
r e l i g i o n s of Cyprus - a small mosque and C h r i s t i a n 
church located around 8 October Square only f i f t y 
metres from the Green Line. Before the i n t e r -
communal troubles of December 1963 - August T964 
the two communities l i v e d side-by-side i n many parts 
of the i s l a n d . There are numerous p h y s i c a l reminders 
of t h i s i n southern Cyprus where i t i s not unusual to 
f i n d a Turkish mosque i n close proximity to a Greek 
Orthodox church. 
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ABSTRACT. 
The main aim of t h i s study i s to examine the r o l e of the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force i n Cyprus i n r e l a t i o n to fundamental changes to the 
human and p o l i t i c a l geography of the i s l a n d . The p o l i t i c a l background 
to these changes i s given some a n a l y s i s but the major focus of the study 
i s on the s p a t i a l aspects of intercommunal c o n f l i c t , and the problems 
created f o r c i v i l i a n l i f e by a r t i f i c i a l ethnic b a r r i e r s , barbed wire-
fences, sentry-posts, roadblocks, and other p h y s i c a l l i n e s symbolizing 
the separation of the Greek and Turkish C y p r i o t s 0 
A f t e r a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n p r i o r to Independence, the 
c e n t r i f u g a l f o r c e s d i v i d i n g the two communities and r e s u l t i n g i n the 
formation of Turkish Cypriot enclaves are discussed. I n the l i g h t of 
these major changes U.N.P.I.CYP. had to cope with many complicated 
p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s on the ground r e l a t i n g to the separate de facto 
t e r r i t o r i a l c o n t rol of c e r t a i n parts of the Republic of Cyprus by the 
Turkish C y p r i o t s . This study s t r e s s e s the economic and humanitarian 
duties of what i s b a s i c a l l y a m i l i t a r y peacekeeping f o r c e . I n c a r r y i n g 
out these duties there are many linkages between the non-military tasks 
of U.N.F.I.CYP. and the human geography of the island,, 
F i n a l l y , the period since the forming of the de facto p a r t i t i o n l i n e 
between the two communities i s considered i n d e t a i l , and p a r t i c u l a r 
a t t e n t i o n i s given to U.N.F.I.CYP.*s a c t i v i t i e s between the two Forward 
Defence Lines of the National Guard and Turkish Army, i . e . i n the U.N.-
co n t r o l l e d Buffer Zone. 
The study then attempts to draw some conclusions regarding the l i k e l y 
future r o l e of U.N.F.I.CYP., and to h i g h l i g h t the problems posed by the 
p o l i t i c a l deadlock between the two communities. There i s also a short 
conclusion on the geography of peacekeeping, which i s based e n t i r e l y on 
t h i s d e t a i l e d case study. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
AIMS. APPROACH'. AND INTRODUCTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. 
This introduction i s divided into two s e c t i o n s . The f i r s t deals with 
the main aims and approach adopted i n t h i s study. The second gives 
d e t a i l s of the complexity of the Cyprus Problem as necessary background 
to the r e s t of the d i s s e r t a t i o n . 
Section One. 
The p r i n c i p a l aim of the d i s s e r t a t i o n i s to emphasize the "geographical 
aspects"" of the United Nations peacekeeping operations i n Cyprus. The 
f a c t that Cyprus i s an i s l a n d of only 9,251 sq. km. with a population of 
only 650 - 700,000 makes the i s l a n d a manageable s i z e f o r a d e t a i l e d 
study of t h i s type. The compact, e a s i l y defined heterogenous space of 
the i s l a n d provides a valuable " t e s t i n g ground" f o r a n a l y s i s of the 
s p a t i a l dimensions of intercommunal c o n f l i c t and "the i n t e r p o s i t i o n a r y 
r o l e " of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l peacekeeping force between the protagonists. 
There have been other d e t a i l e d s t u d i e s of the United Nations Force i n 
Cyprus ( U.N.F.I.CYP. ) operations, but none have focused on the s p a t i a l 
aspects of peacekeeping i n r e l a t i o n to the p e c u l i a r p o l i t i c a l geography 
of Cyprus. For instance, Charles C.Moskos, 1976, c a r r i e d out a study of 
the m i l i t a r y sociology of peacekeeping, analysing "whether the imperatives 
of noncoercion and i m p a r t i a l i t y require a reformulation of conventional 
m i l t i a r y s o c i o l i z a t i o n and a r e s t r u c t u r i n g of standard m i l i t a r y 
organization." (1) B r i g a d i e r Michael Harbottle, 1970, examines the-
organisation and deployment of U.N.F.I.CYP. and provides i n s i g h t s into 
p a r t i c u l a r i n c i d e n t s from the standpoint of a former c h i e f - o f - s t a f f of 
the Force, 1966-68. Another-comprehensive and c r i t i c a l account of 
U.N.F.I.CYP. i n i t s f i r s t decade i s provided by James A.Stagenga, who 
questions whether or not the U.N. Force helped to "freeze and perpetuate" 
an anomalous and dangerous patchwork p a r t i t i o n between the communities. (2 
Other studies have concentrated on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l dimension of United 
Nations peacekeeping and the i n t r i c a c i e s of U.N.P.I.CYP.'s mandate, 
comparing i t to other United Nations peacekeeping ventures. (3) 
L i t t l e attempt i s made i n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n to make comparisons with 
or g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s about i n t e r n a t i o n a l peacekeeping as a means of 
regulating c i v i l war or intercommunal c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s . U.N.P.I.CYP. 
i s not being used as a 'model' f o r future peacekeeping ventures, although 
some us e f u l lessons have already been le a r n t from the Cyprus operation 
regarding such c r i t i c a l f a c t o r s as mounting and forming an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
peacekeeping force, financing i t , i t s administrative arrangements and 
l o g i s t i c a l support machinery. As Stagenga points out:-
" U.N.P.I.CYP. was t a i l o r e d to cope with Cyprus c r i s i s r a t h e r 
than to conform to any standard pattern or doctrine derived 
from U.N.E.P. or O.N.U.C.',' two earlier peacekeeping f o r c e s . (4) 
I n so f a r as there may be s i m i l a r i t i e s between the s i t u a t i o n i n Cyprus and 
other s t a t e s torn by i n t e r - e t h n i c , r e l i g i o u s , or t r i b a l antagonisms 
combined with regional forces acting c e n t r i f u g a l l y to s p l i n t e r the s t a t e s , 
U.N.P.I.CYP.'s experiences may provide valuable information as to the^ 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h i r d party i n t e r v e n t i o n i n c o n f l i c t 
s i t u a t i o n s . Such lessons may be p a r t i c u l a r l y applicable to t h i r d world 
countries where the negative a n t i c o l o n i a l aspects of nationalism are 
weaker than "the multitude of p a r t i c u l a r i s t tendencies'.' ( 5 ) 
Cyprus i s shared by Greek and Turkish Cypriots, yet due to a v a r i e t y of 
i n t e r n a l and ex t e r n a l c e n t r i f u g a l f a c t o r s they perceived t h e i r shared 
space d i f f e r e n t l y and mutually e x c l u s i v e g e o p o l i t i c a l goals. The 
combination of these goals and ex t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l / m i l i t a r y i n i t i a t i v e s 
helped to fundamentally a l t e r the p o l i t i c a l and human geography of Cyprus. 
The most dramatic manifestation of t h i s took place i n 1974 with the complete 
separation of the two communities into mono-ethnic areas divided by a 
de facto boundary. 
The- s p a t i a l aspects of intercommunal c o n f l i c t and r e s u l t i n g changes t a 
an understanding of U.N.P.I.CYP. deployment, operations, achievements, and 
the c o n s t r a i n t s working against "a return to normal conditions" as 
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envisaged by e i t h e r community and by U.N.P.I.CYP., a l l of whom had d i f f e r e n t 
perceptions of the s i t u a t i o n and of why the Force was created. Richard 
P a t r i c k ' s research on the geographical aspects of intercommunal c o n f l i c t , 
i . e . "the l o c a t i o n a l aspects of each i n c i d e n t , where i t occurred and why, 
how the l o c a t i o n affected each incident and v i c e versa, where- refugees 
went, the l o c a t i o n a l consequences of both evacuation and reception 
v i l l a g e s and t h e i r economies", ( 6 ) highlighted the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the 
s p a t i a l environments of each community. For-instance, the Turkish 
Cypriote created t h e i r own space by forming protected enclaves and quarters 
i n various parts of the i s l a n d , which l e f t the map of Cyprus dotted with 
" i s l a n d s " of Turkish Cypriot-control f o r over a decade, December 1963 to 
July 1974 . I n t h i s way the Turkish Cypriots a l t e r e d t h e i r ' s p a t i a l 
environments, became i n c r e a s i n g l y cut-off from the Greek Cypriots, and 
i n t r o v e r t e d i n t h e i r socio-economically confined strongholds which t h e i r 
leaders were determined to hold onto r a t h e r than l e t them f a l l undpr the 
influence of the Cyprus Government. On the o t h e r hand the Greek Cypriots 
maintained control of over ninety per cent of the t e r r i t o r y of Cyprus, 
remained r e l a t i v e l y comfortable i n t h e i r economic pr o s p e r i t y , and were 
unable or u n w i l l i n g to enter Turkish Cypriot areas, a l l of which produced 
a dangerous complacency about the p l i g h t of Turkish Cypriots and the 
p o l i t i c a l deadlock. The " i s o l a t e d s t a t e " of the Turkish Cypriot community 
tended to enhance the psychological b a r r i e r s and phobias separating the 
two communities. 
From the above comments i t can be i n f e r r e d that the "buffer" a c t i v i t i e s 
of U.N.F.I.CYP. i n maintaining p h y s i c a l b a r r i e r s and c e a s e - f i r e l i n e s , the 
accepted s t a t u s quo on the i s l a n d s p l i t by intercommunal s t r i f e , helped to 
consolidate a de facto separation of the two main Cypriot communities. In 
t h i s context much of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n i s devoted to:-
( T ) U.N.F.I.CYP.'s r o l e as a "buffer f o r c e " between the b e l l i g e r e n t s . 
(2) I t s e f f o r t s to break down the b a r r i e r s separating Greek from Turkish 
Cypriot by attempting to "normalize" socio-economic conditions i n the 
i s l a n d . 
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(3) An a n a l y s i s o f the f o r c e s behind the f o r m a t i o n o f d i s t i n c t community-
d e f i n e d b e h a v i o u r a l environments i n o r d e r t o determine o t h e r 
c e n t r i f u g a l and c e n t r i p e t a l tendencies o t h e r than those emanating 
from U.N.F.I.CYP.'s a c t i v i t i e s . 
(4) An examination o f the numerous d i s t r i b u t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s a r i s i n g 
not from the heterogenous space o f the i s l a n d but from "man-created 
space", and U.N.P.I.CYP.'s response t o these problems. 
Twice" i n the l a s t two decades Cyprus has undergone major changes i n i t s 
p o l i t i c a l geography, c r e a t i n g massive socio-economic, demographic and 
p o l i t i c a l upheavals. T h i s study w i l l focus on the g e o g r a p h i c a l problems 
caused by a r b i t r a r y e t h n i c d i v i d i n g l i n e s drawn across the landscape o f 
Cyprus, such as t r u n c a t e d communications, d i s r u p t e d freedom o f movement, 
d i v i d e d a g r i c u l t u r a l resources and the d i s r u p t i o n o f land-use, m i s a l l o c a t i o n 
o f economic r e s o u r c e s , w e l f a r e f a c i l i t i e s , movement o f goods and people, 
c o n s t r a i n t s on human^and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n / c o o p e r a t i o n . As Richard 
P a t r i c k observed :-
" The processes o f c o n f l i c t a l t e r the phenomenal environment 
i n which and upon which they a c t . Geographers have 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y been i n t e r e s t e d i n such r e s u l t s as boundary 
changes, p o p u l a t i o n m i g r a t i o n s , resource r e d i s t r i b u t i o n , 
s h i f t s o f l o c a t i o n s , a l t e r a t i o n s t o spheres o f i n f l u e n c e — 
g e n e r a l l y speaking our focus has been on how c o n f l i c t a f f e c t s 
the s p a t i a l p a t t e r n o f phenomena; which, f o r v a r i o u s reasons, 
we view as s i g n i f i c a n t . " ( 7) 
Two broad p e r i o d s w i l l be covered i n d e t a i l , 1964 t o J u l y T974 and J u l y 
1974 t o 1984. For the f i r s t decade o f U.N.P.I.CYP. peacekeeping I w i l l 
q u e s t i o n the e x t e n t t o which the Force may have helped to p r o t e c t a 
s e p a r a t i s t movement i n Cyprus by c a r r y i n g out i t s d i v e r s e a c t i v i t i e s as 
( i ) an i n t e r p o s i t i o n a r y f o r c e , and ( i i ) a communication b r i d g e between the 
two communities at a time o f l i t t l e o r no progress i n intercommunal 
n e g o t i a t i o n s towards a s e t t l e m e n t o f the Cyprus Problem. The second 
p e r i o d deals s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h the consequences o f and peacekeeping problems 
c r e a t e d by an e n f o r c e d a r t i f i c i a l d i v i s i o n o f a s m a l l i s l a n d . P a r t i c u l a r 
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a t t e n t i o n w i l l be g i v e n t o the p e c u l i a r g e o g r a p h i c a l problems o f the 
Uni t e d Nations B u f f e r Zone, u t i l i z i n g r e c e n t f i e l d w o r k o b s e r v a t i o n s 
and i n t e r v i e w s w i t h U.N.P.I.CYP. p e r s o n n e l . F i n a l l y , the c u r r e n t 
p o l i t i c a l and s p a t i a l stalemate w i l l be discussed i n r e l a t i o n t o the 
c o n t i n u i n g presence o f a U.N. Force i n Cyprus. 
S e c t i o n Two: The Cyprus Problem. 
" Cyprus was the c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r i n a long Turko-Greek 
s t r u g g l e and disentanglement, and the T u r k i s h government's 
a t t i t u d e t o i t was concerned w i t h s e c u r i t y f e a r s as much 
as w i t h the T u r k i s h m i n o r i t y : f e a r s d a t i n g from p r e v i o u s 
Turko-Greek encounters...as w e l l as the nightmare o f being 
e n c i r c l e d by a c o a l i t i o n o f pan-Hellenism and Great Powers 
such as B r i t a i n , France o r Russia. " (8) 
" The Cyprus Problem(s) must not be viewed simply as 
'a problem o f Greeks and Turks'. Nor i s i t t r u e t o say 
' t h a t but fo r - the i n f l u e n c e o f B r i t a i n and l a t e r the 
U.S.A. the Greek and T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s would t o t h i s day 
be l i v i n g t o g e t h e r i n harmony.'" (9) 
" C l e a r l y , both communities were under the c o n t r o l o f 
o u t s i d e f a c t o r s over which they had very l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e ; 
t h e r e i s every i n d i c a t i o n t h a t , d i v o r c e d from the- w i d e r 
p o l i t i c a l argument, harmony c o u l d have p r e v a i l e d . " (TO) 
These three- q u o t a t i o n s , seemingly c o n t r a d i c t o r y , are taken from 
t h r e e e x p e r t s on d i f f e r e n t aspects o f the Cyprus Problem, and they 
i l l u s t r a t e the- c o m p l e x i t y o f t h i s m u l t i f a c e t e d i s s u e . Indeed i t i s 
u s e f u l t o look at the Cyprus Problem from v a r i o u s l e v e l s and 
p e r s p e c t i v e s . 
( i ) Intercommunal Coexistence and C o n f l i c t . 
The i s l a n d o f Cyprus i s shared by two major communities — the Greek 
and T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s , f o r m i n g about 80 and 18 per cent o f the p o p u l a t i o n 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . There are also s m a l l numbers o f M a r o n i t e s , Armenians, and 
more r e c e n t l y , Lebanese. To a l a r g e e x t e n t t h i s b i p a r t i s a n p o p u l a t i o n i s 
1 
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the Cyprus Problem. Greek and T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s have d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r a l , 
r e l i g i o u s and l i n g u i s t i c backgrounds which helped t o f o s t e r d i v e r s e 
n a t i o n a l i s m s , a p o l a r i z a t i o n o f community p o l i t i c s and a s p a t i a l 
s e p a r a t i o n o f the communities. S t r e s s i n g these d i f f e r e n c e s between the 
two ' C y p r i o t ' communities has l e d some^ a u t h o r i t i e s t o the c o n c l u s i o n 
t h a t " the Turks and the Greeks cannot,get on t o g e t h e r ". (1T) I f the 
past twenty years o r so are considered i n i s o l a t i o n many observers would 
probably agree w i t h such a statement. But as C h r i s t o p h e r H i t c h e n s , 1984, 
puts i t :-
" I n o r d e r t o c r i t i c i z e t h i s t r i t e and c y n i c a l view, which 
i s the p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o u n t e r p a r t • o f p a r t i t i o n , one has t o 
wage a b a t t l e a g a i n s t amnesia." (T2) 
This means t a k i n g a w i d e r view o f Cyprus' h i s t o r y and the development o f 
intercommunal c o n f l i c t i n Cyprus. 
P r i o r - t o the Independence C o n s t i t u t i o n the two communities were 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d along r e l i g i o u s r a t h e r than r a c i a l d i f f e r e n c e s $ 3 ) a "Greek" 
was simply an adherer t o Orthodox C h r i s t i a n i t y and a "Turk" an upholder 
o f I s l a m . Bicommunal d e f i n i t i o n s were o f f i c i a l l y e n s h r i n e d i n A r t i c l e 
Two o f the 1960 C o n s t i t u t i o n which s t a t e s :-
"...th e Greek Community comprises a l l c i t i z e n s o f the Republic 
who are o f Greek o r i g i n and whose mother tongue i s Greek o r 
who are members o f the Greek Orthodox Church; t h e T u r k i s h 
Community comprises a l l c i t i z e n s o f the Republic who are o f 
T u r k i s h o r i g i n and whose mother tongue i s T u r k i s h o r who 
share the T u r k i s h c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s 1 o r who are Muslims; 
C i t i z e n s o f the Republic who do not come w i t h i n ( these ) 
p r o v i s i o n s . . . s h a l l , w i t h i n t h r e e months...opt t o belong 
t o e i t h e r the Greek o r T u r k i s h community." (14) 
These c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s encouraged e t h n i c p o l a r i z a t i o n and the 
development o f community consciousness as opposed t o a C y p r i o t n a t i o n a l 
consciousness. The p r o v i s i o n s e f f e c t i v e l y i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d p o l i t i c a l 
d i v i s i o n s t h a t were t a k i n g place as a r e s u l t o f the Independence Move-
ment. For i n s t a n c e , the Greek C y p r i o t s had f o r g e d t h e i r a n t i c o l o n i a l 
sentiments w i t h demands f o r Enosis (Union w i t h Greece). Enosis was 
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more than an e x p r e s s i o n o f Pan-Hellenism t o Greek C y p r i o t s , as P e t e r Loizos 
e x p l a i n s , " i t was some k i n d o f search f o r a l l i e s , r o o t s , and d i g n i t y by 
c l a i m i n g a c o n n e c t i o n t o a more p r e s t i g i o u s c u l t u r e - , t h a t o f mainland 
Greece". (15) With the-growth o f the Enosis s t r u g g l e ^ ther T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s 
became i n c r e a s i n g l y concerned t h a t s h o u l d the i s l a n d become another' 
d i s t a n t p r o v i n c e of Greece they would be e i t h e r e x p e l l e d from Cyprus, o r 
become an u n d e r p r i v i l e g e d and downtrodden m i n o r i t y w i t h i n G r e a t e r Greece. 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s became more aware o f t h e i r e t h n i c i d e n t i t y , v u l n e r a b l e 
m i n o r i t y s t a t u s i n Cyprus, and more v o c i f e r o u s i n pushing f o r t h e i r r i g h t s 
i n Cypriott a f f a i r s . B r i t a i n a c t i v e l y encouraged t h i s p o l i t i c i z a t i o n o f 
communal d i f f e r e n c e s and used the' T u r k i s h m i n o r i t y t o prop up the c o l o n i a l 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . (T6) T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s were even used as a u x i l i a r y p o l i c e -
men i n the b a t t l e a g a i n s t E.O.K.A. ( E t h n i k i Organosis K y p r i o n Agoniston — 
N a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n o f Freedom F i g h t e r s ) i n the l a t e - • F i f t i e s , which 
caused intercommunal bloodshed. As Michael A t t a l i d e s p o i n t s out :-
The r e a l intercommunal b i t t e r n e s s o n l y extended t o the grass 
r o o t s l e v e l when k i l l i n g s t a r t e d . " (T7) 
Before the outbreak o f intercommunal v i o l e n c e i n the late-T950s t h e r e 
had been a h i g h degree o f interdependence i n economic and c e r t a i n r i t u a l 
r e l a t i o n s i n Cyprus. (T8) I f one goes back t o the Ottoman p e r i o d b e f o r e 
the development o f Greek n a t i o n a l i s m theipwere few signs o f widespread 
communal a n i m o s i t y . On the c o n t r a r y , d i s t i n c t i o n s between "Greeks" and 
"Turks" were o f t e n b l u r r e d by i n s t a n c e s o f i n t e r m a r r i a g e , and a s u b s t a n t i a l 
number o f conversions from C h r i s t i a n i t y t o I s l a m . There were even whole 
v i l l a g e s o f Greek-speaking Muslims. Many C y p r i o t s bore the- nickname o f 
Linobambaki ( Linen Cotton ) , s i g n i f y i n g t h e i r "mixed" o r i g i n s . There 
also s e v e r a l mixed peasant r e v o l t s i n o p p o s i t i o n t o h i g h e r taxes imposed 
by the Church o r Ottoman Governor. (T9) 
U n t i l r e c e n t times t h e r e was much c o o p e r a t i o n i n socio-economic l i f e , 
thff o r d i n a r y people never f i n d i n g i t d i f f i c u l t t o l i v e t o g e t h e r , t o share 
the i s l a n d , p laces o f work, v i l l a g e s , suburbs, coffeeshops, and wedding 
f e s t i v i t i e s . Working-class members o f both communities j o i n e d the-
communist-led Pan-Cypriot Labour F e d e r a t i o n (P.E.O.), which had 4,000 
T u r k i s h members be f o r e the Turks formed " s e p a r a t i s t " t r a d e unions i n 
response t o intercommunal c o n f l i c t . 
P r o f e s s o r Coufoudakis,1976, t r i e d t o analyse ""the dynamics o f p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t i t i o n and d i v i s i o n i n Cyprus". He h i g h l i g h t e d some i m p o r t a n t i n t e r n a l a»\d 
e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s l e a d i n g t o the s p a t i a l s e p a r a t i o n o f the communities. 
One o f the i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s d u r i n g Ottoman r u l e was the r e v i t a l i s a t i o n 
o f the Orthodox Church under the M i l l e t system, t r a n s f o r m i n g the Archbishop 
i n t o "the unchallenged spokesman i n p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , e d u c a t i o n a l and 
r e l i g i o u s a f f a i r s o f the Greek C y p r i o t community."' (20) During the a n t i -
c o l o n i a l movement the c a l l f o r Enosis was "spearheaded by Orthodox church-
men, p a s s i o n a t e l y r i g h t - w i n g , and l a c k i n g i n s i g h t i n t o T u r k i s h C y p r i o t 
t h i n k i n g . " (2T) Another^ source o f d i v i s i o n was the segregated 
e d u c a t i o n a l system, which strenghened community t i e s t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
"mother l a n d s " , and f o s t e r e d the p e r p e t u a t i o n o f e t h n i c d i f f e r e n c e s . As> 
P a t r i c k observed :-
" Th i s system o f e d u c a t i o n has not o n l y produced s t r o n g 
Greek and T u r k i s h p a t r i o t i s m r a t h e r than any sense o f 
C y p r i o t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , but i t has a l s o m a i n t i n e d and 
emphasized the v i l l a i n o u s r o l e s i n t o which Greeks and 
Turks have h i s t o r i c a l l y cast each o t h e r . " (22) 
Economic d i s p a r i t i e s between the two communities were another p o t e n t i a l 
source o f communal s e p a r a t i o n . At Independence T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s had an 
average per c a p i t a income some twenty per cent below t h a t o f Greek C y p r i o t s . 
Furthermore, most o f the i s l a n d ' s l u c r a t i v e businesses were i n Greek hands. 
These d i s p a r i t i e s were mainly due t o s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s as 
opposed t o any p o l i c y o f " e x p l o i t a t i o n " by Greek C y p r i o t s . (23) U n f o r t u n a t e -
l y these economic d i f f e r e n c e s were t o be "used" by the le a d e r s o f both 
communities i n o r d e r t o achieve t h e i r separate p o l i t i c a l g oals a f t e r 
December 1963. 
H i t h e r t o e x t e r n a l causes o f the s e p a r a t i o n o f Greek and T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s 
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Have- o n l y been h i n t e d a t , but they w i l l now be g i v e n more w e i g h t , f o r as 
one commentator has put i t — 
At almost every stage i n the drama...the weaknesses o r 
e r r o r s o f C y p r i o t s were e x p l o i t e d o r compounded by e x t e r n a l 
i n t e r v e n t i o n . " (24) 
Others a l s o s t r e s s the m a n i p u l a t i o n o f and i n t e r f e r e n c e i n C y p r i o t a f f a i r s 
by i n t e r e s t e d o u t s i d e powers as being the p r i c i p a l f a c t o r i n "the g r a d u a l 
movement toward p o l i t i c a l p a r t i t i o n on the i s l a n d " . (25>) Greek and 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t phobias about each o t h e r have not o n l y been i n t e n s i f i e d 
by i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l r i v a l r i e s but by the complex i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f 
i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l power p o l i t i c s . 
( i i ) The G e o p o l i t i c a l Dimension o f the Cyprus Problem. 
Cyprus has an advantageous p o s i t i o n at t h e easternmost end o f the 
M e diterranean, near the t r o u b l e d Levant, a v a l u a b l e p o s i t i o n f o r " a l l 
forms o f advance, economic, m i l i t a r y and c u l t u r a l . " (26) The s t r a t e g i c 
p o s i t i o n o f the i s l a n d i s l a r g e l y the cause o f outside^ i n t e r f e r e n c e i n 
C y p r i o t a f f a i r s . The l i n k a g e s between Cyprus and v e s t e d e x t e r n a l i n t p r e s t s 
are a t v a r i o u s l e v e l s . 
I n t r a - R e g i o n a l L e v e l : Graeco-Turkish R i v a l r y . 
By d e f i n i n g the c h i e f p r o t a g o n i s t s i n Cyprus as the Greek N a t i o n and 
t h f f T u r k i s h N a t i o n the Cyprus Problem becomes one element o f the i n t r a -
r e g i o n a l r i v a l r y between Greece and Turkey. I n t h i s c o n t e x t " N a t i o n " i s 
d e f i n e d as a group o f people who f e e l themselves l i n k e d by a common 
c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e (hence the Enosis Movement). As Rich a r d P a t r i c k e x p l a i n s 
^ I f Turkey and Greece- are i n c l u d e d w i t h i n the community 
boundaries o f the p r o t a g o n i s t s , the Cyprus Problem c o u l d 
be viewed as o n l y one o f s e v e r a l connected c o n f l i c t 
systems o v e r l a p p i n g the Greek and T u r k i s h N a t i o n a l 
boundaries." (27) 
For t h r e e hundred years ( f r o m 157T t o 1878) Cyprus was p a r t of" t h e 
Ottoman Empire, a l t h o u g h the m a j o r i t y o f i t s p o p u l a t i o n were Greek 
s e t t l e r s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , f r o m the time o f the f i r s t i n f l u x o f T u r k i s h 
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Muslims from the mainland the seeds o f "Cyprus rs c o n t i n u i n g c o n f l i c t 
between a Greek C h r i s t i a n m a j o r i t y and a T u r k i s h Muslim m i n o r i t y " 
were sown. (n."U27) I n 182T, the mainland Greeks rose a g a i n s t t h e i r 
T u r k i s h o v e r l o r d s , m o t i v a t e d by the "Megali I d e a " o r Great Idea o f 
H e l l e n i s m , i . e . the l i b e r a t i o n o f a l l Greeks everywhere and, 
u l t i m a t e l y , the recovery o f C o n s t a n t i n o p l e as the c a p i t a l o f a u n i f i e d 
and r e s u r g e n t Byzantine Empire. F o l l o w i n g a Russo-Turkish war i n 1877 
the Turks handed Cyprus o v e r - t o F r i t a i n i n r e t u r n f o r a defence agree-
ment. On the day B r i t i s h r u l e began, J u l y 8, 1878, the new B r i t i s h 
High Commissioner was welcomed by the Bishop o f C i t i u m , who expressed 
hope t h a t Cyprus would soon be r e u n i t e d w i t h "Mother Greece". I n T915 
B r i t a i n o f f e r e d Cyprus t o Greece as an inducement to t h a t c o u n t r y t o 
e n t e r war on the side o f the A l l i e s a g a i n s t Germany, A u s t r i a , Hungary 
and Turkey. Athens r e f u s e d the o f f e r , d e c i d i n g to remain n e u t r a l . 
A f t e r the r i s e o f Kemal A t l / a t u r k , the founder o f modern Turkey, t h e r e 
was the s i g n i n g o f the T r e a t y o f Lausanne i n J u l y 1923, which l e d t o a 
redrawing o f the Greaco-Turkish boundary and an exchange o f p o p u l a t i o n s , 
c r e a t i n g — " a l i n e a r i n t e r f a c e between two s t a t e s i n the f o r m o f a 
boundary which promised t o be s t a b l e because i t was agreed 
by both p a r t i e s and was m o s t l y drawn through sea, and 
because m i n o r i t i e s were l a r g e l y c l e a r e d from the t e r r i t o r i e s 
which i t separated." (28) 
As B r i a n Beeley, 1977, p o i n t s out; t h i s T r e a t y merely s h i f t e d the- l o c a t i o n 
o f a p o t e n t i a l l y h o s t i l e i n t e r f a c e t o t h e Aegean and t o Cyprus, which 
o f f i c i a l l y became a "Crown Colony" i n 1925. The drawing o f the boundary 
i n T h r a c e and the e a s t e r n Aegean Achieved the s p a t i a l s e p a r a t i o n o f Greeks 
and Turks considered v i t a l t o s t a b i l i t y a t the p o l i t i c a l i n t e r f a c e . (29) 
W i t h i n Cyprus the two communities developed p o l a r i z e d p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n s 
p u l l e d by t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e "mother l a n d s " . T u r k i s h C y p r i o t demands f o r 
TakBim ( i . e . P a r t i t i o n ) were* s t r e n g t h e n e d by the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y 
s u p e r i o r i t y over' Greece i n the? e a s t e r n Mediterranean and by i t s close-
p r o x i m i t y t o Cyprus. To- the- l a r g e r powers, Greece and Turkey, Cyprus 
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became an i m p o r t a n t t e r r i t o r i a l / s t r a t e g i c i s s u e connected w i t h an 
i n c r e a s i n g l y s i g n i f i c a n t resource-cum-boundary d i s p u t e i n the Aegean 
Sea. Since 1'923 t h i s sea has v i r t u a l l y been sc "Greek Lake", a process 
completed i n 1947 w i t h the annexation t o Greece o f the Dodecanese 
I s l a n d s o n l y afew k i l o m e t r e s from the T u r k i s h c o a s t l i n e . The r i v a l r y 
over the Aegean has m u l t i p l i e d w i t h the d i s c o v e r y o f o i l and gas d e p o s i t s 
i n the seabed. I n 1973/74 Turkey made u n i l a t e r a l d e l i m i t a t i o n s o f a 
c o n t i n e n t a l s h e l f boundary i n the Aegean by g r a n t i n g e x p l o r a t i o n concessions 
to the T u r k i s h Petroleum Company — an a c t i o n which brought Greece and 
Turkey close t o war i n 1^976. Ankara* would l i k e a Median Line e s t a b l i s h e d 
i n the Aegean t o a l l o w T u r k i s h e x p l o r a t i o n o f the e a s t e r n h a l f o f i t , but 
the^ Greeks are u n w i l l i n g t o lose access t o l a r g e p a r t s o f the seabed o r 
t o a l l o w Greek I s l a n d s t o be t u r n e d i n t o "enclaves" w i t h i n a T u r k i s h zone. 
(30) 
I n the summer o f T974 Turkey i n t e r v e n e d i n Cyprus f o l l o w i n g a Greek coup 
a g a i n s t Makarios, and consequently the^ i s l a n d was d i v i d e d . Turkish' 
propaganda expresses h e r f e a r s : -
"Turkey was being e n c i r c l e d ; Greece was t r y i n g t o make the 
Aegean a Greek Lake. Union o f Cyprus w i t h Greece would 
complete the c i r c l e . . . t h e T u r k i s h p o p u l a t i o n o f Cyprus 
would be f o r c e d o u t . . . " (3T) 
Since t h a t p a r t i t i o n many Greek C y p r i o t s are w e l l aware o f t h e i r " m i n o r i t y 
s t a t u s " i n the e a s t e r n Mediterranean r e g i o n and are w o r r i e d t h a t one day 
the Turks w i l l attempt t o annex the whole i s l a n d . (32) I n many r e s p e c t s 
the Cyprus Problem thus r e p r e s e n t s a "'double m i n o r i t y problem". T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t s have been w o r r i e d about t h e i i r m i n o r i t y p o s i t i o n w i t h i n Cyprus 
and domination by the Greeks, whereas w i t h the weight o f Turkey a t t h e i r 
backs the Greek C y p r i o t s are a " s t r a t e g i c m i n o r i t y " . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e 
past h i s t o r y o f Graeco-Turkish r i v a l r y has proved t h a t the readjustment 
o r c r e a t i o n o f de f a c t o p o l i t i c a l boundaries o r e t h n i c i n t e r f a c e s has 
merely s h i f t e d the arena o f c o n f l i c t r a t h e r than s o l v e d i t , and the 
e x i s t e n c e o f such a p h y s i c a l p a r t i t i o n i n Cyprus has not erased the 
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p o s s i b i l i t y o f a Graeco-Turkish war over the i s l a n d . 
The Super-Power- Level : Cyprus and N.A.T.O. 
Cyprus, l i k e Lebanon, has s u f f e r e d from i t s g e o p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n . 
Throughout the course o f the intercommunal c o n f l i c t , one o f Washington's 
concerns has been t o m a i n t a i n s t a b i l i t y i n the e a s t e r n f l a n k o f N.A.T.O., 
o v e r r i d i n g any concern f o r C y p r i o t independence o r C y p r i o t a s p i r a t i o n s . 
As A d a l b e r t Weinstein puts i t :-
" How does i t happen t h a t t h i s e c o n o m i c a l l y meaningless 
and m i l i t a r i l y n o n - e x i s t e n t s m a l l Cyprus w i t h i t s 650,000 
i n h a b i t a n t s have such an i n f l u e n c e on the w o r l d scene ? 
The answer i s s i m p l e . G e o g r a p h i c a l l y i t i s a s e c u r e l y 
anchored a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r a t the i n t e r s e c t i o n p o i n t o f 
the l i n e s o f t e n s i o n o f the g r e a t n u c l e a r powers. " (33) 
The B r i t i s h Sovereign Base Areas, D h e k e l i a and A k r o t i r i , no l o n g e r serve 
t h e i r o r i g i n a l f a c t i o n — t h a t o f sa f e g u a r d i n g B r i t i s h c o n t r o l o v e r 
Suez, Jordan, and I r a q , but they are key bases c o n t r o l l e d by an i m p o r t a n t 
member o f N.A.T.O., a l t h o u g h not d i r e c t l y under N.A.T.O. command. Un i t e d 
S t a t e s s t r a t e g i s t s view Cyprus as a base f o r e a r l y - w a r n i n g i n s t a l l a t i o n s 
and f o r a e r i a l s u r v e i l l a n c e o f the A r a b - I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t . P r i o r t o ther 
T974 coup d'e'tat a g a i n s t P r e s i d e n t Makarios Washington were concerned 
about the i s l a n d ' s independent, n o n - a l i g n e d s t a t u s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n view 
o f the f a c t t h a t the l a r g e s t p o l i t i c a l p a r t y i n Cyprus was A.K.E.L., the 
C y p r i o t communist p a r t y , which was t o t a l l y a g a i n s t any- s o l u t i o n b i n d i n g 
tVi*t 
Cyprus t o N.A.T.O. GivenVthe Unit e d States has s e v e r a l m i l i t a r y bases, 
p l u s the S i x t h F l e e t i n the Mediterranean area, Cyprus under Makarios 
was seen as a p o t e n t i a l "Cuba i n the Mediterranean", (34) Such a s t a n d -
p o i n t has l e d numerous academic observers t o the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the 
United S t a t e s played on i n t r a - r e g i o n a l r i v a l r i e s and intercommunal c o n f l i c t 
i n o r d e r t o produce a s i t u a t i o n more f a v o u r a b l e t o the N.A.T.O. A l l i a n c e . 
Cyprus became a " t a c t i c a l pawn" r a t h e r than an independent " c o u n t r y w i t h 
a complex i n d i v i d u a l i t y . " (35) As P o l i v i o s P o l y v i o u , 1980, p o i n t s o u t , 
once the Turks had landed s u b s t a n t i a l m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n Cyprus i n J u l y 
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T974, "American p o l i c y t i l t e d d e c i s i v e l y and c o n s c i o u s l y i n f a v o u r o f 
Turkey a s i t was thought t h a t o n l y i n t h i s way c o u l d l o s s e s w i t h i n 
N.A.T.O. be minimi z e d and American s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s s a f e g u a r d e d . " ( 36 ) 
Some commentators have gone even f u r t h e r to s u g g e s t t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s 
d i r e c t e d the t r a g i c e v e n t s o f 1974, s u p p o r t i n g the Ju n t a - b a c k e d r e b e l l i o n 
i n Cyprus and the T u r k i s h m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n for-ming a p a r t i t i o n 
of the i s l a n d , w i t h i t s n o r t h e r n p a r t under the i n f l u e n c e o f a key member 
of N.A.T.O. Some Washington s t r a t e g i s t s may have viewed t h i s r e s u l t a s 
being i n the b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f the Western d e f e n s i v e system i n the r e g i o n . ( 3 7 ) 
C o l o n i a l L e v e l : B r i t a i n ' s S t r a t e g i c I n t e r e s t s and ' D i v i d e and R u l e ' . 
C y p r u s ' s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e to B r i t a i n r e a c h e d i t s peak d u r i n g the 
a n t i c o l o n i a l movement i n Cyprus d u r i n g the 1950s. F o l l o w i n g the e v a c u a t i o n 
o f Suez, i n J u l y 1954, the i s l a n d became B r i t a i n ' s Middle E a s t m i l i t a r y 
h e a d q u a r t e r s , and a base to p r o t e c t v i t a l o i l s u p p l i e s . These s t r a t e g i c 
c o n c e r n s provoked Anthony Eden to " i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e " the Cyprus Q u e s t i o n 
by e n c o u r a g i n g T u r k e y ' s i n v o l v e m e n t , which was a move d e s i g n e d to c o u n t e r 
the r i s i n g t i d e o f E n o t i s t s e n t i m e n t amongst Greek C y p r i o t s . 
Throughout t h e c o l o n i a l p e r i o d , 1878 - T960, ' d i v i d e and r u l e ' p o l i c i e s 
h e l p e d to prop up t h e c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Greek C y p r i o t s were 
e f f e c t i v e l y n e u t r a l i z e d by a c o a l i t i o n of B r i t i s h and T u r k i s h r e p r e s e n t -
a t i v e s i n the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l . B r i t a i n a l s o u n d e r e s t i m a t e d the 
s t r e n g t h o f the Greek C y p r i o t n a t i o n a l i s t s e n t i m e n t s and the p r o - E n o s i s 
movement. T h i s was demonstrated by p o l i t i c a l r e p r e s s i o n a f t e r - p r o - E n o s i s 
r i o t s i n T931. ( 3 8 ) L i t t l e was done to promote C y p r i o t n a t i o n a l 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . I n f a c t , the two communities were - t r e a t e d a s "a n a t u r a l 
e x t e n s i o n o f Greece and the Ottoman T u r k s r e s p e c t i v e l y . . . t h e h o r i z o n t a l 
bonds t h a t d e veloped between the two communities u n d e r t h e Ottoman E m p i r e " 
were broken. ( 3 9 ) 
C r i s i s p o i n t was r e a c h e d i n the T950s when the a g i t a t i o n f o r s e l f -
d e t e r m i n a t i o n and f o r E n o s i s r e a c h e d a c l i m a x under two c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r s , 
A r chbishop Makarios and C o l o n e l George G r i v a s . I n A p r i l 1955, E.O.K.A. 
- 15 -
( i . e . E t h n l k i Organosis K y p r i o n Agoniston. N a t i o n a l O r g a n i e a t i o n o f 
Freedom F i g h t e r s ) s t a r t e d i t s campaign o f sabotage a g a i n s t the B r i t i s h . 
I n T956 Makarios was deport e d , supposedly f o r c o m p l i c i t y w i t h E.O.K.A. 
At the end o f 1956 B r i t a i n attempted a s e t t l e m e n t drawn up by Lord 
R a d c l i f f e . He proposed t h a t f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , defence, i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y 
should remain w i t h the Governor, whereas i n o t h e r m a t t e r s C y p r i o t s should 
be g r a n t e d maximum self-government i m m e d i a t e l y . I n a c t u a l f a c t the Greek 
C y p r i o t s were o f f e r e d more power than ever b e f o r e , but they r e j e c t e d 
the p r o p o s a l s since no mention was made o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . I n the -
House o f Commons, the C o l o n i a l S e c r e t a r y , Lennox-Boyd, made the f i r s t 
p u b l i c r e f e r e n c e t o p a r t i t i o n , a r g u i n g t h a t the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s would 
choose t o j o i n Turkey i f g i v e n s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Meanwhile the T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t s adopted Taksim ( P a r t i t i o n ) as a co u n t e r - s l o g a n t o Enosis. On 
a v i s i t t o Turkey i n 1*957 Dr Kiicuk, T u r k i s h C y p r i o t l e a d e r , commented 
t h a t Ankara would c l a i m n o r t h e r n Cyprus. 
The murder o f a T u r k i s h C y p r i o t a u x i l i a r y policeman i n 1957 t r i g g e r e d 
o f f a s e r i e s o f s e r i o u s intercommunal c l a s h e s , causing some T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t s t o evacuate homes and v i l l a g e s . I n response t o E.O.K.A. a t t a c k s 
the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s formed t h e i r own defence o r g a n i s a t i o n c a l l e d T.M.T. 
( i . e . Turk Mudafa T e s k i l a t ) , a p a r a m i l i t a r y f o r c e a s s i s t e d by Ankara. 
(40) Apart from p r o v o k i n g intercommunal emnity E.O.K.A. had f o r c e d 
B r i t a i n t o r e t h i n k i t s Cyprus s t r a t e g y . As Robert Stephens put i t :-
" With 28,000 B r i t i s h t r o o p s t i e d down chasing two o r 
t h r e e hundred E.O.K.A. t e r r o r i s t s , Cyprus had become 
a m i l i t a r y l i a b i l i t y . " (4T) 
I n mid-1'958 Archbishop Makarios i n d i c a t e d f o r the f i r s t time t h a t he 
was prepared t o f o r g o Enosis and s e t t l e f o r independence. He was 
concerned t h a t p a r t i t i o n would e i t h e r be imposed by B r i t a i n o r won by 
the Turks i n a c i v i l war should B r i t a i n leave before^ a guaranteed s e t t l e -
ment was reached. At the same time B r i t a i n decided t h a t s o v e r e i g n t y over 
l i t t l e Cyprus was no l o n g e r c r u c i a l t o her s t r a t e g i c r e q u i r e m e n t s . 
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Furthermore, t h e r e was concern over the growing r i f t w i t h i n N.A.T.O. 
between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. A l l these f a c t o r s l e d t o 
t r i p a r t i t e t a l k s between B r i t a i n , Greece and Turkey c u l m i n a t i n g i n 
the Zurich-London Agreements o f February 1959. Although Archbishop 
Makarios and a l a r g e d e l e g a t i o n from Cyprus were present a t these 
t a l k s the p r o v i s i o n s were imposed from o u t s i d e Cyprus by the t h r e e 
i n t e r e s t e d powers. Thus the C y p r i o t l e a d e r s were presented w i t h a 
f a i t a c compli, a s e t t l e m e n t they were o b l i g e d t o accept. U n f o r t u n a t e l y 
f o r C y p r i o t u n i t y n e i t h e r Enosis nor Taksim were dead, b o t h p o l i c i e s 
reemerged a f t e r Independence. 
For a more thorough u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the v a r i o u s l e v e l s o f the Cyprus 
Problem the reader s h o u l d c o n s u l t the b i b l i o g r a p h y at the back. The~ 
preceding s e c t i o n i s o n l y i n t e n d e d as a summary o f some o f the major 
s t r a n d s o f the Problem and not a d e f i n i t i v e account. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONSTITUTIONAL C R I S I S AND THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF 
GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS. 
On 14 March 1971, P r e s i d e n t Makarios s t a t e d i n a p u b l i c b r o a d c a s t :-
"' Cyprus i s a Greek I s l a n d . I t was Greek from the dawn 
of h i s t o r y and i t s h a l l remain Greek f o r e v e r . We have 
t a k e n i t o v e r as a w h o l l y Greek I s l a n d and we s h a l l 
p r e s e r v e i t as an u n d i v i d e d Greek I s l a n d , u n t i l we hand 
i t o v e r to Mother G r e e c e . " ( T ) 
At a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e on 22 F e b r u a r y T972, Rauf Denktas , the T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t l e a d e r , b l u n t l y commented :-
" . . . n o t h i n g s h o r t of g e o g r a p h i c a l s e p a r a t i o n w i l l save 
t h i s community ( T u r k i s h C y p r i o t ) from f u t u r e h a r a s s m e n t . " ( 2 ) 
Both s t a t e m e n t s r e v e a l the o p p o s i t e v i e w s each community adopted ( 3 ) , 
and how l i t t l e both s i d e s had moved towards p o l i t i c a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 
d u r i n g the t u r b u l e n t decade o f the ' S i x t i e s . T h i s C h a p t e r c o n c e n t r a t e s 
on ( i ) the c o l l a p s e o f the Independence C o n s t i t u t i o n , and ( i i ) d i f f e r e n t 
g e o g r a p h i c a l c r i t e r i a i n o r d e r to see j u s t how i n t e r m i x e d Cyprus was 
b e f o r e the de f a c t o s e p a r a t i o n of T u r k i s h from Greek C y p r i o t s , and 
q u e s t i o n s whether o r not t h e r e was any g e o g r a p h i c a l b a s i s f o r a 
" g e o g r a p h i c a l s e p a r a t i o n " of the two communities. 
( i ) The Independence C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
The r e a s o n s f o r the c o l l a p s e o f the f i r s t C y p r i o t R e p u b l i c a r e w e l l 
documented e l s e w h e r e so t h i s i s o n l y a s k e l e t o n o u t l i n e . The Z u r i c h -
London Accords l a i d the b a s i c framework o f the C o n s t i t u t i o n and drew up 
t h r e e i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r e a t i e s :-
( 1 ) The T r e a t y of E s t a b l i s h m e n t , e n a b l i n g B r i t a i n to r e t a i n 
a b s o l u t e s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r two m i l i t a r y b a s e s , A k r o t i r i and 
D h e k e l i a , t o t a l l i n g 99 s q uare m i l e s . 
( 2 ) Under the T r e a t y of Guarantee, B r i t a i n , G r e e c e , o r Turkey 
c o u l d i n t e r v e n e to uphold the independence of Cyprus w i t h the 
p r o v i s o t h a t E n o s i s and Taksim were p r o h i b i t e d , and to r e s t o r e 
the 1960 C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
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( 3 ) The T r e a t y of A l l i a n c e p r o v i d e d t h a t Greece c o u l d s t a t i o n 
I 9 5 0 t r o o p s a n d ' t u r k e y 6 5 0 t r o o p s on C y p r u s . 
Independence was g a i n e d on 16 August 1 ' 960 , but the R e p u b l i c ' s f i r s t 
t h r e e y e a r s s u f f e r e d a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i s i s and v i r t u a l governmental 
p a r a l y s i s . The complex system of c h e c k s and b a l a n c e s w r i t t e n i n t o the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n to p r e s e r v e bicommunalism and s a f e g u a r d T u r k i s h C y p r i o t 
r i g h t s proved to be a major c e n t r i f u g a l f o r c e p o l a r i z i n g the two 
community l e a d e r s h i p s . Greek C y p r i o t s c l a i m e d t h a t the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t 
" m i n o r i t y " was g r a n t e d powers out of a l l p r o p o r t i o n to t h e i r numbers. 
The C o n s t i t u t i o n gave " e t h n i c b a l a n c e " BC h i g h e r p r i o r i t y t h a n " m a j o r i t y 
r u l e " . ( 4 ) The Greek C y p r i o t s argued t h a t the e t h n i c r a t i o s were u n f a i r , 
f o r i n s t a n c e , T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s were e n t i t l e d to t h i r t y p e r cent of a l l 
c i v i l s e r v i c e p o s t s ; f o r t y p e r c e n t o f army p o s t s ; moreover, the~ T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t V i c e - P r e s i d e n t had v eto powers o v e r a l l l e g i s l a t i o n r e l a t i n g to 
f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , d e f e n c e , o r i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y . Bicommunalism was thus 
i n s t u t i o n a l i z e d i n a C o n s t i t u t i o n which d i d n o t h i n g to enhance i n t e r -
communal c o o p e r a t i o n a t t h e p o l i t i c a l l e v e l . Another example were the 
l e g i t i m i z e d s e p a r a t e m u n i c i p a l i t i e s o r g a n i z e d a l o n g bicommunal l i n e s , 
""thereby becoming the o n l y organ of the c o n s t i t u t i o n based on the i d e a 
of t e r r i t o r i a l s e p a r a t i o n " . ( 5 ) P r e s i d e n t Makarios argued t h a t the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n was imposed on the C y p r i o t people w i t h o u t c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h 
them and s h o u l d be s u b j e c t to r e v i s i o n . T h e r e f o r e he wrote to V i c e - P r e s -
i d e n t Kuijuk p r o p o s i n g t h i r t e e n amendments to the C o n s ^ u t i o n . ( 6 ) I f 
implemented the s u g g e s t e d a l t e r a t i o n s would have t r a n s f o r m e d the R e p u b l i c 
i n t o a s t a t e r u l e d by m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e s , which was u n a c c e p t a b l e to 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s who wanted to be t r e a t e d as " c o - f o u n d e r s " of the 
R e p u b l i c r a t h e r than as a m i n o r i t y group. Ankara h a s t i l y r e j e c t e d 
M a k a r i o s ' p r o p o s a l s , s e t t i n g the scene f o r the intercommunal c l a s h e s 
of C h r i s t m a s week 1 9 6 3 and f o r the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t w i t h d r a w a l from 
Government. 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t l e a d e r s have s u s e q u e n t l y drawn a t t e n t i o n to the a c t i v i t i e s 
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o f the M i n i s t e r of the I n t e r i o r , P o l y k a r p o s Y o r g a d i s , who c l a n d e s t i n e l y 
c i r c u l a t e d the A k r i t a s P l a n . T h i s p l a n l a y s down a s e r i e s o f s t e p s 
whereby the Greeks would make a d j u s t m e n t s to the C o n s t i t u t i o n and uBe 
the concept of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n to a c h i e v e E n o s i s . I t a l s o s u g g e s t e d 
t h a t i f T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s r e s i s t e d they were to be subdued by f o r c e . ( 7 ) 
On 2T December intercommunal v i o l e n c e broke o u t . A " s e c r e t army" of ex-
E.O.K.A. men took o v e r from the p o l i t i c i a n s by o r g a n i z i n g a t t a c k s on 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s who were t h e m s e l v e s p r e p a r i n g f o r such an o c c u r r e n c e . 
A c c o r d i n g to P e t e r L o i z o s :-
" . . . t h e most s e r i o u s T u r k i s h C y p r i o t m i s t a k e was to form 
armed groups f o r p r o t e c t i o n i n the event o f intercommunal 
h o s t i l i t i e s . . . T h i s gave f u e l to Greek e x t r e m i s t s ' c l a i m s 
t h a t the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s were going to provoke p a r t i t i o n . 
I t l e d d i r e c t l y to intercommunal v i o l e n c e . . . " ( 8 ) 
I t seems more a c c u r a t e to argue t h a t both communities b u i l t up p a r a -
m i l i t a r y groups i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e adlock, an outbreak 
of v i o l e n c e , and owing to the s u r v i v a l o f t h e i r m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e -
p o l i t i c a l g o a l s . 
( i i ) Was t h e r e any g e o g r a p h i c a l b a s i s f o r bicommunalism and p a r t i t i o n f 
Cyprus has been d e s c r i b e d a s ... 
" an e t h n o g r a p h i c a l f r u i t - c a k e i n which the Greek and T u r k i s h 
c u r r a n t s were mixed up i n e v e r y town and v i l l a g e and o f t e n i n 
e v e r y s t r e e t . " ( 9 ) 
At Independence t h e r e were 11'4 "mixed" v i l l a g e s ( r e f e r to T a b l e 2 . 1 ) , 
a l l urban c e n t r e s had mixed p o p u l a t i o n s , and i n no one r e g i o n d i d the 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s form a m a j o r i t y of the p o p u l a t i o n . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g 
to r e c o r d t h a t t h e r e was a d r a m a t i c d e c l i n e i n the number o f mixed 
v i l l a g e s even p r i o r to December 1'963. M i c h a e l Drury found i n the Paphos 
D i s t r i c t o n l y s e v e n p e r cent ( 25,000 ) of the t o t a l r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n 
i n h a b i t e d v i l l a g e s i n which the e t h n i c r a t i o f e l l below 2 : 1 . 
" I n 1*960, i t was t h u s 'normal' to i n h a b i t a v i l l a g e which 
was e s s e n t i a l l y monoglot and m o n o - r e l i g i o u s . " (TO) 
I n f i v e o f the s i x d i s t r i c t towns the e t h n i c q u a r t e r s were c l e a r l y d e f i n e 
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TABLE 2.1 THE DECLINE OF MIXED COMMUNITIES IN CYPRUS, 1891-1970 
Date Total 
V i l lages 
Greek 
Cypriot 
Turki sh 
Cypriot 
Mixed 
V i l l ages 
Mixed as 
percentage 
of total 
1891 702 342 114 346 49.4% 
1931 694 358 84 252 36.3% 
1960 623 392 117 114 18.3% 
1970 602 444 n o 48 7.9% 
Sources: M.R.G. Report, , 1976, No.30, Cyprus, p.28. 
Pa t r ick , R. 1976, p.12. i see Fig. 2:1 I 
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P . G _ S ! I PROGRESSIVE SEGREGATION OF THE 
CYPRIOT ETHNIC COMMUNITIES, 
1891-1970 
702 
Totals 
694 623 602 
1S91 
Greek-Cypriot 
Turk-Cypriot 
Mixed 
1931 1960 
Census Years 
1970* 
(* based on 
field research) 
PATRICK ' 76 
A centre was considered to be mixed if ten 
or more people of a second ethnic group were 
residents. If the centre's total 
population was less than 100, the minority ethnic 
group had to comprise at least 10% of that total. 
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though b o u n d a r y - l e s s . V i l l a g e s a l s o had h i g h l e v e l s o f e t h n i c 
s e g r e g a t i o n and d u p l i c a t i o n o f f u n c t i o n s . As Drury, T977, ar g u e s 
" the r e a l i t y o f the s i t u a t i o n a t independence was one o f 
i n c r e a s i n g e t h n i c p o l a r i s a t i o n a t a l l l e v e l s of c o n t a c t . " ( 1 T ) 
The G e o g r a p h i c a l D i s t r i b u t i o n o f the Communities. 
P r i o r to Independence the i d e a of p a r t i t i o n was mooted i n P a r l i a m e n t 
and t u r n e d i n t o a g e o p o l i t i c a l g o a l by the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s w i t h the 
b a c k i n g of Ankara, but was p a r t i t i o n g e o g r a p h i c a l l y j u s t i f i a b l e o r 
f e a s i b l e ? 
I n an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d — ' P a r t i t i o n i n g Cyprus : A c l a s s e x e r c i s e i n 
A p p l i e d P o l i t i c a l Geography ', A l e x a n d e r Melamid d i s c u s s e d the boundary 
d e f i n i t i o n s o f the proposed p a r t i t i o n l i n e s s u g g e s t e d by the T u r k i s h 
Cypriot's and B r i t i s h ( R e f e r to Map 2.1. ) . He c o n c l u d e d :-
" Owing to the i s l a n d ' s p o p u l a t i o n d i s t r i b u t i o n " d e f i n i t i o n 
o f the boundary f o l l o w i n g the B r i t i s h s u g g e s t i o n w i l l i n v o l v e 
a p o p u l a t i o n exchange o f about 60,000 Greeks from T u r k i s h 
t e r r i t o r y a g a i n s t about the same number of T u r k s from Greek 
t e r r i t o r y . D e f i n i t i o n o f the boundary a c c o r d i n g to the 
T u r k i s h s u g g e s t i o n w i l l i n v o l v e a p o p u l a t i o n exchange o f 
200,000 Greeks ( h a l f o f the Greek p o p u l a t i o n of Cyprus ) 
from T u r k i s h t e r r i t o r y and a g a i n s t about 40,000 T u r k s ( h a l f 
the T u r k i s h p o p u l a t i o n ) from Greek t e r r i t o r y . " ( T2) 
The l a t t e r f i g u r e s a r e e x t r e m e l y c l o s e to the a c t u a l numbers of d i s p l a c e d 
people i n the " p o p u l a t i o n exchange-" f o l l o w i n g the T u r k i s h i n t e r v e n t i o n 
i n T974. ( R e f e r to C h a p t e r S i x ) I n T965 Dr F a z i l Kucuk p r e s e n t e d a 
memorandum to Senor Galo P l a z a , the U n i t e d N a t i o n s Mediator, on 22 
F e b r u a r y . I t argued f o r a g e o g r a p h i c a l s e p a r a t i o n of the two communities 
and a " v o l u n t a r y exchange" of people under U n i t e d N a t i o n s s u p e r v i s i o n . 
I n i t i a l l y the T u r k s had proposed a d i v i d i n g l i n e from the v i l l a g e o f 
Y a l i a on the n o r t h w e s t e r n c o a s t through the 'Green L i n e ' of N i c o s i a , and 
to Famagusta? i n the e a s t . They c l a i m e d the zone n o r t h of t h i s l i n e , some 
T,084 square m i l e s o r 38 p e r cent of the t o t a l a r e a of the R e p u b l i c . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s were p r e p a r e d to reduce the a r e a 
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o r i g i n a l l y c l a i m e d to about 750 square m i l e s o r about 20 p e r c e n t of the 
R e p u b l i c . ( 1 ' 3 ) The t r a n s f e r o f the Greek C y p r i o t p o p u l a t i o n from the 
T u r k i s h zone would, i t was e s t i m a t e d t a k e a decade. I n p r a c t i c e , when 
the p o l i c y of p a r t i t i o n was b r u t a l l y e n f o r c e d by T u r k i s h m i l i t a r y a c t i o n 
i n August 1 9 7 4 , Greek C y p r i o t r e f u g e e s moved en masse, and a l l but a 
m i n o r i t y remained i n the North by December 1 9 7 5 . ( s e e C h a p t e r S i x ) 
Taksim had developed i n t o the p o l i t i c a l g o a l of the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s 
f o r s e v e r a l r e a s o n s :-
i ) P h y s i c a l s a f e t y a g a i n s t Greek C y p r i o t t e r r o r i s t s ; 
i i ) Mainland Turkey s t r o n g l y opposed E n o s i s , i n s i s t i n g t h a t "any s e t t l e -
ment f i r s t l y must m a i n t a i n an e q u i l i b r i u m of t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e r e s t s i n 
the e a s t e r n M e d i t e r r a n e a n . " ( T 4 ) 
i i i ) I t c o u l d a l s o be argued t h a t p o l i t i c a l l y the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t l e a d e r s 
had much to g a i n from p a r t i t i o n , which would e f f e c t i v e l y g i v e them charge 
of a m i n i - s t a t e ^ . 
P o l i t i c a l m o t i v es r a t h e r t h a n g e o g r a p h i c a l s e n s e l i e behind most p h y s i c a l 
d i v i s i o n s of two p e o p l e s s h a r i n g a common t e r r i t o r y . Indeed an a n a l y s i s 
( l «ap# i a -is) 
o f T a b l e s 2 . 1 to 2 . 6 w i l l show t h a t on the b a s i s of p o p u l a t i o n s i z e and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n ; l a n d ownership; and s e t t l e m e n t p a t t e r n s t h e r e was not even 
a b a s i s f o r the f o r m a t i o n of a r t i f i c i a l c a n t o n s l e t a l o n e two de f a c t o 
mono-ethnic zones. (T5) A c c o r d i n g to D i s t r i c t d i s t r i b u t i o n s of Greek 
and T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s , Paphos D i s t r i c t 1 had the l a r g e s t p e r c e n t a g e o f 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s . M i c h a e l Dmiry, T977, r e v e a l s t h a t 3 T . 4 % of t h e 
p o p u l a t i o n of Paphos town ( Ktima ) , and 2 3 . 1 % o f the p o p u l a t i o n o f the 
r e m a i n i n g d i s t r i c t were c l a s s i f i e d a s T u r k i s h C y p r i o t , t h e s e b e i ng the 
h i g h e s t urban and r u r a l p e r c e n t a g e s f o r any p a r t of the i s l a n d w i t h the 
e x c e p t i o n o f N i c o s i a o l d town. 
D u r i n g the f i r s t t h r e e y e a r s of the Independent R e p u b l i c a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
38 % of the i s l a n d ' s s e t t l e m e n t s were e i t h e r T u r k i s h o r mixed. These were 
d i s p e r s e d throughout the c o u n t r y s i d e , and i n no d i s t r i c t d i d the T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t s e t t l e m e n t s form a m a j o r i t y . Only i n s m a l l p a r t s o f each d i s t r i c t 
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TABLE 2.2 THE GROWTH OF GREEK ORTHODOX AND MUSLIM COMMUNITIES 
Census of Greek Orthodox Musiim 
1891 158,585 47,926 
1901 182,739 51,309 
1921 244,887 61,339 
1931 276,572 64,238 
1946 361,199 80,548 
1960 442,363 104,333 
*1973 482,000 (approximate) 
1976 480-488,000 (approx.) 
1978 - 145,000 
Source: St .John-Jones, 1983, The Population of Cyprus, Ins t i tu te of 
Commonwealth Studies , 23, p.19. 
*Notes: (1) 
(2) 
The Census data from 1891-1960, gave "above-average 
qual i ty data", whereas the f igures for 1973 and 1976 
are l e s s r e l i a b l e , few questions were asked in the 
enumerations. As for the 1978 population estimate of 
the Turkish Cypriot community, St.John-Johns questions 
i t s accuracy. He argues that "the tota l of 145,000 was 
not only per fect ly feas ib le on demographic grounds but 
could have been much higher i f some immigration i s 
assumed". 
On the foundation of the Independent Republic of Cyprus 
in 1960 the categories of population change from "Greek 
Orthodox" and Muslim to "Greek Cypriot" and "Turkish 
Cypr iot" , thus the Greek Cypriot category may be in f la ted 
due to the inc lus ion of Maronites and other groups under 
the terms of Community de f in i t ion writ ten into the 
Const i tut ion. 
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TABLE 2.3 DISTRIBUTION OF GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS BY DISTRICT IN 1973 
D i s t r i c t Total 
Population 
Greeks % Turks % 
Nicosia 230,278 184,441 80.09 45,837 19.91 
Kyrenia 33,400 28,828 86.31 4,572 13.69 
Famagusta 127,135 106,112 83.46 21,023 16.54 
Larnaca 61,821 48,568 78.56 13,253 21.44 
Limassol 118,600 103,725 87.46 14,875 12.54 
Paphos 63,420 48,020 75.72 15,400 24.28 
TOTAL 634,654 519,694 81.9 114,960 18.1 
Source : K a r o ^ i s , G. 1976, p.16. 
N.B. He used the resu l ts of the Census of Population and Agr icu l ture , 
1960, together with those of the Demographic Report for the 
year 1970, Government Printing Of f i ce , Nicosia . 
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TABLE 2.4 DISTRIBUTION OF GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOT LAND OWNERSHIPS 
Population 
Groups 
Area 
( in donums) 
% 
Greeks 4,123,711 59.6 
Turks 852,455 12.3 
Armenians, Maronites 
and others 
91,406 1.4 
State owned 1,847,820 26.7 
TOTAL 
i 
1 
6,915,392 i 100.0 
Source: Lands and Surveys Department, 'Whose i s What? The true 
fac ts of land ownership 1 in Cyprus, Cyprus To-day,Vol .X I I ,No.6 . 
N.B. Excluding state land ownership, the percentages read as fo l lows: -
Greeks 81.37% 
Turks 16.82% 
Armenians, Maronites and 
others 1.81% 
Total 100.00 
CO 
& 
i I 
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TABLE 2.5 GREEK AND TURKISH HOLDINGS, 1960 
Population Group Area ( in donums) % 
Greeks 2,502,441 78.3 
Turks 652,486 20.4 
Others 42,821 1.3 
TOTAL 3,197,748 100.0 
Source: Census of Population and Agr icul ture , 1960. 
Taken from : Karouzis, G. 1973, p. 109. 
TABLE 2.6 DISTRIBUTION OF HOLDINGS BY DISTRICT, 1960 
D i s t r i c t Total Greek 1 Turk 
i 
Other 
Nicosia 20,107 
i 
17,302 
j 
2,727 78 
Kyrenia 4,988 3,966 657 
i 
365 
Famagusta 14,533 12,242 
i 
1 2,286 5 
Larnaca 6,570 5,057 1,509 4 
Limassol 12,874 11,627 1,239 8 
Paphos 11,054 8,712 2,338 2 
TOTAL 70,124 58,906 10,756 462 
Source: As Above. 
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were t h e r e any c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of T u r k i s h C y p r i o t and mixed c e n t r e s , 
s u ch as i n the s o u t h e r n f o o t h i l l s of the P e n t a d a k t y l o s range, w i t h 
the T u r k i s h s e t t l e m e n t s of A y i o s Andronikos, A y i o s I a c o v o s , A r t e m i s , 
K a l i v a k i a , P l a t i n i , P h o t t a , A y i o s Ermolaos s p r e a d a c r o s s t h i s a r e a . 
Such c o n c e n t r a t i o n s formed the- b a s i s of n o r t h e r n T u r k i s h C y p r i o t 
e n c l a v e s , f o r example i n the a r e a s o u t h of S t . H i l a r i o n C a s t l e . 
( r e f e r to Map3'-1) 
Mixed p o p u l a t i o n c e n t r e s were" d e c l i n i n g b e f o r e December 1963, 
f a l l i n g from 36 % to T8 % o f the t o t a l number of s e t t l e m e n t s from 
1931 to 1960. T h i s d e c l i n e i s e x p l a i n e d by a c ombination of f a c t o r s :-
i ) During the c o l o n i a l p e r i o d t h e r e was a r e d u c t i o n i n the number of 
m a r g i n a l v i l l a g e s i n a B r i t i s h attempt to s e p a r a t e l anduse i n c e r t a i n 
a r e a s . ( T 6 ) 
i i ) E a r t h movement's, dam c o n s t r u c t i o n , w a t e r su p p l y problems have a l s o 
c a u s e d abandonment o r r e s e t t l e m e n t of some v i l l a g e s . 
i i i ) R u r a l - u r b a n m i g r a t i o n i n c r e a s e d a f t e r World War I I as a r e s u l t o f 
s o cio-economic changes and u r b a n i s a t i o n . ( T 7 ) 
I V ) E.O.K.A. v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s and revenge k i l l i n g s 
p ersuaded many T u r k s to e v a c u a t e v i l l a g e s i n 1957-58. They w h o l l y o r 
p a r t l y e v a c u a t e d 27 v i l l a g e s . These r e f u g e e s r e t u r n e d to a l l but s i x 
of the abandoned v i l l a g e s once intercommunal r e l a t i o n s had calmed down, 
on l y to r e - e v a c u a t e them i n the 1 9 6 3 - ' 6 4 c r i s i s . As P i e r r e O b e r l i n g 
w r i t e s : - " The exodus of T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s from mixed and i s o l a t e d 
v i l l a g e s which began a t t h a t time was u l t i m a t e l y to l e a d 
to the p h y s i c a l s e p a r a t i o n of the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t 
community from the Greek C y p r i o t community." (T8) 
O f t e n v i l l a g e r s e v a c u a t e d c e r t a i n s e t t l e m e n t s because they " f e l t " 
i s o l a t e d and v u l n e r a b l e to a t t a c k . These " f e e l i n g s " r e a c h e d new h e i g h t s 
i n the intercommunal v i o l e n c e o f 1 9 6 3 - ' 6 4 , and i n many c a s e s were 
j u s t i f i e d . I t was d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d t h a t intercommunal t e n s i o n s 
emerged as "the dominant i n f l u e n c e i n a f f e c t i n g the p a t t e r n o f s e t t l e -
ment." ( 1 9 ) C h a p t e r Three w i l l h i g h l i g h t some of the major changes i n 
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the p o l i t i c a l geography of Cyprus r e s u l t i n g from such p o p u l a t i o n move-
ments, which a c c o r d i n g to R u s s e l l King "formed the g e o g r a p h i c a l s t e p p i n g 
s t one to the nevr s t a t e " , i . e . the T u r k i s h - c o n t r o l l e d m i c r o - s t a t e i n 
n o r t h e r n C yprus. ( 2 0 ) 
I n George K a r o u z i s ' d e t a i l e d s t u d y of v a r i o u s g e o g r a p h i c a l c r i t e r i a 
i n an attempt to f i n d a r a t i o n a l s o l u t i o n to the Cyprus Problem based 
on knowledge of p o p u l a t i o n d i s t r i b u t i o n , s e t t l e m e n t p a t t e r n s , and l a n d 
ownership, he d i s c o v e r e d t h a t the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t p o p u l a t i o n l i v i n g i n 
TT7 p u r e l y T u r k i s h v i l l a g e s i n T960 was c o n c e n t r a t e d i n 54 a r e a s . ( 2 1 ) 
Out o f t h e s e 54 a r e a s , 3 3 were i n groupings of j u s t one v i l l a g e , 1 7 i n 
groupings of two to f i v e v i l l a g e s , and j u s t f o u r o t h e r s i n groups o f 
o v e r f i v e v i l l a g e s . He then added mixed v i l l a g e s of both Greek and 
T u r k i s h m a j o r i t i e s i n o r d e r to d i s c o v e r the e x i s t e n c e o f " T u r k i s h 
R e g i o n s " w i t h b o u n d a r i e s c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b o r d e r s o f 
v i l l a g e groups. He f i n a l l y d e c i d e d on seven s t r a n g e l y shaped r e g i o n s 
( see Map I t w i l l be u s e f u l to c o n s i d e r t h i s map when examining 
what a c t u a l l y has happened to the map of Cyprus o v e r the l a s t two 
decades, and to compare i t w i t h the maps showing T u r k i s h C y p r i o t e n c l a v e s . 
G i v e n the d i s p e r s e d n a t u r e o f many of the T u r k i s h s e t t l e m e n t s and s m a l l 
s i z e o f most of the v i l l a g e groupings, the f o r m a t i o n o f " p o c k e t s " o f 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t c o n t r o l c o m p l e t e l y t r a n s f o r m e d the l a n d s c a p e o f the 
i s l a n d i n p o l i t i c a l and human terms. 
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F o o t n o t e s and R e f e r e n c e s . 
(1 ) R e f e r to b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l r e f e r e n c e s and to C h a p t e r F i v e f o r more 
d e t a i l s on M a k a r i o s ' ambiguous s t a n d on E n o s i s . 
( 2 ) Quoted i n A t t a l i d e s . M . 1 9 7 9 , Cyprus. ( Q P r e s s L t d . , E d i n b u r g h ),p.156 
( 3 ) Although i t s h o u l d be noted t h a t Archbishop Makarios made s e v e r a l 
ambiguous and c o n t r a d i c t o r y s t a t e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g E n o s i s . 
p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r 1967 when a m i l i t a r y J u n t a was i n power i n Athens 
and he was under p r e s s u r e from e x t r e m i s t s w i t h i n h i s own community. 
(4 ) M i n o r i t y R i g h t s Group Report, No.30, 1984, Cyprus, p . 8 . 
( 5 ) i b i d . 
( 6 ) M a k a r i o s ' proposed amendments to the C o n s t i t u t i o n i n c l u d e d the 
removal of P r e s i d e n t i a l and V i c e - P r e s i d e n t i a l veto powers; the 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of u n i f i e d m u n i c i p a l c o u n c i l s ; the r e v i s i o n o f the 
communal r a t i o s i n the c i v i l s e r v i c e and s e c u r i t y f o r c e s to c o i n c i d e 
w i t h the a c t u a l p o p u l a t i o n r a t i o of f o u r Greeks to e v e r y one T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t . 
( 7 ) O b e r l i n g . P . 1 9 8 2 , The Road to B e l l a p a i s . ( Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ) 
p.81. 
a n < i M i n o r i t y R i g h t s Group Report, 1984, Cyprus. p.9. 
(8 ) M i n o r i t y R i g h t s Group Report, No.30, 1976 e d i t i o n , C y p r u s , r e f e r to 
P e t e r L o i z o s , P a r t 2 . 
( 9 ) F o l i e , C . 1 9 6 4 , Legacy of S t r i f e . Cyprus from r e b e l l i o n to c i v i l war. 
( Penguin Books ) . 
( 1 0 ) Drury.M.P. J a n u a r y 1 9 7 7 , 'Western Cyprus: Two decades o f p o p u l a t i o n 
u p h e a v a l , 1956 - ' 7 6 ' , a paper p r e s e n t e d a t the 
I n s t i t u t e o f B r i t i s h Geographers Annual C o n f e r e n c e . 
(11) i b i d . 
( 1 2 ) Melamid.A. i n The J o u r n a l o f Geography. 1 9 6 0 , V o l . 5 9 , p. 1 2 2 . 
( 1 3 ) U.N.Mediator's Report to the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l , 26 March 1 9 6 4 , p a r a . 
1 0 9 . 
(14) i b i d . . p a r a . 1 1 0 . 
( 1 5 ) K a r o u z i s , G . 1 9 7 6 , P r o p o s a l s f o r a s o l u t i o n to the Cyprus Problem. 
( Cosmos P r e s s , N i c o s i a ) , p.94. 
(16) Some examples a r e g i v e n from Western Cyprus by M i c h a e l Drury, 1 9 7 7 , 
op. c i t . 
(1 7 ) P a t r i c k , R . A . 1 9 7 6 , P o l i t i c a l Geography and the Cyprus C o n f l i c t . 
( U n i v e r s i t y o f Waterloo P r e s s , Canada ) , p.8. 
(18 ) O b e r l i n g , op. c i t . . p.6T. 
(1 9 ) Drury, T977, OP. c i t . . 
( 2 0 ) King.R. August 1980, 'Cyprus s i n c e T974: Economic and Demographic 
Change', a p a p e r p r e s e n t e d to the Geography S e c t i o n , 
F i f t h M e d i t e r r a e a n C o n f e r e n c e , B a r - I l a n U n i v e r s i t y , 
I T e l A v i v , 5 - 7 August 1980. ( 2 1 ) K a r o u z i s . G . 1 9 7 6 , op. c i t . . pp.110 - 1 3 9 . 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SPATIAL ASPECTS OF INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICT AND FORMATION OF 
TURKISH CYPRIOT ENCLAVES IN CYPRUS. 
I n a r e p o r t s u b m i t t e d to the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l on 26 March T965, 
S e n i o r Galo P l a z a , U.N. Mediator i n Cyprus, s t a t e d :-
,r A l l through t h i s p e r i o d ( D e c . ' 6 3 to March ' 6 5 ) t h e r e 
were two k i n d s of "green l i n e " on C y p r u s , and few people 
d a r e d to c r o s s e i t h e r k i n d . There were f i r s t l y the 
p h y s i c a l b a r r i e r s , c o n s t r u c t e d out of r o a d - b l o c k s , s t r o n g -
p o i n t s , f o r t i f i e d houses, sandbagged w a l l s and t r e n c h e s . . . 
The second k i n d of "green l i n e " was the p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
k i n d . . . " ( T ) 
With the f o r m a t i o n of T u r k i s h Cypriote e n c l a v e s the two 
communities m a i n t a i n e d " a p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s t a n c e between 
each o t h e r as members of d i f f e r e n t groups. Such d i s t a n c i n g 
can be c o n c e p t u a l i z e d as the r a i s i n g o f an i n v i s i b l e w a l l . 
Wherever a c t u a l dangers a r o s e on Cyprus from the p r o x i m i t y 
o f Greeks and T u r k s , c o n c r e t e w a l l s were b u i l t . I n v e s t e d 
w i t h emotion as t h e s e were, they a l s o r e p r e s e n t e d p s ycho-
l o g i c a l w a l l s i m p o s s i b l e to break down."' ( 2 ) 
The above q u o t a t i o n s r e f e r to the meeting of " I n v i s i b l e " and " V i s i b l e " 
w a l l s s e p a r a t i n g the two communities as a r e s u l t o f de f a c t o changes i n 
the p o l i t i c a l geography of Cyprus, December 1963 to August 1 9 6 4 . 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the decade 1964 to ' 7 4 "saw a c o n t i n u i n g p r o c e s s of 
c l e a v a g e between the two communities." ( 3 ) 
S e c t i o n One: The Outbreak of Intercommunal V i o l e n c e . 
Once the C o n s t i t u t i o n had c o l l a p s e d the i n i t i a t i v e f e l l i n t o the hands 
of community p a r a m i l i t a r i e s and t e r r o r i s t s . Many former E.O.K.A. members 
had n e v e r handed o v e r t h e i r weapons to the Cyprus P o l i c e , which e n a b l e d 
s e v e r a l d i s s i d e n t armed gangs to e x i s t independent of c e n t r a l government 
d i r e c t i o n . S i m u l t a n e o u s l y , T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s had made some p r e p a r a t i o n s 
under the guidance o f T .M.T. to s e a l o f f T u r k i s h C y p r i o t q u a r t e r s and 
f o r t i f y t h e i r v i l l a g e s r i n the event of Greek C y p r i o t a s s a u l t s . 
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The l a s t o c c a s i o n when T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s c o u l d walk the s t r e e t s of the 
Greek s e c t o r of N i c o s i a w i t h o u t harassment o r f e a r of harassment was on 
2T December 1 9 6 3 . At 2 - 1 5 a.m. on t h a t day a group o f T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s 
were stopped i n Hermes S t r e e t , the boundary of the o l d G r e e k / T u r k i s h 
q u a r t e r s of c e n t r a l N i c o s i a , by a p a t r o l of Greek C y p r i o t p o l i c e w i s h i n g 
to see t h e i r i d e n t i t y c a r d s . An angry crowd g a t h e r e d , f i r i n g broke out, 
and a T u r k i s h C y p r i o t couple were shot dead. News of t h i s i n c i d e n t 
s p a r k e d o f f i n d i s c r i m i n a t e f i g h t i n g i n o t h e r p a r t s of the c a p i t a l . 
Appeals f o r an immediate c e a s e - f i r e were i g n o r e d by Greek C y p r i o t s who 
a t t a c k e d T u r k i s h a r e a s of the mixed n o r t h e r n suburbs of Omorphita and 
Trakhonas. Many were k i l l e d , wounded o r t a k e n h o s t a g e . A f t e r t h r e e 
T u r k i s h j e t s buzzed o v e r N i c o s i a i n what the T u r k i s h Prime M i n i s t e r 
d e s c r i b e d as "warning f l i g h t s " and s e v e r a l a p p e a l s by the t h r e e G u a r a n t o r 
Powers f o r an end to f i g h t i n g , P r e s i d e n t Makarios a c c e p t e d a c e a s e - f i r e 
on C h r i s t m a s Day. The Government, by now c o m p r i s i n g o n l y Greek C y p r i o t 
l e a d e r s a f t e r a T u r k i s h C y p r i o t w i t h d r a w a l from a l l governmental and 
c i v i l s e r v i c e p o s i t i o n s , agreed to a t r i p a r t i t e p e a c e - k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n . 
T h i s was.to be c a r r i e d out by the n a t i o n a l c o n t i n g e n t s of G r e e c e , Turkey, 
and B r i t a i n , under the command of M a j o r - G e n e r a l P e t e r Young, who was i n 
charge of the B r i t i s h Army U n i t s i n C yprus. I n no time, t o t a l c e a s e - f i r e 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f e l l i n t o B r i t i s h hands, f o r the o t h e r c o n t i n g e n t s had 
taken s i d e s w i t h t h e i r C y p r i o t c o m p a t r i o t s . The Greeks e v e n t u a l l y moved 
back to t h e i r permanent camp, whereas the T u r k i s h N a t i o n a l C o n t i n g e n t 
remained encamped around Kermia, O r t a Keuy, and G e u n y e l i a l o n g the 
s t r a t e g i c N i c o s i a - K y r e n i a r o a d . ( r e f e r to map3-2) 
While the B r i t i s h mounted t h e i r p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n which was to 
l a y the f o u n d a t i o n s f o r U.N.P.I.CYP., intercommunal f i g h t i n g c o n t i n u e d . 
F o l l o w i n g the C h r i s t m a s week t r o u b l e s i n N i c o s i a , v i o l e n c e s p r e a d to o t h e r 
a r e a s of the i s l a n d . Prom December 1963 to end-August 1964, 72 mixed 
v i l l a g e s were e v a c u a t e d by T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s , and 24 w h o l l y T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t v i l l a g e s were abandoned. U n i t e d N a t i o n s f i g u r e s e s t i m a t e d about 
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25,000 r e f u g e e s , of whom about 21,000 were g i v e n homes i n l a r g e r 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t communities, w h i l e the r e m a i n d e r found temporary 
s h e l t e r i n r e f u g e e camps. ( 4 ) O t h e r s have argued t h a t between 25,000-
30,000 T u r k s became r e f u g e e s . ( 5 ) A c c o r d i n g to R i c h a r d P a t r i c k , 
p r o b a b l y l e s s t han 200 Greek C y p r i o t e from s i x mixed v i l l a g e s became 
r e f u g e e s because of f i g h t i n g o r intercommunal t e n s i o n a f t e r December ' 6 3 . 
( 6 ) 
By mid-1964 a de f a c t o patchwork p a r t i t i o n had t r a n s f o r m e d the 
p o l i t i c a l geography of Cyprus from a u n i t a r y R e p u b l i c i n t o a R e p u b l i c 
" r i d d l e d w i t h h o l e s " . ( 7 ) S u p e r f i c i a l l y i t had a s i n g l e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 
but i n f a c t i t was p o l i t i c a l l y d i v i d e d between the Greek C y p r i o t c e n t r a l 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the "breakaway" T u r k i s h C y p r i o t l e a d e r s h i p , who 
c o n t r o l l e d about 1.6 % of the i s l a n d ' s t e r r i t o r y . ( 8 ) Based on f i e l d -
r e s e a r c h i n T970-'71, R i c h a r d P a t r i c k r e v e a l e d t h a t 57 f o r m e r l y "mixed" 
v i l l a g e s were then p u r e l y Greek, 19 T u r k i s h C y p r i o t v i l l a g e s remained 
c o m p l e t e l y d e s e r t e d , and some a r e a s of each d i s t r i c t town were e i t h e r 
p a r t i a l l y o r w h o l l y e v a c u a t e d . ( 9 ) F u r t h e r m o r e , a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1T5 
v i l l a g e s and q u a r t e r s i n h a b i t e d by T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s were under the 
P r o v i s i o n a l T u r k i s h C y p r i o t A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ( so named i n December 1967). 
I n c o n t r a s t o n l y 42 v i l l a g e s and q u a r t e r s w i t h T u r k i s h r e s i d e n t s were 
c o n t r o l l e d by the Cyprus Government, a c c o u n t i n g f o r only ten p e r cent 
of the e n t i r e T u r k i s h C y p r i o t p o p u l a t i o n . Even t h e s e v i l l a g e s were 
o n l y p a r t i a l l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the Government's a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e , 
and except f o r t a x payment were l e f t to t h e i r own d e v i c e s . 
U.N.F.I.CYP. was thrown i n t o t h i s p e c u l i a r and c o n f u s i n g p o l i t i c a l 
geography to r e s t o r e peace and t r a n q u i l i t y to the i s l a n d . I n o r d e r to 
a p p r e c i a t e the e x t e n t of the problems f a c i n g U.N.F . I.CYP., i t . i s c r u c i a l 
to have a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the s p a t i a l dynamics of C y p r i o t i n t e r -
communal c o n f l i c t and t e r r i t o r i a l c o n t r o l i n the p e r i o d December '63 to 
August ' 6 4 . I n r e a l i t y D.N.F . I .CYP. a r r i v e d as the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s 
were e f f e c t i v e l y c r e a t i n g the b a s i s f o r a r u d i m e n t a r y , fragmented " s t a t e 
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w i t h i n a s t a t e " . (10) One of the p r i m a r y o b s t a c l e s f a c i n g the U n i t e d 
N a t i o n s F o r c e was t h a t T u r k i s h C y p r i o t l e a d e r s and T u r k i s h m i l i t a r y 
commanders c o u l d not a l l o w t h e i r people to conform a b s o l u t e l y to the 
U n i t e d N a t i o n s * c o n c e p t i o n of n o r m a l i t y i n the i s l a n d , because t h a t 
c o n c e p t i o n i n c l u d e d a r e c o g n i t i o n of the e x i s t i n g ( Greek ) C y p r i o t 
Government as the l e g i t i m a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f o r the whole i s l a n d . (1T) 
The map of Cyprus was even more c o m p l i c a t e d than i n d i c a t e d by Map 3 . 3 . , 
f o r i t was not always c l e a r who had e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l where. There- were 
numerous " c o n t e s t e d a r e a s " t h a t c o u l d not d e f i n i t e l y be a l l o t t e d to 
e i t h e r the Cyprus Government or T u r k i s h C y p r i o t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . ( 1 2 ) 
Many p o t e n t i a l t r o u b l e s p o t s were l o c a t e d a t e t h n i c i n t e r f a c e s where 
t h e r e were no p r e c i s e d e m a r c a t i o n s i n d i c a t i n g g e o p o l i t i c a l b o u n d a r i e s . 
Thus U.N.F.I.CYP. commanders had to be c o n s t a n t l y aware of s u c h 
" s e n s i t i v e a r e a s " of ambiguous t e r r i t o r i a l and p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s , a s -
we-ll as of v a r i o u s l o c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o r agreements r e g a r d i n g freedom 
o f movement through o r Greek C y p r i o t a c t i v i t y around T u r k i s h C y p r i o t -
c o n t r o l l e d a r e a s . These p a r o c h i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s / a g r e e m e n t s were between 
l o c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of both communities, o f t e n under U n i t e d N a t i o n s 
a u s p i c e s , producing compromises where c o n f l i c t s may have a r i s e n . ( T 3 ) 
A t y p i c a l c a s e would be an "agreement" c o n c e r n i n g Greek C y p r i o t r i g h t s 
to use c e r t a i n roads p a s s i n g through T u r k i s h C y p r i o t - c o n t r o l l e d l a n d , 
o r t h e i r r i g h t s to farm l a n d i m m e d i a t e l y a d j a c e n t to a- T u r k i s h C y p r i o t 
s e t t l e m e n t . 
I n some a r e a s the l i m i t s of c o n t r o l e x e r c i s e d by e i t h e r community 
were marked by two c o n c e n t r i c r i n g s of f o r t i f i e d p o s t s s e p a r a t e d by a 
" c o n t e s t e d zone" p a t r o l l e d by U.N.F.I.CYP. p e r s o n n e l . I n o t h e r ^ a r e a s 
" c o n f r o n t a t i o n l i n e s " e x i s t e d between N a t i o n a l Guard p o s i t i o n s and 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t F i g h t e r s , the most obvious being the "Green L i n e " i n 
Nicosia?. A l l t h e s e a r e a s o f p o t e n t i a l o r a c t u a l c o n f l i c t were c l o s e l y 
o b s e r v e d by members o f U.N.F.I.CYP. Both the Cyprus Government and 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t 1 L e a d e r s h i p wished to extend t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l c o n t r o l 
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o r to t e s t each o t h e r s c o n t r o l of c e r t a i n " s t r a t e g i c a r e a s " by 
" c r e a t i n g i n c i d e n t s " d e l i b e r a t e l y a g g r a v a t i n g intercommunal t e n s i o n s . 
( 1 4 ) By h e l p i n g to reduce t e n s i o n o r to p r e v e n t i n c i d e n t s from 
o c c u r r i n g U.N.F.I.CYP. m a i n t a i n e d a s p a t i a l s t a t u s quo. T h i s i s why 
i t i s so i m p o r t a n t to u n d e r s t a n d the e v o l u t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l map 
o f Cyprus and l o c a t i o n a l a s p e c t s of intercommunal c o n f l i c t a t the 
time when U.N.P.I.CYP. took o v e r from a b e l e a g u e r e d B r i t i s h p e a c e -
k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n . The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s w i l l t h e r e f o r e examine the 
f o r m a t i o n and shapes of the e n c l a v e s under T u r k i s h C y p r i o t - c o n t r o l . . 
S e c t i o n Two: " C o n f r o n t a t i o n L i n e s " and E n c l a v e s . 
i ) The "Green L i n e " 
During the E.O.K.A. campaigns of the l a t e 1950s the G r e e k / T u r k i s h 
q u a r t e r s o f the c a p i t a l were d i v i d e d by a w i r e f e n c e e s t a b l i s h e d to keep 
both communities a p a r t i n o r d e r to p r e v e n t intercommunal bloodshed. T h i s 
l i n e r o u g h l y f o l l o w e d the c o u r s e of Paphos and Hermes s t r e e t s ( r e f e r to 
Map 3.T.) During the f i r s t t h r e e r e l a t i v e l y calm y e a r s of independence 
t h e r e was no r e a l n e c e s s i t y f o r ' a p h y s i c a l s e p a r a t i o n of the communities, 
but p e a c e f u l , mixed c o e x i s t e n c e ended w i t h the f i r s t g u n f i r e on 21 
December ' 6 3 . On the night" of 28-29 December a g r e e n p e n c i l l i n e was 
drawn a c r o s s a map of N i c o s i a by G e n e r a l Young under the a u s p i c e s of 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of both communities. (1'5) The "Green L i n e " was n e v e r 
i n t e n d e d to be a n y t h i n g o t h e r than a temporary cordon s a n i t a i r e between 
the a n t a g o n i s t s , p a t r o l l e d by " n e u t r a l " t r o o p s to ensure t h a t the c e a s e -
f i r e 1 was m a i n t a i n e d and the t a c t i c a l p o s i t i o n s o f opposing f i g h t e r groups 
remained s t a t i o n a r y . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the Green L i n e became a symbol o f 
e t h n i c s e g r e g a t i o n and a d i v i s i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l g e o p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f -
i c a n c e . As M i c h a e l H a r b o t t l e p o i n t s out :-
" L i t t l e d i d anyone a t t h a t t a b l e t h a t n i g h t , l e a s t o f a l l 
G e n e r a l Young, think' t h a t the g r e e n r i b b o n of c h i n a g r a p h 
would become a d i v i d i n g l i n e between T u r k - and Greek 
C y p r i o t f o r f o u r y e a r s , an u n r e m i t t i n g o b s t a c l e to p r o g r e s s 
towards n o r m a l i z a t i o n between the two communities." ( 1 6 ) 
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M A P _ 3 : 1 
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s o u r c e : B e n n e t t . J . A . . 1 9 7 7 . M.A. D i s s e r t a t i o n 
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The d i v i d i n g l i n e i n N i c o s i a became a means to p o l i t i c a l ends, and l i k e 
many o t h e r l i n e s of d e m a r c a t i o n and f o r t i f i e d e t h n i c i n t e r f a c e s , i t 
r e p r e s e n t e d a p h y s i c a l b a r r i e r b l o c k i n g the way to a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e -
ment based on u n i t y and c o o p e r a t i o n r a t h e r ' than e t h n i c s e g r e g a t i o n . The 
b i f u r c a t i o n of the c a p i t a l , moreover, c r e a t e d numerous i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l 
and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e problems, i n c l u d i n g the d i v i s i o n o f communications, 
w a t e r and e l e c t r i c a l s u p p l i e s , a l l of which w i l l be d e a l t w i t h i n C h a p t e r 
F i v e . 
i i ) G e u n y e l i - A g h i r d a E n c l a v e . 
During the C h r i s t m a s ' 6 3 f i g h t i n g many T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s f l e d to the s a f e t y 
of the d e v e l o p i n g s t r o n g h o l d e x t e n d i n g from the T u r k i s h " o l d q u a r t e r " of 
N i c o s i a northwards v i a the K y r e n i a Road p r o t e c t e d by the T u r k i s h N a t i o n a l 
C o n t i n g e n t , The f i r s t wave of r e f u g e e s a c c o u n t e d f o r an e s t i m a t e d 8,000 
people o r s i x t e e n p e r cent of a l l v i l l a g e s e v a c u a t e d d u r i n g 1 9 6 3 - ' 6 4 . 
P r o b a b l y 7,000 r e f u g e e s were from N i c o s i a and i t s immediate e n v i r o n s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the suburbs of Omorphita ( 5 , 1 2 6 r e f u g e e s ) , Trakhonas 
( 9T2 ) , S t r o v o l o s and E y l e n j a ( 316 ) . ( 1 7 ) I t s h o u l d be s t r e s s e d t h a t 
t h e r e were a l s o some Greek C y p r i o t r e f u g e e s from t h e s e mixed s u b u r b s . 
Many o t h e r r e f u g e e s who e n t e r e d the N i c o s i a E n c l a v e and the a r e a under 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t de f a c t o c o n t r o l e x t e n d i n g n orthwards through G e u n y e l i , 
K r i n i , and Aghirda, came from mixed r u r a l v i l l a g e s i n l a t e r p o p u l a t i o n 
movements when v i o l e n c e s p r e a d i n t o the c o u n t r y s i d e . T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s 
abandoned twelve v i l l a g e s n e i g h b o u r i n g the G e u n y e l i - A g h i r d a E n c l a v e , 
such as A k a k i , Aredhiou, A r g a k i , Dhenia, and S k y l l o u r a , a l l abandoned 
v i l l a g e s f o r m e r l y w i t h mixed e t h n i c p o p u l a t i o n s . Thus an i n f l u x o f 
r e f u g e e s from s c a t t e r e d r u r a l s e t t l e m e n t s h e l p e d the T u r k i s h L e a d e r s h i p 
to c o n s o l i d a t e t e r r i t o r i a l c o n t r o l from the c a p i t a l to a points o v e r -
l o o k i n g the K y r e n i a c o a s t l i n e . ( r e f e r to Map 3 . 2 ) 
The K y r e n i a P a s s and S t . H i l a r i o n C a s t l e . 
The - n o r t h e r n s e c t i o n of t h i s i m p o r t a n t T u r k i s h e n c l a v e c e n t r e d around 
A g h i r d a , which was p a r t o f the N i c o s i a R e g i o n a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e 
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M A P _ 3 : 2 G E U N Y E L I - A G H I R D A E N C L A V E 
I showing i n i t i a l strategic pos i t ions of 
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But had a s e p a r a t e m i l i t a r y command. ( see Table- 3 . 2 f o r d e t a i l s o f 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l of v i l l a g e s i n the P e n t a d a k t y l o s ) 
T u r k i s h N a t i o n a l C o n t i n g e n t s o l d i e r s and T u r k i s h C y p r i o t F i g h t e r s were 
s t a t i o n e d i n p o s i t i o n s n e a r to the K y r e n i a Road. The c o n c e n t r a t i o n of 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s i n the G e u n y e l i - Aghirda: Enclave- s e r v e d s e v e r a l 
a d v a n t a g e s , a l t h o u g h the Kyrenia- c o a s t l i n e was s t i l l f i r m l y under Greek 
C y p r i o t c o n t r o l . F o r ' i n s t a n c e , the T u r k s had c o n t r o l of the mountain on 
which S t . H i l a r i o n C a s t l e s t a n d s , o v e r l o o k i n g t h e - c o a s t to the n o r t h and 
N i c o s i a to the s o u t h . I t i s a s t r a t e g i c a l l y and s y m b o l i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t 
p o i n t , o n l y t e n m i l e s from the o u t s k i r t s o f N i c o s i a , and the o n l y peak 
i n the P e n t a d a k t y l o s under T u r k i s h C y p r i o t c o n t r o l . A c c o r d i n g to 
P r o f e s s o r Volkan :-
" . . . t h e mountaintop had become a symbol of T u r k i s h omnipotence. 
A huge T u r k i s h f l a g was hung from the peak o f S t . H i l a r i o n to 
a n o t h e r mountaintop nearby. I t was so enormous t h a t i t c o u l d 
be s e e n a s s r e d spot from many m i l e s away.** ( 1 8 ) ( a l s o set Fig.3:1) 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s were a b l e to g a i n c o n t r o l of t h i s s t r a t e g i c a l l y 
i m p o r t a n t a r e a l a r g e l y owing to the p r e - e x i s t e n c e of s e v e r a l mixed and 
p u r e l y T u r k i s h s e t t l e m e n t s i n the c e n t r a l and s o u t h e r n P e n t a d a k t y l o a , 
e s p e c i a l l y i n l o c a t i o n s n e a r the K y r e n i a Road and to the south-west of 
K y r e n i a town. ( see Map 3 . 2 and T a b l e 3.T f o r d e t a i l s ) The- e n c l a v e 
developed around a c l u s t e r o f f i v e T u r k i s h C y p r i o t c e n t r e s :- A g h i r d a , 
Keumurju, P i l e r i , K r i n i , and P h o t t a . I f c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s g i v e n to the 
s u r r o u n d i n g r e g i o n t h e r e were o n l y f o u r t o w n s / v i l l a g e s under the c o n t r o l 
o f the Cyprus Government t h a t had T u r k i s h quarters', o n l y one, A y i a I r i n i , 
had a T u r k i s h C y p r i o t , m a j o r i t y . Most o t h e r p u r e l y T u r k i s h C y p r i o t 
v i l l a g e s had been emptied o f t h e i r i n h a b i t a n t s ( e . g . T r a p e z a ) o r were 
absorbed by the p r o t e c t i v e r i n g of T u r k i s h C y p r i o t F i g h t e r s and de f a c t o 
c o n t r o l . A y i a I r i n i i s an i s o l a t e d v i l l a g e west of Myrtou, n e a r Morphou 
Bay, so i t was c o m p l e t e l y c u t - o f f , but i t s T u r k i s h i n h a b i t a n t s d e c i d e d 
to s t a y w h i l e the v i l l a g e was too f a r away from o t h e r p r e d o m i n a n t l y 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t v i l l a g e s to be i n c l u d e d i n a v i l l a g e " g r o u p i n g " under 
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TABLE 3:1 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND SETTLEMENTS I N THE 
KYRENIA PLAIN AND PENTADAKTYLOS. 
A g r o - P h y s i o g r a p h i c 
Region 
Greek C y p r i o t 
P o p u l a t i o n 
P e r c e n t a g e 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t 
P o p u l a t i o n 
P e r c e n t a g e 
Number of v i l l a g e s 
* 
1) C e n t r a l 
P e n t a d a k t y l o s 66 .95 ' 
2 ) Southern f o o t h i l l s 
o f the P e n t a d a k t y l o s 
6 7 . 9 7 
3 ) N o r t h e r n f o o t h i l l s 
o f the P e n t a d a k t y l o s 
4 ) K y r e n i a P l a i n 
8 8 . 7 1 
8 8 . 6 4 
3 3 . 0 5 
3 2 . 0 3 
1 1 . 2 9 
11 .36 
8 
9 1 2 
8 0 5 
T o t a l : - 29 14 8 
* Key to v i l l a g e s 
T ( Greek ) ; 2 ( T u r k i s h ) ; 3 ( Mixed ) : 
So u r c e : K a r o u z i s ( 1976 ) P r o p o s a l s f o r a S o l u t i o n to t h e Cyprus Problem. 
( Cosmos P r e s s , N i c o s i a , pp 24 and 49 ) 
See a l s o Cyprus P o p u l a t i o n D i s t r i b u t i o n Map ( 1960 )„ 
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TABLE '3:2 DETAILS OP TURKISH CYPRIOT AND MIXED VILLAGES 
I N THE KYRENIA PLAIN AND PENTADAKTYLOS. 
Under c o n t r o l o f the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t L e a d e r s h i p , 
Common Name T u r k i s h C y p r i o t 
Name 
T u r k i s l 
Populai 
A y i o s 
Andronikos 
Topcukoy 375 
Keumurju . Komurcu 55 
A g h i r d a A g i r d a g 1,375 
K r i n i P i n a r b a s i 545 
P i l e r i G o c e r i 128 
P h o t t a Dagyolu 785 
Temblos Z e y t i n l i k 450 
Kambyli H i s a r k o y 335 
K a l y v a k i a K a l a v a c 271 
Kornokipos Gornec 393 
A y i o s 
K h a r i t o n 
Ergenekon 1T6 
A y i o s 
I a k o v o s 
A l t i n o v a 400 
Melounda M a l l i d a g 300 
S e t t l e m e n t s abandoned by T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s . 
L i v e r a s L i v e r a s ( 12 ) 
D h i o r o s Yorgos ( 156 ) 
A y i r m o l a ( 20 ) A y i o s 
Ermolaos 
V a s i l i a 
L a p i t h o s 
T r a p e z a 
A y i o s 
Y e o r y i o s 
V a s i l y a 
L a p t a 
T e k n e c i k 
A y y o r g i 
( 213 ) 
( 370 ) 
( 79 ) 
( 143 ) 
Greek C y p r i o t 
P o p u l a t i o n 
150 
600 
467 
1,300 
4,000 
250 
Mixed s e t t l e m e n t s under the c o n t r o l o f the Cyprus Government. 
3,000 K y r e n i a 
Kazaphani 
A y i a I r i n i 
K l e p i n i 
G i r n e 
Ozankoy 
Akdeni z 
ArapkSy 
800 
( 696 ) 
405 
( 598 ) 
465 
18 
( 27 ) 
630 
150 
185 
R e s i d e n t 
Refugees 
750 
250 
11 
300 
219 
96 
29 
15 
29 
N.B. F i g u r e s i n b r a c k e t s r e p r e s e n t the numbers o f r e f u g e e s who l e f t the 
v i l l a g e s . s o u r c e : Patr ick 11976 Ipp 278 - 3 2 3 
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Turkish Cypriot c o n t r o l . Dhioros, a mixed v i l l a g e close to Myrtou, was 
completely evacuated by i t s Turkish r e s i d e n t s , most of whom f l e d to the 
Guenyeli - Aghirda Enclave. ( r e f e r to Map 6 : 8 , f o r v i l l a g e l o c a t i o n s ) 
On A p r i l 25, T964, Greek Cypriots attempted to knock-out Turkish 
p o s i t i o n s near to the Kyrenia Pass, but f a i l e d to gain ground. On 29 
A p r i l , U.N.P.I.CYP. intervened to arrange a c e a s e - f i r e . Eventually 
c e a s e - f i r e l i n e s were drawn by United Nations personnel by marking the 
f r o n t - l i n e p o s i t i o n s of both s i d e s . U.N.P.I.CYP. occupied "disputed 
p o s i t i o n s " wherever p o s s i b l e . ( 1 9 ) These c e a s e - f i r e l i n e s posed numerous 
problems f o r Cypriots l i v i n g on e i t h e r side of them. For example, 
Temblos, s i t u a t e d at the northern extension of the Aghirda Enclave, 
was l i t e r a l l y hemmed-in on three s i d e s and had U.N.P.I.CYP. troops a l l 
around i t to prevent National Guard and uniformed Turkish F i g h t e r s from 
entering the v i l l a g e as part of l o c a l c e a s e - f i r e arrangements. As a 
r e s u l t of these a r b i t r a r y l i n e s Temblos v i l l a g e r s could only get to 
N i c o s i a v i a the Kyrenia Road, despite attempts to improve the mountain 
track to S t . H i l a r i o n . ( r e f e r to Chapter F i v e , Part 0ne,p.t17) To get to 
the Kyrenia Road they were subjected to Government r e s t r i c t i o n s and 
searches. 
U n t i l 26 October 1*964 no Greek Cypriot was permitted to t r a v e l along 
the Kyrenia Road, running from N i c o s i a v i a Geunyeli to the north coast. 
So one of the f i r s t steps U.N.F.I.CYP. made- to "normalize" conditions 
i n Cyprus was to reopen the roHd to Greek C y p r i o t ' c i v i l i a n s , who were-
only allowed to move through the T u r k i s h - c o n t r o l l e d area i f they were 
i n the d a i l y U.N.F.I.CYP. Nicosia-Kyrenia convoys, otherwise they had 
to take long detours around the perimeter of the Enclave. (20) 
The Geunyeli - Aghirda Enclave^ was c l e a r l y demarcated from the "Green 
Li n e " within old N i c o s i a to i t s northern extremity at Temblos. Confined 
within three l i n e s of s o l d i e r y , t h e i r own F i g h t e r s , U.N.F.I.CYP. "blue 
b e r r e t s " , and Greek Cypriot National Guardsmen, the Turkish Cypriot 
Leadership and m i l i t a r y commanders had t i g h t c o n trol over- t h i s s t r a t e g i c 
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enclave, the most important s o l i d block of Turkish Cypriot t e r r i t o r i a l 
c o n t r o l i n the i s l a n d . ( r e f e r to Map 3 . 3 ) This enclave played a very 
s i g n i f i c a n t part i n the Turkish invasion of T 9 7 4 . ( see Map 3 . 2 . ) 
i i i ) Refugee Movements and Enclave Formation i n Other D i s t r i c t s ; 
According to Richard P a t r i c k , V976 , 
..the m a j o r i t y - m i n o r i t y status i s more accurately defined 
by taking a broader view than one confined to the ethnic 
composition of each v i l l a g e i n i s o l a t i o n . I n v a r i a b l y , a 
Turkish Cypriot m a j o r i t y i n a given v i l l a g e gives way to a 
m i n o r i t y status i f the regional s i t u a t i o n i s considered." ( 2 1 ) 
In. a d e t a i l e d study of ethnic population, settlement, and land owner-
ship d i s t r i b u t i o n i n Cyprus,George Karouzis, T 9 7 6 , came to the same 
conclusion using various geographical d e f i n i t i o n s of region. ( 2 2 : r e f e r 
also to Chapter Two ) The d e t a i l e d example of the Geunyeli - Aghirda 
Enclave reveals the extent to which Turkish Cypriot c o n t r o l depended 
on the p r e - e x i s t i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n of Greek, Mixed, and purely Turkish 
settlements. Areas w i t h a r e l a t i v e l y high l o c a l density of Turkish 
Cypriots or high proportion of Turkish/Mixed v i l l a g e s ( according to the 
T960 Census ) , were often the foundation or "core" of Turkish Cypriot 
enclaves. For example, the Xeros - Karavostassi area had several Turkish 
and Mixed centres, i n c l u d i n g E l i a , Kazivera-, L i m n i t i s and Ambelikou. 
Surrounding the Greek Cypriot settlement of Athienou were ten purely 
Turkish or Mixed v i l l a g e s , such as Ayia, Lourounjina, Potamia, Arsos, 
and Melousha. ( 2 3 ) 
The most widespread refugee movements took place i n January 1964 a f t e r ' 
the l i f t i n g of road-blocks by the Cyprus Government. Fifty-one per cent 
of a l l v i l l a g e s eventually evacuated by end-August 1964 were evacuated 
i n t h i s month, a t o t a l of 6 , 4 4 3 people. ( 2 4 ) February accounted f o r 
2 , T 8 5 people and eighteen per cent of the t o t a l number of v i l l a g e B 
deserted by Turkish Cypriots. Five v i l l a g e s ( 9T3 people ) were evacuated 
i n the months of March and May, and f i n a l l y , s i x v i l l a g e s and 83T people 
evacuated i n e a r l y August. 
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MAP-3:5 PAPHOS DISTRICT : TURKISH CYPRIOT ENCLAVES 
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I t seems that most refugee movements were spontaneous, corresponding 
to outbreaks of intercommunal violence and i n t i m i d a t i o n , such as 
occurred i n the Paphos D i s t r i c t i n February and T y l l i r i a i n August. 
A d e t a i l e d study of "population upheaval" i n Western Cyprus reveals 
some i n t e r e s t i n g points about the geography of refugee movements i n 
the i s l a n d as a whole. (25) Paphos D i s t r i c t had the highest D i s t r i c t 
r a t i o of Turks to Greeks, about 1 : 3 . Michael Drury, 1 9 7 7 , found that 
t h i r t y - t w o per cent of a l l inhabited v i l l a g e s i n the D i s t r i c t had a 
Turkish Cypriot m a j o r i t y , and that w i t h the exception of the Dhiarezos 
Valley group and a small group near Lyso, they formed few obvious 
c l u s t e r s . ( r e f e r to Map 3.5 ) Most of these v i l l a g e s had a small 
population, an average size of 365 i n h a b i t a n t s , and had scattered 
l o c a t i o n s . Whereas many of the Greek Cypriot settlements were l a r g e r 
and were not surrounded by Turkish Cypriot settlements, although there 
were exceptions such as Lyso caught behind the v i l l a g e s of Meladhia and 
Melandra. This settlement p a t t e r n added to Turkish Cypriot f e e l i n g s of 
geographical i n s e c u r i t y once intercommunal h o s t i l i t i e s f l a r e d up. 
In Paphos D i s t r i c t the refugee movement p a t t e r n shows that Turkish 
Cypriots o f t e n moved to new locations e i t h e r because of t h e i r c e n t r a l 
p o s i t i o n w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r group of Turkish/Mixed v i l l a g e s , or because 
the v i l l a g e s were t a n g e n t i a l to main l i n e s of communication and so ran 
less r i s k of i n t e r f e r e n c e . As Drury revealed, the r e s u l t i n g formation 
of Turkish Cypriot enclaves i n Paphos D i s t r i c t avoided most main roads, 
a pattern not repeated i n other parts of Cyprus where enclave formation 
created major problems f o r road communications. ( r e f e r to Chapter Five 
Section on Freedom of Movement ) Another point to make concerning the 
o v e r a l l p a t t e r n of enclaves i n Cyprus i s that where therewas rugged, 
h i l l y topography, poor communications between v i l l a g e s , and a scattered 
i n t e r - m i x t u r e of Greek and Turkish Cypriot settlements, i t was only 
possible to form t i n y "pockets" of Turkish Cypriot- c o n t r o l surrounded 
by Greek C y p r i o t - c o n t r o l l e d t e r r i t o r y . 
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The largest movements of refugees i n Western Cyprus occurred during 
f 
February and March f o l l o w i n g b a t t l e s i n Paphos town i t s e l f . V i l l a g e r s 
from neighbouring Lemba and Yeroskipos moved to the over-crowded 
Turkish quarter of Paphos. Fig h t i n g i n other areas led Turkish Cypriots 
from Khoulou, Kourtaka and Pitargou to seek refuge i n Axylou. Once 
Turkish Cypriots i n Polis were beseiged, refugee movements began i n 
north-western parts of the D i s t r i c t and i n remote areas, where v i l l a g e s 
evacuated included Phasli, K r i t o u Terra, Mamoundali, Asproyia, Loukrounou, 
and G a l a t a r i a . I n the countryside the major ' r e c i p i e n t ' centres were 
Androkikou, Mandria, Stavrokono, and Anadhiou, which received the 
v i l l a g e r s of Lapithiou"taken" by the Greek Cypriots i n March T 9 6 4 . ( 2 6 ) 
Once intercommunal f i g h t i n g i n Cyprus had calmed down there were only 
four mixed v i l l a g e s remaining. Of these, Ayia Varvara and Akoursos were 
both under Government c o n t r o l , w h i l s t Kouklia and Timi, both w i t h large 
Greek Cypriot populations, maintained t h e i r Turkish quarters under guard 
by armed Fighters. ( r e f e r to Map 3 : 5 ) 
I n Paphos and other d i s t r i c t s there appears to have been l i t t l e or no 
c e n t r a l i z e d coordination of the refugee movements, although no doubt 
some were encouraged by T.M.T. Patrick found i t "...more t y p i c a l f o r 
v i l l a g e r s to move on t h e i r own i n i t i a t i v e leaving most of t h e i r c l o t h i n g , 
f u r n i t u r e and food behind." ( 2 7 ) Turkish Cypriot leaders denied any 
contingency plan f o r population r e d i s t r i b u t i o n and consolidations i n 
c e r t a i n s t r a t e g i c areas, although they d i d o f f e r assistance to v i l l a g e r s 
i n transport p r o v i s i o n and refugee housing. But as Michael Drury stresses, 
n The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of m i n o r i t y consciousness w i t h s p e c i f i c 
and c l e a r l y demarcated t e r r i t o r y was of c r u c i a l psychological 
importance...the Turkish C y p r i o t s . . . f e l t that the l e g a l 
recognition of the two communities was inadequate, at least 
f o r the less numerous one, unless a s p a t i a l dimension was 
added." (28) 
T e r r i t o r i a l separation c e r t a i n l y became an important p o l i t i c a l bargaining 
to the Turkish Cypriot Leadership, and concern f o r the physical safety 
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of t h e i r community was uBed as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r segregation. 
i v ) The Turkish Quarters of Famagusta. Larnaca. and Paphos. 
The Turkish Cypriot m u n i c i p a l i t y of Pamagusta comprised the walled 
c i t y ; the suburbs of Baikal, Karaolis, and Sakarya. U.N.F.I.CYP. 
maintained several look-out points along the walls and at the entrances 
of the other quarters. There was also a d e m i l i t a r i z e d zone around the 
Turkish Cypriot quarters preventing the development of close armed 
con f r o n t a t i o n . I n contrast, Larnaca was s i m i l a r to Nicosia i n tha t i t 
remained a centre of tension throughout December *63 to August '64, and 
a cease-fire l i n e was established along the western boundary of Scala, 
the Turkish Cypriot quarter, marked by Artemis Avenue which separated 
Turkish Cypriot Fighters from National Guardsmen. U.N.P.I.CYP. kept 
t h i s , rconfrontation l i n e " under continual s u r v e i l l a n c e . 
Paphos also had i t s ethnic i n t e r f a c e marked by a cease-fire l i n e . 
B i t t e r intercommunal f i g h t i n g began on 7 March '64 when hundreds of 
Greek Cypriots were taken hostage, prompting r e t a l i a t o r y hostage taking 
and an attempt to overrun the Turkish quarter of town. About twenty per 
cent of i t s 3,500 population were made refugees as most of the quarter 
was evacuated, leaving a Turkish Cypriot c o n t r o l l e d area of only a few 
hundred square yards. B r i t i s h troops intervened to e s t a b l i s h a cease-
f i r e zone around the quarter, which was l a t e r p a t r o l l e d by U.N.P.I.CYP. 
The quarter was entrenched on and behind a b l u f f from the town centre 
westwards, leaving a swathe of d e r e l i c t urban no-man's-land running 
through the town centre. (29) 
Limassol's Turkish Cypriot quarter was not demarcated by f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , 
and there was more contact between Greek and Turkish Cypriots than i n 
other D i s t r i c t towns. Under l o c a l agreements, uniformed Fighters were 
not permitted to parade or to carry weapons i n parts o f the quarter 
adjacent to the Greek Cypriot sector. 
I t , should be stressed t h a t smaller towns and v i l l a g e s also had ethnic 
d i v i s i o n s and quarters. For example, P o l i s , i n the north-west of Paphos 
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D i s t r i c t , had an enclaved Turkish Cypriot poulation l i v i n g i n an ol d 
Turkish secondary school. I n Chapter Five more d e t a i l s are given on 
the f u n c t i o n i n g of these enclaves and the numerous problems caused by 
such a r t i f i c i a l d i v i s i o n s of people. From T964 to T974 these d i s t i n c t 
ethnic quarters continued to survive, keeping the two communities apart. 
" They l i v e d t h e i r separate l i v e s , o f t e n side by side 
without open animosity, but more of t e n i n a state of 
dormant h o s t i l i t y . " (30) 
v) The Ba t t l e f o r T y l l i r i a and the Kokkina Enclave. 
Ther l a s t refugee movements took place i n early August T964 i n n o r t h -
l e f t 
west Cyprus, T y l l i r i a region. They/following a Greek Cypriot offensive 
under the auspices of General Grivas, who was e f f e c t i v e l y commanding the 
National Guard. ( r e f e r to Footnote 3 t ) The Turkish Cypriots were i n 
c o n t r o l of the only main road through the region. ( r e f e r to Map5:3 ) 
On 4 A p r i l armed elements of both communities fought to gain c o n t r o l of 
a h i l l dominating a section of the highway. U.N.F.I.CYP. intervened to 
arrange a cease-fire four days l a t e r , and U.N. observation posts were 
established between the two r i v a l camps. Although the coastal road was 
reopened to c i v i l i a n t r a f f i c the Turkish Cypriots soon placed road-blocks 
along i t . (32) 
Apart from the concern about Greek freedom of movement along the nor t h -
west coast, the Cyprus Government was worried about the p o s s i b l i t y that 
the Turks could smuggle-in large numbers of weapons v i a Kokkina. To 
combat t h i s 2,000 National Guard troops were deployed i n the area facing 
5D0 Turkish Cypriot Fighters w i t h i n the enclave. On 6 August, Government 
forces attacked Turkish Cypriot v i l l a g e s around Kokkina, f o r c i n g t h e i r 
i nhabitants to r e t r e a t i n t o a narrow beachhead. 
Refugees moved i n t o Kokkina from purely Turkish Cypriot centres such 
as Mansoura, S e l l a i n T'Appi, Ayios Theodhoros, and Alevga. To prevent 
the Turkish Cypriots of Kokkina from being overrun Turkish A i r Force j e t s 
invaded Cyprus air-space to knock-out National Guard posi t i o n s over-looking 
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the enclave. On 9 August, the United Nations Security Council c a l l e d 
for-an immediate cease-fire. This enabled U.N.P.I.CYP. to e s t a b l i s h 
"neutral p o s i t i o n s " around Kokkina and L i r a n i t i s . Thus the boundaries 
of these enclaves were c l e a r l y demarcated, p a t r o l l e d by U.N„ s o l d i e r s , 
and made known to the m i l i t a r y commanders of both sides. Greek Cypriots 
were p r o h i b i t e d from entering Kokkina, and were only allowed to use the 
coastal road through L i m n i t i s during daylight hours only. Eence l o c a l 
Greek Cypriots were often obliged to take very long detours through or 
around the edge of the Troodos Mountains to avoid Turkish Cypriot 
enclaves. Other t i n y Turkish C y p r i o t - c o n t r o l l e d areas i n t h i s region 
centred around Lefka/Ambelikou and Elea, Angolemi, Ghaziveran, Both 
enclaves were under close U.N.P.I.CYP. s c r u t i n y . 
For Turkish Cypriots, Kokkina remains an important symbol epitomizing 
t h e i r determination to r e s i s t Greek Cypriot domination, and as such i t 
held a garri s o n f o r Turkish regulars out of a l l proportion to i t s size 
or population. For Greek Cypriots, Kokkina emphasized the m i l i t a r y support 
Ankara was w i l l i n g to give to the s t r a t e g i c a l l y vulnerable Turkish Cypriot 
held pieces of t e r r i t o r y i n Cyprus. Furthermore, the T y l l i r i a f i g h t i n g 
had revealed how weak peace-soldiers are when opposing communities take 
up arms to achieve t h e i r goals. There was very l i t t l e United Nations 
troops could do against the stronger National Guard, p a r t i c u l a r l y when 
they were only mandated to use "forc e " i n self-defence r a t h e r than to 
prevent shooting. U.N.F.I.CYP. proved to be much more e f f e c t i v e as a 
"constabulary f o r c e " once cease-fires had been arranged. (33) 
Section Three: The Extent of Turkish Cypriot T e r r i t o r i a l Control, and 
the A r r i v a l of U.N.F.I.CYP. 
By March the bulk of refugees had moved ( about ten per cent of the 
Turkish Cypriot population ). Many never to r e t u r n to t h e i r homes, and 
the Turkish Cypriot leadership and m i l i t a r y commanders consolidated t h e i r 
de facto c o n t r o l over t h e i r scattered t e r r i t o r y . I n f a c t some Fighter 
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commanders resorted to armed thr (aets, and even i n a few cases to murder, 
to prevent some refugees from moving i n t o Cyprus Government- c o n t r o l l e d 
t e r r i t o r y . The Greek Cypriots were prepared to encourage the r e t u r n of 
Turkish refugees to o l d homes but not i f they were i n "sensitive, s t r a t e g i c 
areas" adjacent to enclaves or National Guard p o s i t i o n s . They wanted 
to prevent more land f a l l i n g i n t o Turkish Cypriot hands and "accused the 
B r i t i s h troops of f o s t e r i n g p a r t i t i o n of the i s l a n d by p u t t i n g themselves 
between the combatants and escorting f l e e i n g refugees from mixed v i l l a g e s 
to Turkish-held communities."" (34) James Stagenga, T968, points out that 
many Greek Cypriots remembered t h e i r 1 struggle against the B r i t i s h Army 
during the "Emergency Period" of c o l o n i a l rule- from 1955 to 1959. 
" Moreover, by e s t a b l i s h i n g "Green Line" n e u t r a l zones to 
separate the two communities i n Nicosia, Larnaca, and elsewhere, 
the B r i t i s h were t a c i t l y p a r t i t i o n i n g parts of the country." (35) 
I t has been suggested that Archbishop Makarios used B r i t i s h then United 
Nations peacekeeping forces to parry the threat of u n i l a t e r a l Turkish 
i n t e r v e n t i o n , enabling Greek Cypriots to continue t h e i r attacks ( m i l i t a r y 
and economic ) on Turkish Cypriot enclaves. (36) The point being that 
the presence of "neutral"" peace s o l d i e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y under the 
p r o t e c t i v e umbrella of the United Nations, would deteir Ankara from 
sending troops. 
On 4 March 1964, U.N.P.I.CYP. was authorized. 
" Both Cypriot communities were aware that once t h i s force 
was deployed the then e x i s t i n g patterns of coercive c o n t r o l 
throughout the i s l a n d would be 'frozen'. Both sides there-
fore were i n t e n t on consolidating or extending t h e i r c o n t r o l 
before U.N.P.I.CYP. could intervene." (37) 
As one commentator put i t , the U.N. Force was introduced "to see that 
the s p a t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of these two environments did not a l t e r " . (38) 
At i t s peak strength i n June T964, U.N.P.I.CYP. comprised 6,400 men. 
Such l i m i t e d manpower had to be c a r e f u l l y deployed at the island's major 
trouble-spots and e t h n i c - i n t e r f a c e s , and l i k e the hamstrung B r i t i s h i 
force, i t could not be everywhere at once, which meant that the Greek 
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Cypriot g u e r r i l l a s and National Guard "could choose t h e i r objectives 
at w i l l . " (39) 
U.N.P.I.CYP.'s day-to-day operations i n Cyprus had to cope with the 
numerous problems a r i s i n g from the fragmented p a t t e r n of intercommunal 
c o n f l i c t and t e r r i t o r i a l c o n t r o l . I n T964 the United Nations estimated 
that "areas administered by the Turkish Cypriot community...and 
defended by Turkish Cypriot Fighters" covered "approximately 54 square 
miles; or 1/2 per cent of the t o t a l area of the country, w i t h a 
population of about 59,000, i n c l u d i n g T3,600 refugees." (40) U.N.P.I.CYP. 
gave de facto rather than " o f f i c i a l " r e c o g nition to these enclaves, and 
i t recognized the major areas under Turkish Cypriot c o n t r o l , such as 
the o l d Turkish quarter of Nicosia; the Geunyeli - Aghirda Enclave 
( o f t e n r e f e r r e d to i n U.N.Reports and other sources as the "Nicosia 
enclave" ) | the Turkish quarters of Larnaca and Pamagusta; the town of 
Louroujina ; an enclave comprising Lefka, another around Kalyvakia, and 
the two beachheads at Kokkina and L i m n i t i s . ( r e f e r to Map 3.3 ) The 
areas given "enclave s t a t u s " by U.N.P.I.CYP. were those where close 
"confrontation l i n e s " existed or where intercommunal h o s t i l i t y was more 
l i k e l y to occur, the r f o r e s e c u r i t y was t i g h t , w i t h opposing f i g h t e r s 
maintaining positions separated by United Nations observation posts and/ 
or p a t r o l s . Richard Patrick's estimates made i n T970-'71 include a l l 
areas undeir the de facto c o n t r o l of the Turkish Cypriot Leadership, then 
c a l l e d the "Provisional Administration", which contained approximately 
105,000 i n h a b i t a n t s , i n c l u d i n g 20,000 refugees. I n 1971 there were s t i l l 
some 8,000 Turkish Cypriots l i v i n g i n t e r r i t o r y under Greek Cypriot 
c o n t r o l . I n t o t a l , about twenty per cent of the Turkish Cypriot 
population had abandoned homes i n December *63 - August '64, w h i l s t the 
ma j o r i t y of Turkish Cypriots already l i v e d i n locat i o n s where Greeks were 
e i t h e r unable or u n w i l l i n g to penetrate. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to compare d i f f e r e n t attempts to delineate Turkish 
Cypriot areas. Map 3.6 i s an American one based on Surkish Cypriot 
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sources. I t indicates Turkish v i l l a g e groupings, together w i t h the 
most important mixed v i l l a g e s of Cyprus, e i t h e r w i t h a Greek or Turkish 
Cypriot m a j o r i t y , plus areas of Turkish c o n t r o l , Karouzis, T976, argues 
that " . . . i n f a c t t h i s i s not the case because apart from c e r t a i n 
i s o l a t e d cases^no c o n t r o l was exercised i n a l l the areas shown". ( 4 t ) 
Map 3.4 i s by Professor Emile Kolodny ( 4 2 ) and i s purported to show the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of the Turkish Cypriot community i n T 9 7 0 , Turkish Cypriot 
enclaves, purely Turkish and mixed villages/towns. I t i s useful there-
fore to compare the map w i t h the one produced by Richard Patrick ( Map 3,3) 
which shows "Turkish Cypriot Controlled Areas i n T 9 7 0 " . Karouzis had 
the f o l l o w i n g c r i t i c i s m s to make regarding Kolodny's map :-
(a) The enclaves shown on the map were not a l l areas to which Greek 
Cypriots could have no access. 
(b) The Turkish Cypriot enclaves number 4 4 , or i f the Turkish Cypriot 
quarters of Nicosia, Pamagusta, Laraaca and Paphos are counted, 4 8 . 
(c) The number of v i l l a g e s shown as abandoned i s not accurate. 
(d) Some purely Turkish or mixed v i l l a g e s have been omitted. 
(e) There i s a s i g n i f i c a n t s i m i l a r i t y between the borders of Turkish 
Cypriot areas i n the Kolodny map and those used i n the American map. 
I n contrast, Patrick's map shows 40 enclaves, 44 i f the fo u r towns are 
included. As Karouzis attempted to show,these enclaves were not 
necessarily areas of purely Turkish v i l l a g e s , population or land owner-
ship, and did not include a l l such areas w i t h i n t h e i r - b o r d e r s . 
Not only did the patchwork p a r t i t i o n of the i s l a n d pose problems f o r 
U.N.P.I.CYP. i n i t s e f f o r t s to keep the peace, i t also posed administra-
t i v e problems f o r the Turkish Cypriot Leadership, which had only loose 
c o n t r o l over i t s dispersed enclaves. U n t i l the removal of r e s t r i c t i o n s 
on Turkish freedom of movement i n March 1 9 6 8 , i t was extremely d i f f i c u l t 
f o r the Leadership to maintain anything but d i s t a n t contact w i t h the 
various enclaves and quarters under i t s de facto c o n t r o l . I n practice,, 
l o c a l Fighter commanders and Turkish o f f i c e r s from the mainland or v i l l a g e 
mukhtars ( leaders ) remained i n c o n t r o l of t h e i r respective l o c a l areas, 
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p a r t i c u l a r l y i n areas some distance from Nicosia and the Geunyeli -
Aghirda Enclave. Over the 1964 to 1974 period the Turkish Cypriots 
developed a complicated hierarchy of t e r r i t o r i a l a d ministrative c o n t r o l . 
There were seven de facto l o c a l government regions, each w i t h a D i s t r i c t 
O f f i c e r based i n the largest l o c a l m u n i c i p a l i t y , who dealt w i t h v i l l a g e 
leaders and town mayors over c i v i l matters. At the top of the admin-
i s t r a t i v e ladder was the General Committee ( Provisional Administration 
from December T967 onwards ) which sat i n Turkish Nicosia, headed by 
former Vice-President KUclik, and was i n charge of island-wide Turkish 
Cypriot p o l i c y . When c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y considerations over-lapped 
there was close l i a i s o n between the General Committee and senior m i l i t a r y 
o f f i c e r s . As w i l l be shown i n Chapter Five some mainland Turkish o f f i c e r s 
had great influence over l o c a l events and were responsible f o r a? number 
of v i o l e n t i n c i d e n t s . At the lower l e v e l s of the hierarchy the influence 
of the Leadership i n Nicosia broke down. Richard Patrick produced a 
det a i l e d study and map of Turkish Cypriot l o c a l government organisation 
as i t existed i n T970. ( see Map3.7) 'Groupings' of Turkish Cypriot 
v i l l a g e s found i n close proximity usually had a m i l i t a r y and/or p o l i c e 
headquarters i n the most c e n t r a l or important v i l l a g e of the group. I t 
was i n the more i s o l a t e d v i l l a g e groups under Turkish Cypriot c o n t r o l 
that l o c a l a f f a i r s were run by Fighter leaders, mukhtars. and p o l i c e 
c h i e f s . ( 4 3 ) 
Section Four: U.N.F.I.CYP. and the P o l i t i c a l Geography of Cyprus. T964 - ' 7 4 . 
The United Nations Force i n Cyprus was confronted w i t h numerous 
d i f f i c u l t tasks as soon as i t became^ operational on 27 March 1964 . 
F i r s t l y , i t had to see thai; cease-fire arrangements were observed by 
both sides, a d i f f i c u l t task when there was always a l i k e l i h o o d t h a t 
General Grivas would act independently of d i r e c t i v e s from c e n t r a l govern-
ment. Secondly, U.N. personnel had to cope wi t h Government r e s t r i c t i o n s 
on goods moving i n t o Turkish Cypriot areas. A f t e r the f a i l u r e of the 
attack on Kokkina President Makarios decided to pursue p o l i t i c a l goals 
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by applying economic pressure on the Turkish Cypriots rather than by 
force of arms. As part of t h i s p o l i c y the Cyprus Government put an 
economic blockade on Turkish Cypriot administered enclaves, stopping 
the movement of " s t r a t e g i c m a t e r i a l s " i n t o those areas. ( see Chapter 
Five ) T h i r d l y , there were r e s t r i c t i o n s on Greek Cypriot m o b i l i t y 
through Turkish enclaves. Fourthly, the Turkish Cypriot enclaves were 
badly overcrowded and had a refugee- problem, which meant that there Were 
large numbers of homeless people lacking basic amenities. At f i r s t 
U.N.F.I.CYP. had great d i f f i c u l t y i n g e t t i n g much needed medical and 
other a i d i n t o Kokkina, and i t was not u n t i l mid^September 1964 that 
these supplies were delivered. 
Throughout i t s f i r s t decade of operations i n Cyprus,U.N.F.I.CYP. 
refused to give the Turkish Cypriot Leadership any i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
r e c o g n i t i o n , dealing w i t h the purely Greek Cypriot a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as 
the Government of the whole Republic. At the same time, U.N.F.I.CYP, 
di d recognize the g r a v i t y of the et h n i c - c u r a - p o l i t i c a l p a r t i t i o n . As 
the Secretary-General reported on 11 March 1965 :-
" The Turkish Cypriot p o l i c y of s e l f - i s o l a t i o n has led the 
community i n the opposite d i r e c t i o n from normality. The 
community leadership discourages the Turkish Cypriot 
population from engaging i n personal, commercial,or other 
contact with t h e i r Greek Cypriot compatriots, from applying 
to Government o f f i c e s i n adm i n i s t r a t i v e matters or from 
r e s e t t l i n g i n t h e i r homes i f they are refugees." (44) 
U.N.F.I.CYP. were faced w i t h an i s l a n d criss-crossed by physical b a r r i e r s , 
"confrontation l i n e s " , and the problems of hardening "psychological 
b a r r i e r s " between the two communities. As Galo Plaza recognized, 
n The physical impediments to normal r e l a t i o n s between the 
communities were serious enough, hardly less so was the 
psychological impediment caused by the suppression of the healthy 
movement of ideas, f o r which were s u b s t i t u t e d slogans and 
counter-slogans shouted by propaganda machines across the 
d i v i d i n g l i n e s i n uncompromising, provocative or h o s t i l e tones." 
(45) 
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I t i s d i f f i c u l t to f u l l y appreciate the extent of the hardships suffered 
by the enclaved Turkish Cypriots. Their i s o l a t i o n behind " v i s i b l e w a l l s " 
tended to create more " i n v i s i b l e w a l l s " between the two sides. As Drury 
puts i t :- " The two communities' separation, as the decade advanced, 
became incr e a s i n g l y entrenched, p h y s i c a l l y , emotionally, and 
m a t e r i a l l y . " (46) 
Professor Volkan, 1979, likened the Turkish Cypriots to caged b i r d s . . . 
" They had become prisoners, i n s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t t h e i r 
"prisons" lay w i t h i n the neighbourhoods of t h e i r own people 
i n which i t was possible to conduct some semblance of normal 
l i f e . " (47) 
Under these abnormal circumstances U.N.P.I.CYP. acted as the only 
communication bridge between ordinary Cypriots on e i t h e r side of the 
de fa c t o d i v i d i n g l i n e s , t r y i n g to breakdown the problems of physical 
and psychological detachment, the psychological "green l i n e s " separating 
them. Frequently young U.N.P.I.CYP. o f f i c e r s were engaged i n d e l i c a t e 
discussions between v i l l a g e mukhtars. farmers, policemen, and business-
men of both sides i n attempts to s e t t l e parochial disputes and reach 
l o c a l compromises. Such "c o r r e c t i v e and preventive" mediation, as 
HaTbottle describes i t , "determines t h e i r success as peacekeepers, not 
the a u t h o r i t y of the s e l f - l o a d i n g r i f l e s that they may hold i n t h e i r 
hands." (48) 
Very often intercommunal disputes o r incidents arose as a d i r e c t r e s u l t 
of the pe c u l i a r p o l i t i c a l geography i n a given area. For example, Greek 
Cypriot farmers sometimes t r i e d to enter a Turkish Cypriot area without 
the p r i o r permission of l o c a l Turkish Cypriot a u t h o r i t i e s . I n such 
circumstances U.N.F.I.CYP. would intervene to prevent any h o s t i l e reactions 
United Nations escorts would then be arranged to protect farmers entering 
Turkish areas provided they had permission from l o c a l Turkish Cypriot 
p o l i c e or mukhtars. Such l o c a l "agreements" or "understandings" were not 
always easy to arrange i n the absence of clear demarcation l i n e s between 
the disputants. Very often the boundary between t e r r i t o r y under Greek or 
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Turkish Cypriot c o n t r o l was ambiguous. As Richard Patrick explains, the 
boundary " more nearly resembles a f r o n t i e r zone i n the unguarded 
f i e l d s about the v i l l a g e . Such zones are i l l - d e f i n e d , and 
t h e i r i r r e g u l a r shapes depend on l o c a l patterns of ethnic 
settlement, land ownership, communication, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , 
and intercommunal h o s t i l i t y . " (49) 
U.N.F.I.CYP. were preoccupied w i t h c l e a r l y defined "confrontation l i n e s " 
around the enclaves of Kokkina, Aghirda - Guenyeli, and those d i v i d i n g 
the ethnic quarters of towns l i k e Nicosia and Larnaca. The Force also 
deployed men at points near to or w i t h i n "contested areas" between the 
communities where changes i n the l o c a l status quo or breaches of the 
peace were always a p o s s i b i l i t y . The only areas where U.N.P.I.CYP. 
could relax i t s observations and a c t i v i t i e s were those without any 
Turkish Cypriots, such as parts of the c e n t r a l Troodos, and around 
remote and s t r a t e g i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t v i l l a g e s where the l o c a l people 
of e i t h e r community adopted a " l i v e and l e t l i v e " a t t i t u d e . 
Chapter Pive considers the f i r s t decade of U.N.P.I.CYP. a c t i v i t i e s i n 
depth. These operations reveal many i n t e r l i n k a g e s between the island's 
physical, human, and p o l i t i c a l geography and p r a c t i c a l peace-keeping 
tasks. Two main categories of operations w i l l be examined. I n United 
Nations phraseology these are :-
( i ) A c t i v i t i e s toward preventing a recurrence of f i g h t i n g and c o n t r i b u t i n g 
to the r e s t o r a t i o n of law and order, and 
( i i ) A c t i v i t i e s toward a r e t u r n to normal conditions. 
The f i r s t group of a c t i v i t i e s were part of a wider process of " p a c i f i c a t i o n 
or "de-confrontation". U.N.P.I.CYP. i n t e r p o s i t i o n e d i t s troops i n actual 
or p o t e n t i a l trouble spots, arranged cease-fires, manned and demarcated 
" n e u t r a l " zones, negotiated f o r the removal of f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , road-
blocks, and other evidences of co n f r o n t a t i o n . The second category of 
U.N. Force duties included many non-martial socio-economic and humanitarian 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a f f e c t i n g the d a i l y l i v e s of both Cypriot communities. 
U.N.F.I.CYP. were, according to Stagenga, "helping to f o s t e r such 
in t a n g i b l e s as intercommunal t r u s t and mutual confidence." (50) 
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The U.N. Force had a m i l i t a r y branch c a l l e d Operations Economics 
involved i n a wide v a r i e t y of problems a f f e c t i n g the l i v e s and l i v e l i h o o d s 
of the Turkish communtiy i n t h e i r homes and v i l l a g e s and along demarcation 
l i n e s . D e t a i l s of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s such as a r b i t r a t i n g water r i g h t s , 
escorting farmers i n s t r a t e g i c areas, and s e t t l i n g disputes over l o c a l 
resources are given i n Chapter Five. Five headings are concentrated on 
under U.N.F.I.CYP.'s "normalization" a c t i v i t i e s . These are :-
i ) Freedom of movement; 
i i ) C i v i l i a n services; 
i i i ) A g r i c u l t u r e ; 
i v ) Industry and other aconomic a c t i v i t i e s ; 
v) R e l i e f operations: 
Chapter Four examines some d e f i n i t i o n s of "peacekeeping" r e l a t i n g to 
U.N.F.I.CYP., and the l i m i t a t i o n s of i t s mandate. Government and Turkish 
Cypriot r e s t r i c t i o n s on i t s freedom of movement are also considered. 
Finally,, one section i s devoted s p e c i f i c a l l y to the p r a c t i c a l problems 
of deploying men i n a small compact i s l a n d w i t h a complex p d l i t i c a l 
geography and changing patterns of intercommunal c o n f l i c t . 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PEACEKEEPING IN PERSPECTIVE. 
" U.N.F.I.CYP.'s was the t h i r d mission attempted by a world 
peace forc e , and the most complex. Unlike Gaza or the Congo, 
which o f f e r e d d i s t i n c t ethnic d i v i s i o n s , Cyprus was a land 
of i n e x t r i c a b l y mixed communities. The f i g h t i n g had now 
consolidated scores of embattled Turkish enclaves among a 
sea of Greeks, each of which required U.N. p r o t e c t i o n . " (1) 
".„othe Turks thought U.N.F.I.CYP. was there to save them 
from the Greeks; the Greeks thought i t was there to help the 
Government suppress Turkish rebels." (2) 
" I t i s permissible to wonder whether, u l t i m a t e l y , the main 
p o l i t i c a l r e s u l t of the presence of a United Nations Force 
i s not to make the s p l i t between communities an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
a f f a i r . The n a t u r a l slope- of evo l u t i o n would be that which , 
can already be glimpsed; demarcation l i n e , then f r o n t i e r s , then 
p a r t i t i o n . Turkey would have therefore achieved an unhoped 
f o r success, f o r which Greece and the Greek Cypriots would 
doubtless never pardon her." (3) 
Section One : What i s Peacekeeping and What i s a Peacekeeping Force ? 
Some D e f i n i t i o n s and the case of U.N.F.I.CYP. 
A useful working d e f i n i t i o n of a peacekeeping force i s provided by 
Charles Moskos.Jnr., 1976, i n h i s s o c i o l o g i c a l study of U.N.F.I.CYP. 
A peacekeeping force should comprise components from various nations, 
operating under the command of an i m p a r t i a l world organisation, and 
should seek to reduce or prevent armed h o s t i l i t i e s w i t h the absolute 
minimum use of armed force i t s e l f . (4) I t should also be as n e u t r a l as 
possible i n a given c i v i l war s i t u a t i o n , and should not allow i t s e l f 
to become "a ' t h i r d f o r c e ' i n a c o n f l i c t . " (5) As Brigadier Harbottle, 
T970, points out 
» 
U.N.F.I.CYP. was established a t " the s p e c i f i c request of the 
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Government of the t e r r i t o r y concerned, to provide a s t a b i l i z i n g 
influence and presence f o r the maintenance of peace. I t i s not 
there to take sides nor to use strong-arm t a c t i c s to e f f e c t 
t h i s purpose. " (6) 
The difference between most m i l i t a r y operations and a peacekeeping one 
l i e s i n "the imperatives of i m p a r t i a l i t y and noncoercion."" (7) Normally 
a m i l i t a r y force i s engaged i n a s s i s t i n g a recognized c i v i l a u t h o r i t y 
to prevent t e r r o r i s m , r e v o l u t i o n , or an attempt to overthrow the govern-
ment. Under such circumstances the m i l i t a r y i s put i n a p a r t i a l p o s i t i o n 
where the use of force i s a recognized method of dealing w i t h the problem. 
I n contrast, a peacekeeping force i s o f t e n placed i n an i n t e r p o s i t i o n a r y 
r o l e to h a l t or reduce a c o n f l i c t , already i n i t i a t e d . (8) Referring to 
the B r i t i s h Army, Michael Harbottle argues "that t h e i r whole p r o j e c t i o n 
and i n c l i n a t i o n as s o l d i e r s had been towards meeting force with f o r c e , 
and, where necessary, f i g h t i n g to achieve t h e i r t a c t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . 
They had never before been placed i n t h i s 'in-between' p o s i t i o n where 
weapons were the l a s t things to be useiand none of them l i k e d i t . " (9) 
As Moskos argues, peacekeeping requires a reformulation of conventional 
m i l i t a r y s o c i o l i z a t i o n and a r e s t r u c t u r i n g of standard m i l i t a r y 
organization. 
The United Nations Organisation has become associated with peacekeeping 
operations as an " i m p a r t i a l " i n t e r n a t i o n a l body wi t h the f a c i l i t i e s to 
set up such operations. I n s p i t e of U.N.P.I.CYP.'s i n t e r n a t i o n a l make-
up i t was and i s comprised mostly of "countries having close ties- w i t h 
B r i t a i n , the West and Western All i a n c e s " , w i t h no contingents from Afro-
Asian or L a t i n American countries. (TO) 
i ) Peacekeeping. Peacemaking, or Peacebuilding ? 
Using Moskos' d e f i n i t i o n a peacekeeping force i s 
an " i n t e r - n a t i o n a l l y l e g i t i m a t e d constabulary...charged w i t h 
a prophylactic r o l e — the containment and r e t a r d a t i o n of 
c o n f l i c t . " 
I t i s designed as an i n t e r i m measure to f o r e s t a l l the g l o b a l i z a t i o n of 
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a l o c a l c o n f l i c t u n t i l a p o l i t i c a l settlement can be devised and 
accepted. (11) This i s c r u c i a l to a f u l l understanding of U.N.P.I.CYP.'s 
e 
operations, f o r i t has never been granted a "therapeutic r o l e " of 
f i n d i n g a s o l u t i o n to intercommunal c o n f l i c t i n Cyprus. This l a t t e r 
task was the preserve ot the O.N. Mediator. (T2), whose job i t was to 
use diplomacy and mediation as a way of r e c o n c i l i n g diverse p o l i t i c a l 
and s t r a t e g i c a t t i t u d e s i n the Cyprus Problem. (T3) As Professor 
Coufoudakis puts i t :-
" By providing f o r the appointment of a mediator, the Council 
f o r the f i r s t time acknowledged that peacekeeping i s n e i t h e r 
i d e n t i c a l nor necessarily conducive to peacemaking. The 
Council's peacekeeping and mediation proposals provided both 
the preventive and the therap.utic f u n c t i o n . Resolution T86 
therefore t a c i t l y recognized the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n expressed by 
many states about U.N.E.F., that without an active mediation 
e f f o r t U.N.E.F. had contributed to the p a c i f i c perpetuation of 
the dispute." (14) 
Harbottle has gone f u r t h e r to stress the i n t e r l i n k a g e s between the various 
l e v e l s of t h i r d party i n t e r v e n t i o n i n c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n , i . e . between 
the peacemaking, Mediator l e v e l , and the peacekeeping, U.N.P.I.CYP. 
l e v e l . I t i s up to t h i r d party "to f a c i l i t a t e r a t h e r than to impose a 
settlement", by carrying out i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s at a l l l e v e l s . (15) 
During the f i r s t phase of i t s operations i n Cyprus, 1964 - 1968, 
U.N.P.I.CYP. was quite successful i n i t s " p a c i f i c a t i o n r o l e " . But the 
period 1968 - 1"974, when intercommunal negotiations had resumed, 
represented a "second phase" f o r U.N.P.I.CYP., when i t s m i l i t a r y duties 
"lapsed i n t o routine observation, p a t r o l l i n g , and l i a i s o n . " (16) During 
t h i s "dead period" f o r the United Nations Force, Harbottle argues more 
could have been done on the ground to bring the disputants closer 
together, w h i l s t the leaderships of each side discussed a settlement. 
For instance, U.N.F.I.CYP.'s mandate ( see Section Two, Chapter Four ) 
could have been extended to enable wider "peacebuilding i n i t i a t i v e s " , 
i . e . the promotion of peaceful s o c i a l change through socio-economic 
- 77 -
reconstruction and development, or what Stagenga termed as " c i v i c action 
p r o j e c t s . " (T7) A l t e r n a t i v e l y , the s t r u c t u r e of U.N.F.I.CYP. could have 
been a l t e r e d to allow f o r an enlargement of i t e Operations Economics 
branch i n the m i l i t a r y , or a la r g e r c i v i l i a n p o l i ce contingent. I n other 
words, to al l o w for-an enlarged humanitarian and economic r o l e f a c i l i t a t i n g 
the promotion of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s conception of "normality" i n Cyprus. 
Indeed other specialized agencies of the United Nations could work i n 
tandem w i t h U.N.F.I.CYP. to promote greater socio-economic s t a b i l i t y i n 
Cyprus as they have done i n several troubled areas of the Third World. 
Michael Harbottle (18) argued f o r :-
a combined operation i n which d i f f e r e n t types of agencies are 
needed f o r the peaceful containment of c o n f l i c t , the r e -
establishment of s t a b i l i t y , and the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of community 
l i f e . " 
Others have pointed out that i n the l a t e - S i x t i e s and early-Seventies 
Cyprus "represented the most concentrated f i e l d of United Nations 
development a i d i n the world.**" (T9) The^ United Nations Development 
Programme i n Cyprus ( U.N.D.P.) was d i s t i n c t from U.N.F.I.CYP., and i t s 
a i d was not designed to support the Force's mandate. I n the- l i g h t of 
United Nations r e c o g n i t i o n of the Government of Cyprus, U.N.D.P. was 
unable to accede to the Turkish P r o v i s i o n a l Administration's c a l l f o r 
a share of U.N.D.P. a i d , accredited to the Greek Cypriot a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
I n s p i t e of t h i s l i m i t a t i o n , there was ... 
"...much u n o f f i c i a l l i a i s o n between the o f f i c e r s of U.N„D.P. 
and U.N.F.I.CYP., and pressure by U.N.D.P. experts to i n t e g r a t e 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot i n i t s various p r o j e c t s to 
support U.N.F.I.CYP.'B e f f o r t s to achieve a r e t u r n to normalcy.**(20) 
An example of UoN.D.P. and U.N.F.I.CYP. cooperation leading to i n t e r -
communal cooperation was over the completion of the spillway of the Kanli 
Keuy Dam, located i n the Geunyeli - Aghirda Enclave. (21) ( r e f e r to 
Chapter Five ) Unfortunately, such examples of an i n t e g r a t i o n of United 
Nations agencies i n closing the gap between the c o n f l i c t i n g communities 
are very rare i n the case of Cyprus. Furthermore, U.N.F.I.CYP.'s 
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mandate was l e f t unaltered, and the size and scope of the Force were 
reduced rather than extended ( r e f e r to Table 4 . 1 . ) , whist c i v i l i a n 
peacebuilding i n i t i a t i v e s were not made by the Security Council to 
bri n g the two communities together at grass roots l e v e l . ( r e f e r to 
Chapter Five, which discusses many of these points i n more d e t a i l . ) 
I n sum, the d e f i n i t i o n of peacekeeping and the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of a 
peacekeeping force are i n themselves r e s t r i c t i o n s , f o r they allow the 
Force- scope only to preserve a status qucr rathe r than to work f o r a 
s o l u t i o n to the underlying f e a r s , m i s t r u s t , and "psychological green 
l i n e s " between the c o n f l i c t i n g p a r t i e s . A peacekeeper's major f u n c t i o n 
i s to keep the two sides apart i n order to prevent a recurrence of 
f i g h t i n g . On the whole, U.N.F.I.CYP. di d an admirable job, but as 
w i l l be shown i n l a t e r chapters, more could have been done to promote 
higher l e v e l s of intercommunal cooperation i n s p i t e of the p o l i t i c a l 
r i f t between community leaders. I n the f o l l o w i n g sections some- important 
features of a peacekeeping operation should be kept i n mind :-
(a) I t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l composition and command; 
(b) The p r i n c i p l e of i m p a r t i a l i t y ; 
(c) The p r i n c i p l e of non-coercion: 
Section Two: U-N-F.I.CYP,,'s Mandate. 
I n i t s r e s o l u t i o n T86 of 4 March, T964, the Security Council recommended 
" that the f u n c t i o n of the Force should be, i n the i n t e r e s t of 
preserving i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y , to use i t s best 
e f f o r t s to prevent a> recurrence of f i g h t i n g and, as necessary, 
to contribute to the maintenance and r e s t o r a t i o n of law and 
order and a r e t u r n to normal conditions. , r 
Such an ambiguous mandate leaves plenty of room f o r d i f f e r i n g 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n Cyprus. I n p r a c t i c 
the Secretary-General i s delegated s u b s t a n t i a l a u t h o r i t y by the Security 
Council to c l a r i f y and i n t e r p r e t the U.N. r e s o l u t i o n f o r the p r a c t i c a l 
purposes of U.N.F.I.CYP. 
1 
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D i f f e r i n g I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . 
i ) The Greek Cypriot Viewpoint: 
Each leadership saw U.N.F.I.CYP.'s tasks i n terms of t h e i r own 
mutually exclusive p o l i t i c a l goals. President Makarios wanted to 
extend h i s regime's e f f e c t i v e t e r r i t o r i a l c o n t r o l over the whole 
Republic, i n c l u d i n g those f o r t y or so areas c o n t r o l l e d by Turkish 
Cypriots. As the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y recognized a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f o r the 
whole i s l a n d i t argued that the U.N. Force should help i t to eliminate 
the Turkish Cypriots* " r e b e l l i o n " i n order that peace, law and order 
could be restored. As I n t e r i o r M i n i s t e r Georgadjis put i t , 
" The United Nations troops should be n e u t r a l , but that does 
not mean they should t r e a t both sides on an equal f o o t i n g i n 
the confli c t . . . Y o u cannot equate a ma j o r i t y w i t h a m i n o r i t y , 
the l e g a l government wi t h the leaders of a group." (22) 
The Greek Cypriot Leadership wanted U.N.F.I.CYP. to extinguish what 
they saw as a "separatist movement". References were frequently made 
to O.N.U.C.'s part i n crushing the Katanga secession i n the Congo to 
j u s t i f y a s i m i l a r r o l e f o r U.N.F.I.CYP. I n one sense the Force 
conformed to the Cyprus Government's conception of i t s duties as f a r 
as they e n t a i l e d the removal of f o r t i f i c a t i o n s and physical blockades 
between the communities, aswell as measures promoting intercommunal 
economic i n t e g r a t i o n . (23) U Thant, Secretary General, d i d c o n t i n u a l l y 
i n s i s t that U.N.F.I.CYP. was not an adjunct to the Makarios Administration. 
I t s i n i t i a l aim was to keep the protagonists apart. These " b u f f e r " 
duties were c r i t i c i z e d by some Greek Cypriots as a deliberate attempt 
to protect Turkish Cypriots i n t h e i r " s e p a r a t i s t " cause. 
Whatever Makarios' long-term p o l i t i c a l goals were, i . e . Enosis or a 
sovereign, independent, non-aligned and u n i t a r y s t a t e , h i s Government's 
c o n t r o l over ninety per cent of Cypriot t e r r i t o r y was p a r t l y aided by 
United Nations r e c o g n i t i o n . I n the Secretary General's March 1965 
Report, U Thant argues that the Greek Cypriots saw the Force's main 
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fu n c t i o n to be a s s i s t i n g them to restore normality 
" conceived by them...as an orderly submission of the 
Turkish Cypriot community to the a u t h o r i t y and 
l e g i s l a t i o n of the Government." (24) 
i i ) The Turkish Cypriot Viewpoint : 
A pro-Turkish Cypriot viewpoint i s expressed by Pierre Oberling, 1982, 
who w r i t e s , " the T963-T964 c r i s i s was a most unusual phenomenon: i t 
was not a r e v o l u t i o n by a downtrodden mi n o r i t y against an 
arrogant, oppressive m a j o r i t y , but a r e v o l u t i o n by an 
arrogant, oppressive m a j o r i t y against a downtrodden m i n o r i t y . " ( 
I n a memorandum submitted to Senior Galo Plaza, U.N. Mediator, on 
22 February 1965, Vice President Kiicuk spelled out the viewpoint of 
the Turkish Cypriot Leadership, arguing that the Greek Cypriots wanted 
to subjugate and destroy the Turkish Cypriot community. He suggested 
physical separation of the communities as a s o l u t i o n , a suggestion 
supported by Ankara. (26) The Turkish Cypriots saw U.N.F.I.CYP.'S 
r o l e to protect them from Greek Cypriot aggression and to preserve 
t h e i r scattered t e r r i t o r i a l c o n t r o l w i t h i n the Republic. Subsequent 
chapters w i l l examine the extent to which U.N.F.I.CYP. protected t h i s 
de facto p a r t i t i o n . 
i i i ) U Thant's I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Mandate. 
Given the d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposite positions of the two leaderships 
concerning the p o s i t i o n of U.N.F.I.CYP., i t was given awkward tasks to 
f u l f i l by a vaguely worded mandate. As Charles Moskos, 1976, argues, 
" the mandate of U.N.F.I.CYP. was vague ehough to allow the 
disputants to read t h e i r own s e l f - s e r v i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
i n t o it...Though t h i s ambiguity i n U.N.F.I.CYP.'s mandate could 
and did lead to problems i n the f i e l d , i t helped to make the 
U.N. Force acceptable to the concerned p a r t i e s . " (27) 
Sometimes the Force was accused of bias by e i t h e r side i n the pursuance 
of i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , but t h i s was unavoidable f o r U.N.F.I.CYP. did 
not conform to e i t h e r community's p o l i t i c a l goals. Although the United 
Nations recognized "the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus and the 
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a u t h o r i t y of the Government" i t d i d not operate "as an arm of the 
Government". (28) U Thant r e a l i z e d that without a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e ^ 
ment the best U.N.P.I.CYP. could do was maintain an "uneasy e q u i l i b r i u m " 
and t r y to create "an atmosphere more favourable to the e f f o r t s to 
achieve a long-term settlement."(29) He set the guidelines f o r the 
Force's operations w i t h the l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by the fundamental 
"mistrust between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership" 
very much i n mind. (30) 
Obviously U.N.P.I.CYP.'s main task was to act " i n the i n t e r e s t of 
preserving i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y " . The Force proved success-
f u l i n preventing an escalation of c i v i l war i n Cyprus i n t o a Greco-
Turkish war p r i o r to 1974, although diplomatic i n t e r v e n t i o n by the 
superpowers also helped f o r e s t a l l a Turkish m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n i n both 
August '64 and November '67. (3?) 
SeconjLy, U.N.F.I.CYP. had "to use i t s best e f f o r t s to prevent a 
recurrence of f i g h t i n g " by i n t e r p o s i t i o n i n g i t s troops between the 
b e l l i g e r e n t s wherever possible, and by using i t s good o f f i c e s to reduce 
tensions and confrontations. ( see Chapter Five ) 
T h i r d l y , U.N.F.I.CYP. had "to contribute to the maintenance of law and 
order", which was not defined i n l e g a l i s t i c terminology but i n terms of 
s t a b i l i t y and providing p r o t e c t i o n , i . e . p r o t e c t i n g the l i f e and property 
of e i t h e r community from any source of attack by the other community. 
" The main,enance of law and order i s normally the f u n c t i o n of 
governments, and as the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Cyprus govern-
ment and U.N.F.I.CYP. has never been c l e a r l y defined, and has 
been subject to considerable f l u c t u a t i o n s i n g o o d w i l l , i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t to judge the extent of the U.N. c o n t r i b u t i o n i n t h i s 
area." (32) 
Harbottle, 1974, i n The Thin Blue Line, comments on the words "contribute 
t o " i n the mandate. He argues that such wording i s i n d i c a t i v e of two thin g 
4 
t 
" the desire on the part of the Security Council to leave 
provisions of the mandate as f l e x i b l e as possible, d i c t a t i n g 
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no r i g i d guidelines nor prescribing any f i x e d o b j e c t i v e s , 
and the adherence to the accepted p r i n c i p l e of U.N. peace-
keeping i n t e r v e n t i o n as one of a s s i s t i n g rather than 
enforcement." (33) 
F i n a l l y , U.N.F.I.CYP. was asked to contribute to "a r e t u r n to normal 
conditions". I t has often been asked what pr e c i s e l y was meant by 
"normal conditions" ? U Thant c a r e f u l l y avoided a p o l i t i c a l i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of the phrase, applying h i s conception of normality to day-to-
day socio-economic l i f e i n Cyprus. U.N.F.I.CYP. rendered assistance... 
" i n the amelioration of day-to-day a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , economic, 
s o c i a l or j u d i c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s i n g from the d i v i s i o n of 
the communities." (34) 
U.N.F.I.CYP. and Use of Force. 
I n h i s A p r i l , T964, aid memoire. the Secretary General stated that 
"the use of force i s permissible only i n self-defence". (35) Nevertheless, 
"a r a t h e r generous d e f i n i t i o n of self-defence" was intended (36), which 
covered :-
( i ) The defence of United Nations' posts, premises and vehicles under 
armed attack, and 
( i i ) The support of other personnel i n U.N.F.I.CYP. under armed attack.(37) 
U.N.F.I.CYP. could not use force to impose peace, and " i t s use of the 
medium of n e g o t i a t i o n " i s " i t s chief weapon f o r s e t t l i n g a problem".(38) 
I t had to be ready to step i n to part the disputants as soon as they showed 
i n c l i n a t i o n to renew f i g h t i n g . Only when mediation, gentle persuasion, 
and n e g o t i a t i o n f a i l e d , were "measured amoujts of f i r e power" permissible 
"to protect the United Nations operation...and uphold previously 
negotiated settlements." (39) 
Section Three : U.N.F.I.CYP.'s Compostion and Deployment. 
( r e f e r to Table 4.1 ) 
As James A.Stagenga points out :-
" During U.N.F.I.CYP.'s f i r s t tense year there were over 
- 83 -
TABLE 4:1. U.N.P.I.CYP. SIZE AND COMPOSITION, 30 APRIL 1964 TO 31 MAY 1984. 
Date Total U.N.P.I.CYP. M i l i t a r y 
Personnel 
C i v i l i a n 
Personnel 
U.K. Contingent 
( c o n t r i b u t i o n ) 
30 A p r i l 
1964 
6,369 6,34T 28 2,719 
14 August 
T964 
6,211 6,037 174 1,034 
7 June 1966 4 ,861 4 ,687 174 T,053 
7 June 1'967 4,622 4,449 173 1,127 
7 December 
1967 
4,737 4,563 174 1,227 
7 March '68 4,745 4,570 175 1,245 
2 Dec. '68 3,708 3 ,533 175 1,090 
1 Dec. '69 3,650 3,475 T75 1,068 
1 Dec. '70 3,182 3,007 175 t,078 
13 Nov. '71 3,119 2 ,95T 168 1,049 
T3 May '72 3,096 2,922 174 1,055 
4 Dec. '74 4 ,335 4,183 152 1,410 
30 Nov. '75 3,069 3,001 68 809 
30 Nov. '82 2,348 2.3T4 34 761 
30 Dec. '83 2,348 2,314 34 761 
31' May '84 2,347 2,311 36 760 
These f i g u r e s are taken r e s p e c t i v e l y from U.N. Document s :-
S/5679, S/59TO, S/7350, S/7969, S/8286, S/8914 , S/8446, S/952T, S/10005, 
S/T0401, S/10664, S/TT568, S /T1900, S/15502, S/16192, and S/16596. 
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40,000 other w e l l - f e d and f a i r l y w e l l - t r a i n e d armed men on 
the i s l a n d at any given time, w i t h more men e a s i l y available 
f o r speedy m o b i l i s a t i o n . U.N.P.I.CYP. was outmanned by each 
side; simple s t a t i s t i c s m i l i t a t e d against the Force's taking 
any rash p u n i t i v e actions." (40) 
The Force comprises d i s t i n c t n a t i o n a l contingents which f o r the most 
part f u n c t i o n as such (41), and a small c i v i l i a n element of c i v i l 
servants and c i v i l i a n p o l i ce ( U.N.CIV.POL. ) Heading the m i l i t a r y 
element i s the Force Commander, while the p o l i t i c a l element i s headed 
by the Secretary General's Special Representative. The various b a t t e r i e s , 
brigades, regiments, squadrons, and oth e r ' u n i t s are commanded by t h e i r 
n a t i o n a l commanders, vihxr received d i r e c t i v e s from the Force Commander. 
The n a t i o n a l contingents comprised some regular s o l d i e r s ( e.g. U.K. and 
Canada ) and some volunteers (e.g. Scandinavian countries ) . Most of 
U.N.F.I.CYP.'s co n t r i b u t o r s I r e l a n d , the Scandanavian states^ and 
Canada had taken p a r t i n the two previous instances of U.N. peace-
keeping operations i n the Congo and Suez. (42) 
Physical Geography and Force Deployment. 
One of the most fundamental problems posed by geography f o i r any m i l i t a r y 
force i s that of s p a t i a l deployment" of l i m i t e d manpower over large areas 
of t e r r i t o r y , o f t e n characterized by a v a r i e t y of physical features from 
l o c a t i o n to l o c a t i o n . U.N.F.I.CYP.'s r e l a t i v e f u n c t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y 
compared to other U.N. Forces i s p a r t l y due to the f a c t that i t has 
operated i n a small, compact i s l a n d roughly the combined size- of Norfolk 
and Su f f o l k . U.N.F.I.CYP.'s l o g i s t i c a l problems were, therefore, not 
nearly so complex as those e x i s t i n g f o r the much l a r g e r Congo Force, 
O.N.U.C. (43) Cyprus also had the advantages of w e l l developed i n f r a -
s t r u c t u r e and l o g i s t i c a l support f o r U.N.F.I.CYP. from the Sovereign Base 
Areas. 
I n s p i t e of such advantages, a knowledge of the basic topography of 
Cyprus i s c r u c i a l f o r an understanding of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s deployment i n 
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the T964-*74 period. ( r e f e r to map 4.4- ) For example, i n Lefka D i s t r i c t , 
the rugged, northern f o o t h i l l s of the Troodos meant that i s o l a t e d , 
s t a t i c observations posts ( O.P.s ) were preferred to one mobile 
U.N.P.I.CYP. u n i t . The reasons f o r t h i s are obvious. I n t h i s area the 
"confrontation l i n e s " , represented by National Guard and Fighter p o s i t i o n s 
followed a h e l t e r - s k e l t e r course along mountain tops and edges o f t e n only 
a hundred or less yards apart. I r i s h Contingent O.P.s were l i n k e d by a 
rough, narrow t r a c k , s u i t a b l e only f o r jeeps and goats, and were supplied 
by U.N. R.A.F. a i r c r a f t , stationed at Nicosia. I n the winter the jeep 
tracks were o f t e n impassable, thus O.P.s were by f a r the best way of main-
t a i n i n g United Nations surveillance i n t h i s region. Each Observation 
Post detachment did not have the a b i l i t y to intervene i n c o n f l i c t 
s i t u a t i o n s themselves, but could quickly report shooting i n c i d e n t s v i a 
radio so that the platoon or company commander could at once meet l o c a l 
Greek or Turkish commanders to begin cease-fire negotiations. (44) 
P o l i t i c a l Geography and Force Deployment. ( r e f e r to Map 4.1 ) 
i ) Contingent Level Deployment : 
The basis of U.N.F.I.CYP.'s deployment was to match as f a r as possible 
the island's D i s t r i c t boundaries^ to f a c i l i t a t e the ess e n t i a l r e l a t i o n -
ship that would e x i s t between United Nations contingent commanders and 
D i s t r i c t O f f i c e r s and t h e i r senior o f f i c i a l s , together w i t h l o c a l 
representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community. Five operational 
zones were i n i t i a l l y chosen ( see Map 4.1 ) The pe c u l i a r p a t t e r n of i n t e r 
communal c o n f l i c t and varying i n d i v i d u a l strengths of each contingent 
d i d not allow for-one contingent per D i s t r i c t , but U.N.P.I.CYP. was 
deployed i n such a way as to ensure that D i s t r i c t s were covered according 
to the i n t e n s i t y of armed c o n f r o n t a t i o n . Thus, Nicosia and i t s immediate 
environment, had two contingents; the troubled D i s t r i c t s of Kyrenia and 
Lefka had one each; the remaining two contingents covered the r e l a t i v e l y 
quiet f o u r D i s t r i c t s of Famagusta, Lamaca, Limassol, and Paphos. 
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i i ) Cease-Fire Lines : 
The map of Cyprus was complicated by cease-fire l i n e s around Turkish 
Cypriot enclaves. Along these U.N.F.I.CYP. manned permanent posts and 
regular p a t r o l s . The enclaves of Guenyeli - Aghirda; L i m n i t i s and 
Kokkina, a l l has boundaries d e l i m i t e d as a r e s u l t of cease-fire agree-
ments accepted by community leaders on both sides and U.N.F.I.CYP. 
St a t i c O.P.s were maintained by "blue berrets" between the Forward 
Defence Lines of e i t h e r - s i d e . I t was up to U.N.F.I.CYP. to ensure that 
n e i t h e r side encroached on the U.N.-controlled " n e u t r a l " t e r r i t o r y 
separating them. Such cease-fire l i n e s were i n i t i a l l y devised as a 
temporary measure to keep the antagonistic communities apart u n t i l a 
p o l i t i c a l settlement erased or redrew these l i n e s . But as Richard Patrick 
points out, " As the c o n f l i c t dragged on, wit h no p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n i n 
s i g h t , the cease-fire l i n e s assumed more s i g n i f i c a n c e . . . 
Ambiguities which had at f i r s t been accepted were no longer 
t o l e r a t e d . Both sides sought pretexts to manouvre t h e i r armed 
posts forward..." (45) 
For much of the time U.N.F.I.CYP. succeeded i n persuading offending 
p a r t i e s to withdraw to o l d p o s i t i o n s , to f i l l i n trenches, remove 
extended f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , but i n c e r t a i n circumstances new f r o n t - l i n e s 
emerged, or new posts forward of established defence l i n e s . ( refeir to 
Chapter Five ) 
The best example of permanent U.N.F.I.CYP. deployment since i t s a r r i v a l 
i n Cyprus was along Nicosia's "Green Line". 
w Within the walls of Nicosia...U.N.F.I.CYP. i n h e r i t e d a cease-
f i r e agreement that d i d not accurately record the exact width 
of the "Green Line" d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n zone..." (46) 
As a r e s u l t there were- frequent v i o l a t i o n s of the Green Line Agreement 
by both Greek- and Turkish Cypriots. One of the major tasks of U.N.F.I.-
CYP. was to prevent the armed occupation of buildings over-looking the 
"Green Line" or any "clandestine i n f i l t r a t i o n i n t o vacant properties on 
both sides of the s t r e e t s making the l i n e i t s e l f " . (47) This was-a 
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d i f f i c u l t task f o r along Hermes and Paphos streets,Turks and Greeks 
l i v e d i n close proximity, there was a Greek Cypriot shopping area, and 
Greek bazaar traders continued to carry out t h e i r businesses there. The 
s l i g h t e s t i n c i d e n t could moreover spark o f f a chain r e a c t i o n , e.g. a 
shouted abuse across the s t r e e t ; a youth throwing a stone; or the 
accidental discharge of a r i f l e . Along t h i s l i n e of close armed confront-
a t i o n U.N.P.I.CYP. needed endless patience and v i g i l a n c e . O.P.s were 
placed at regular i n t e r v a l s along the whole length of the Green Line with 
frequent p a t r o l s between them. 
On one occasion U.N.F.I.CYP. discovered Turkish Cypriot Fighters had 
set up clandestine positions i n houses along the Green Line, mostly by 
making "mouse-holes" through rear walls and shuttered shops on the north 
side of the s t r e e t s . (48) U.N.F.I.CYP. was not prepared to l e t an 
Agreement: i t was not party to obstruct the f u l f i l m e n t of i t s o b j e c t i v e s . 
I d e a l l y i t would have preferred the complete e l i m i n a t i o n of the Green 
Line, which was a b a r r i e r to "normality", a symbol of segregation, as 
w e l l as a t r a f f i c hazard. Instead U.N.F.I.CYP. did what i t could to 
f o s t e r a " r e t u r n to normal conditions" w i t h i n Nicosia by reopening shops 
and businesses on both sides of the d i v i d i n g l i n e . Any erosion of the 
d e m i l i t a r i z e d area c o n t r o l l e d by U.N.F.I.CYP. would tend to create a 
large "no-man's-land" area i n and around the streets of c e n t r a l Nicosia, 
preventing any economic a c t i v i t y from taking place there. To ease tension 
U.N.F.I.CYP. arranged f o r the removal of a l l Turkish f o r t i f i e d posts and 
armed men, plus the blocking of "mouse-holes" i n properties along the 
Green Line. 
The United Nations Force was unfortunately saddled w i t h the Green Line, 
and as Brigadier Harbottle explains :-
" There was nothing we could do about i t , so long as both sides 
i n s i s t e d upon i t s continued existence. But from the m i l i t a r y 
p oin* of view, i t was a waste of manpower —manpower which 
could have been used more e f f e c t i v e l y i n a less s t a t i c role."(49) 
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Simi l a r problems existed i n other towns w i t h "green l i n e s " , such as 
Lamaca, Pamagusta, and Paphos. 
i i i ) Deployment i n areas away from close confrontation l i n e s : 
As mentioned i n Chapter Three, U.N.F.I.CYP. was not j u s t a " b u f f e r 
f o r c e " but was also a "law and order" f o r c e . Thus i t not only had an 
interposi"fcionary r o l e to play, manning s t a t i c posts between the f r o n t -
l i n e s of opposing f i g h t e r s , but i t also had to maintain a high degree 
of m o b i l i t y , so that i t could send u n i t s r a p i d l y to trouble-spots 
wherever and whenever they arose. I n t h i s way U.N.P.I.CYP. contrasted 
sharply w i t h U.N.E.P., stationed on the I s r a e l i - E g y p t i a n border from 
T956 to 1967, and other border-patrol forces. (50) P r i o r to July 1974 
W.N.F.I.CYP.'s troops could be seen almost everywhere, " p a t r o l l i n g s t r e e t s 
and the countryside, stationed i n Nicosia's stores, even standing 
around h o t e l swimming pools. , r (5T) 
Redeployment of contingents was sometimes necessary to secure a more 
e f f i c i e n t use of available personnel i n r e l a t i o n to t e r r a i n and m i l i t a r y 
requirements. Indeed broad operational zones were a l t e r e d according to 
the Force's size and c a p a b i l i t i e s . ( r e f e r to Map 4.2 ) For instance, 
when the i n i t i a l deployment of the Force was decided upon, BRIT.CON. 
( i . e . the B r i t i s h Contingent ) was a l l o c a t e d the southern zone around 
Limassol, adjacent to two Sovereign Bases, Episkopi and Dhekelia, both 
important f o r t h e i r l o g i s t i c a l support. Later i t was decided to extend 
the contingent's boundary, f i r s t westwards to include 'Paphos and P o l i s , 
then eastwards to include the v i l l a g e of Kophinou at the j u n c t i o n of the 
Limassol - Nicosia and the Limassol - Larnaca roads. This enlarged BRIT. 
CON. zone was over 1,000 square miles, the largest of a l l U.N.F.I.CYP. 
contingent areas. A permanent B r i t i s h I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n camp was located 
at Polemidhia, j u s t north of Limassol town. Supporting t h i s was a mobile 
squadron of armoured vehicles stationed at Zyyi, sixteen miles to the 
east of Limassol. The squadron's task was to p a t r o l a l l roads and tracks 
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to 
away from permanent U.N. p o s t s and r e g u l a r p a t r o l s , and^make "morale 
b o o s t e r " v i s i t s to f a r - f l u n g v i l l a g e s where a permanent U.N. p r e s e n c e 
was i m p o s s i b l e . ( 5 2 ) I n o r d e r to c o v e r most of the i n h a b i t e d a r e a o f 
Cyprus o t h e r c o n t i n g e n t s had s i m i l a r mobile u n i t s o p e r a t i n g everywhere 
t h e r e c o u l d not be a more permanent U.N.P.I.CYP. p r e s e n c e . 
S e c t i o n F o u r : U.N.F.I.CYP.'s Freedom of Movement. 
While U.N.F.I.CYP. was t r y i n g to remove o b s t r u c t i o n s to the f r e e move-
ment o f c i v i l i a n s , i t s own m o b i l i t y was r e s t r i c t e d . ( 5 3 ) On 10 November, 
1964, the F o r c e Commander r e a c h e d an agreement w i t h the Cyprus Government, 
which a l l o w e d U.N.F.I.CYP. "to e n j o y f u l l freedom of movement throughout 
the t e r r i t o r y o f C y p r u s " but f o r c e r t a i n s t i p u l a t e d a r e a s . ( 5 4 ) These 
a r e a s were as f o l l o w s :-
i ) T w e n t y - t h r e e a r e a s , m o s t l y around the c o a s t , which c o u l d be v i s i t e d 
o n l y a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h G e n e r a l G r i v a s . These c o v e r e d 45 s q u a r e 
m i l e s ( o r 1,25 % ) of the t o t a l a r e a of the c o u n t r y . 
i i ) S i x t y - t h r e e a r e a s , s c a t t e r e d throughout the i s l a n d , which c o u l d be 
i n t e r p r e t e d as s t r a t e g i c N a t i o n a l Guard a r e a s , and c o u l d be i n s p e c t e d 
by U.N.F.I.CYP. Zone o r D i s t r i c t Commanders- not below the rank of 
L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l , and o n l y i f p r i o r n o t i c e was g i v e n to l o c a l 
N a t i o n a l Guard commanders. These a r e a s c o v e r e d 15 s quare m i l e s ( i . e . 
0.4 % ) of the t o t a l a r e a o f C yprus. 
Maps were d i s t r i b u t e d to i n d i c a t e t h e s e N a t i o n a l Guard " r e s t r i c t e d a r e a s " 
p r e c i s e l y f o r the b e n e f i t o f a l l c o n c e r n e d . D e s p i t e t h i s p r e c a u t i o n U.N. 
F o r c e movements were s t i l l i n t e r f e r e d w i t h by the N a t i o n a l Guard and Greek 
f o r c e s beyond the agreed r e s t r i c t e d a r e a s . G e n e r a l G r i v a s , as the Supreme 
Commander o f the Greek and Greek C y p r i o t armed f o r c e s , c o n s i d e r e d i t h i s 
r i g h t to r e s t r i c t the movement o f U.N.F.I.CYP. whenever he thought f i t . 
Indeed he added s e v e r a l new r e s t r i c t e d a r e a s to the o r i g i n a l l i s t w i t h o u t 
p r i o r - c o n s u l t a t i o n o r warning to the U.N.F.I.CYP. H e a d q u a r t e r s . ( 5 5 ) 
Another i n h i b i t i n g f a c t o r on U.N.F.I.CYP.'s m o b i l i t y was the f a c t t h a t 
U.N. p a t r o l s were open to o b s t r u c t i o n o r h a r a s s m e n t whenever they 
approached o r moved through a r e a s under the a u t h o r i t y o f T u r k i s h F i g h t e r s . 
Q u e s t i o n a b l y , the o n l y a r e a s where the U.N. F o r c e had f u l l freedom of 
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m o b i l i t y were i n areas of "n e u t r a l ground" between Forward Defence Lines 
of each side. Any attempts to move i n t o U.N.-controlled t e r r i t o r y had 
to be prevented i f possible, although the Force was not always successful 
i n t h i s respect. U.N.F.I.CYP. p a t r o l s were occasionally impeded even 
along recognized and l e g i t i m a t e p a t r o l tracks w e l l away from armed posts 
or f o r t i f i c a t i o n s of e i t h e r community. As w i l l be i l l u s t r a t e d i n 
Chapter Five, i n p r a c t i c e , l i k e the d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l l y - motivated 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of U.N.P.I.CYP.'s mandate, "freedom of movement" meant 
d i f f e r e n t things to d i f f e r e n t people. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. 
PEACEKEEPING IN PRACTICE : U.N.F.I.CYP.'s FIRST DECADE. 
"...ultimate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a return to normal 
conditions i n Cyprus must, obviously, r e s t p r i m a r i l y 
with the a u t h o r i t i e s and people of Cyprus themselves, 
s i n c e normality can come along only as a r e s u l t of a 
determination by the communities... to l a y down t h e i r 
arms and seek to l i v e again i n peace." ( 1 ) 
U.N.F.I.CYP.'s presence contributed "to the r e l a t i v e 
p a c i f i c a t i o n of Cyprus, i t also froze the s i t u a t i o n so 
that the Turkish Cypriot enclaves and l i n e s of d i v i s i o n 
i n the c i t i e s remained i n t a c t f o r a decade." (2) 
" I t would be unfortunate, to say the l e a s t , i f the 
present e f f e c t i v e n e s s of U.N.F.I.CYP. should become 
the pretext f o r f a i l u r e to f i n d a s o l u t i o n to the 
fundamental problem of Cyprus." (3) 
The decade August 1964 to July 1974 w i l l be divided into two d i s t i n c t 
periods f o r U.N.F.I.CYP. The f i r s t , August 1 9 6 4 - November '67", began 
and ended with major intercommunal clashes which nearly triggered o f f 
f u l l - s c a l e war between Greece and Turkey. The second period, November 
' 6 7 to July ' 7 4 , i s one of l e s s intercomraunal tension, renewed i n t e r -
communal negotiations, and serious intra-communal s p l i t s i n the Greek 
Cypriot community. 
Section One : P o l i t i c a l Background. August ' 6 4 to November ' 6 7 . 
There i s no room here f o r a f u l l a n a l y s i s of intercommunal p o l i t i c s 
i n t h i s period, and the reader i s asked to r e f e r to the Bibliography 
f o r references dealing with the i s s u e s mentioned here i n g r e a t e r depth. 
This period was marked by the f a i l u r e of any suggestions f o r a s e t t l e -
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raent and the t o t a l lack of negotiations between the r e s p e c t i v e community 
le a d e r s h i p s . The Acheson Plan (4) was r e j e c t e d by George Papandreou of 
Greece as " p a r t i t i o n masquerading i n the r h e t o r i c of E n o s i s " owing to 
the opposition of Makarios. Senor Glao Plaza's recommendations i n h i s 
report of 26 March 1965 were immediately r e j e c t e d by Ankara. ( 5 ) Oberling 
( 1982 ) argues that the U.N. Mediator's a n a l y s i s "displayed a c a l l o u s 
disregard f o r the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots". Meanwhile Archbishop 
Makarios lobbied f o r an independent sovereign s t a t e abroad and 
simultaneously assured h i s community that he was s t i l l dedicated to the 
goal of E n o s i s . (6) 
On T8 December 1 9 6 5 , a U.N. General Assembly r e s o l u t i o n ( 2077(xx) ) 
supported the Cyprus Government's claim f o r unfettered independence and 
i t e f f e c t i v e l y discounted Turkey's claim to the r i g h t of i n t e r v e n t i o n 
based on the Zurich-London T r e a t i e s of T 9 5 9 . With the support of most 
of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community behind him (7) Archbishop Makarios "could 
proceed from a p o s i t i o n of strength i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g the new 
conditions i n Cyprus", i . e . a Republic based on majority r u l e . (8) 
I n A p r i l 1967 events took a turn f o r the worse when 'the c o l o n e l s ' 
s e i z e d power i n Athens. Suddenly Makarios found himself i d e o l o g i c a l l y 
out-of-step with the right-wing Junta, f o r as Oberling points out, the' 
a u t h o r i t a r i a n , anti-communist Greek Junta "vehemently d i s l i k e d " 
Makarios' " L e f t i s t sympathies and independent mindedness". (9) Within 
Cyprus Makarios was plagued by the aggressiveness and insubordination 
of General Grivas, who s t i l l believed Enosis would be won by force of 
arms. Furthermore, many Greek o f f i c e r s and men had c l a n d e s t i n e l y 
i n f i l t r a t e d the National Guard. (10) Indeed U.N.F.I.CYP. i n c r e a s i n g l y 
i d e n t i f i e d the National Guard with the Greek Army. (11) Although Makarios 
t r i e d to weaken G r i v a s ' p o s i t i o n by reducing the National Guard's 
budgetry a l l o c a t i o n s and by strengthening the Cyprus P o l i c e Force, t h i s 
did not prevent Grivas from launching the l a r g e s t offensive against theOgf 
Turkish Cypriots since Kokkina T964. I n mid-November 1967' the NationalM/= 
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Guard attacked the v i l l a g e s of Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros, k i l l i n g 
twenty-one Turkish Cypriots, an operation which led the two community 
leaderships to reevaluate the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . 
Section Two : U.N.F.I.CYP.'s F i r s t Phase . 1964 - Nov.'67. 
Given the vested i n t e r e s t s of outside powers, N.A.T.O. considerations, 
the p o l a r i s a t i o n of ethnic p o l i t i c s i n Cyprus and the a c t i v i t i e s of the 
National Guard, there was l i t t l e U.N.F.I.CYP. could do other than... 
"remain as n e u t r a l as p o s s i b l e i n the p o l i t i c a l f r a y while 
promoting a calm atmosphere and buying the necessary time 
to enable the p a r t i e s and the Mediator to work out a 
durable and honourable settlement together." (12) 
U.N.F.I.CYP.'s major task was to preserve a peaceful s t a t u s quo between 
the communities w h i l s t higher l e v e l p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e s were being 
sought. As Harbottle explains :-
"Cyprus provides a patchwork of scenarios i n v o l v i n g d i f f e r i n g 
degrees and types of t h i r d party a c t i o n ranging from the good 
o f f i c e s of the United Nations Secretary-General to the 
c o n c i l i a t o r y i n i t i a t i v e s at the grass roots l e v e l of a sub-
ordinate of low p r o f i l e c h a r a c t e r . " (13) 
By rendering a s s i s t a n c e i n the amelioration of day-to-day a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , 
socio-economic and humanitarian problems U.N7F.I.CYP. was helping to 
nurture those p o s i t i v e elements of intercommunal l i f e i n Cyprus, acting 
as a bridge as w e l l as a buffer between the two communities. The 
following s e c t i o n s deal with U.N.F.I.CYP.'s e f f o r t s to promote 'peace', 
' s t a b i l i t y ' and 'normality' i n t h i s troubled i s l a n d . 
i ) P a c i f i c a t i o n E f f o r t s . 
Perhaps the most important i n i t i a l task of U.N.F.I.CYP. was that of 
i n t e r p o s i t i o n i n g i t s troops inbetween the f i g h t e r s of both s i d e s . This 
was followed by various c e a s e - f i r e arrangements, often between l o c a l 
National Guard commanders, Turkish F i g h t e r commanders, and U.N.F.I.CYP. 
o f f i c e r s on-the-spot. At the highest l e v e l "de-confrontation" 
negotiations were c a r r i e d out by the Force Commander and the 
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Secretary-General's S p e c i a l Representative i n Cyprus. 
Examples of U.N.F.I.CYP. e f f o r t s to arrange b i - or u n i l a t e r a l 
d e f o r t l f i c a t i o n agreements. 
U.N.P.I.CYP. made strong stands against attempts by e i t h e r side to 
extend t h e i r b arricades, f r o n t - l i n e s , or erect new ones. General Grivas 
was determined to extend Greek f o r t i f i c a t i o n s throughout the i s l a n d , 
using money a l l o c a t e d to the budget f o r defence and the armed f o r c e s . 
Such a p o l i c y led to counter Turkish Cypriot moves to improve t h e i r own 
defences. For instance, the National Guard constructed a new defensive 
bunker on P a t s a l a H i l l on the south shore of the S a l t Lake of Larnaca, 
f a c i n g the Turkish suburb of S c a l a . I n response Turkish Cypriots dug 
s l i t trenches near the road and west of S c a l a between the road and the 
sea. U.N.P.I.CYP. intervened, and a f t e r t a l k s between the l o c a l Turkish 
Cypriot leader, Dr Orkan Muderrisoglu, the Turkish trenches were f i l l e d 
i n and F i g h t e r s withdrawn. Unfortunately U.N.F.I.CYP. f a i l e d to persuade 
the National Guard to unman P a t s a l a H i l l . (14) 
Larnaca was one of s e v e r a l c o a s t a l s i t e s where the Greek Cypriots 
erected a n t i - i n v a s i o n barricades adjacent to Turkish C y p r i o t - c o n t r o l l e d 
t e r r i t o r y . S i m i l a r c o a s t a l defences were at Kokkina, Temblos, Ghaziveran-
Lefka, and Famagusta. Extensions to these defences often led to out-
breaks of intercommunal f i g h t i n g . When seaward defences at Famagusta 
were constructed the Turkish Cypriots constructed p a r a l l e l b a r r i c a d e s . 
I n turn the National Guard took up a d d i t i o n a l p o s i t i o n s around Turkish 
Cypriot quarters, which eventually l e d to shooting i n c i d e n t s . There-
followed a National Guard seige on the main Turkish Cypriot quarter i n 
Famagusta. A f t e r the r e l a x i n g of the Greek Cypriot blockade, on 6 
December T965, both s i d e s agreed to dismantle a l l f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n s 
surrounding the perimeter of the* Turkish quarter ecept f o r harbour-
defences. (15) 
Another example of National Guard p o s i t i o n i n g c r e a t i n g intercommunal 
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tension was i n the Lefka - Ambelikou area. Guardsmen were placed on h i l l s 
to each side of Lefka, i . e . on Limekiln H i l l and P e r i s t e r o n a r i H i l l . (16) 
The Government contended that these p o s i t i o n s were e s s e n t i a l f o r the 
defence of the Morphou Bay c o a s t l i n e . Nevertheless these new posts 
dominating P e r i s t e r o n a r i v i l l a g e and the Ambelikou l i m e k i l n s were obviously 
provocative and Turkish Cypriote were worried that they would be used 
i n a Greek o f f e n s i v e . This made i t very d i f f i c u l t f o r U.N.P.I.CYP. to 
guarantee against a recurrence of f i g h t i n g . (17) 
U.N.P.I.CYP. never managed to get both s i d e s to agree on a " d e f o r t i f i -
c a t i o n programme". While the Greeks provocatively erected new p o s i t i o n s , 
the Turkish Cypriots consolidated t h e i r s , for-they were1 outnumbered and 
out-gunned by the National Guard. The Turkish Cypriots argued that 
U.N.P.I.CYP. was not strong enough to defend them i f they withdrew 
e x i s t i n g F i g h t e r p o s i t i o n s , and that such a move would leave Turkish 
C y p r i o t - c o n t r o l l e d t e r r i t o r y vulnerable to Greek occupation. As U Thant 
pointed out:- " There i s no peace on the I s l a n d , but a tense and 
f r a g i l e t r u c e . This s i t u a t i o n moreover i s l i k e l y to continue 
as long as...the t e r r i t o r y of the Republic i s cut up by f r o n t -
l i n e s and f o r t i f i c a t i o n s whose presence contributes to main-
ta i n i n g tension at a high p i t c h . " (18) 
V i o l a t i o n s of c e a s e - f i r e agreements and s p e c i f i c i n c i d e n t s r e q u i r i n g 
U.N.P.I.CYP. i n t e r v e n t i o n . 
I n i t i a l l y c e a s e - f i r e l i n e s were drawn as temporary measures when l o c a l 
t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s were unclear. As the c o n f l i c t dragged on these cease-
f i r e l i n e s assumed gr e a t e r s i g n i f i c a n c e . Both sides wanted the l i n e s 
delimited according to c r i t e r i a which s u i t e d them, and both sides sought 
pretexts to manouvre t h e i r armed p o s i t i o n s forward of e x i s t i n g l i n e s . 
I t was often d i f f i c u l t f o r U.N.P.I.CYP. to prevent encroachments into 
U.N. c o n t r o l l e d "neutral areas" or d e m i l i t a r i z e d zones between the forward 
l i n e s of both s i d e s . The majority of c e a s e - f i r e v i o l a t i o n s occurred 
where Turkish enclave boundaries had been delimited as a r e s u l t of cease-
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f i r e agreements accepted by U.N.F.I.CYP., the Cyprus Government, and 
Turkish Cypriot leadership, i . e . Guenyeli-Aghirda; L i m n i t i s ; Kokkina; 
and around the "green l i n e s " of Nicosia, Larnaca, and Paphos ( Ktima ) . 
t y p i c a l example occurred at P i l e r i on the western edge of the main 
Guenyeli-Aghirda Enclave ( r e f e r to Map 3.1 ) . I n September 1965 
Turkish Cypriot f i g h t e r s constructed and occupied a new post 2 , 0 0 0 metres 
west of the v i l l a g e of P i l e r i and T , 000 metres west or forward of t h e i r 
e s t a b l i s h e d Forward Defence Line. This advance had no t a c t i c a l advantage 
but was located i n what had previously been a n e u t r a l area. Some 
National Guard mortars were exploded near to t h i s new Turkish p o s i t i o n . 
( T 9 ) On January 2 2 , T966, the National Guard wounded three Turkish 
Cypriots who were cu t t i n g wood forward of t h e i r l i n e s i n the Karmi Forest 
area of the Pentadaktylos. I n February a Greek Cypriot was ambushed and 
i n j u r e d near to P i l e r i by two Turkish C y p r i o t s . ( 2 0 ) 
Other "confrontation l i n e s " e x i s t e d where National Guard and Cyprus 
P o l i c e detachments were e s t a b l i s h e d i n c l o s e proximity to armed Turkish 
Cypriot quarters and v i l l a g e s . These confrontation l i n e s were not 
n e c e s s a r i l y c l e a r l y demarcated and as mentioned i n Chapter Three; there 
were s e v e r a l "grey a r e a s " of c o n t r o l . Very often m i l i t a r y or v i o l e n t 
intercommunal i n c i d e n t s i n these areas were sparked o f f by a v a r i e t y of 
f a c t o r s , such as r e s t r i c t i o n s on freedom of movement, attempts by e i t h e r 
side to a s s e r t c o n trol i n an area of disputed t e r r i t o r i a l c o n t r o l , o f f -
beat or i r r e g u l a r Cyprus P o l i c e p a t r o l s , and attempts to score d e c i s i v e 
m i l i t a r y v i c t o r i e s . ( 2 T ) 
In the northern part of the Mesaoria P l a i n a group of v i l l a g e s formed 
an i l l - d e f i n e d Turkish Cypriot enclave. ( These v i l l a g e s were: Kalyvakia; 
Kornokipos, Petra tou Dhiyeni; Kourou Monastir; Bey Keuy; Epikho; Ayios 
Khariton ) Greek Cypriots avoided t r a v e l l i n g through t h i s area, and the 
Cyprus Government was concerned l e s t the Turkish Cypriots attempted to 
f o r t i f y t h e i r enclave and block a l l roads running through i t . During 
September 1 9 6 5 ,the Kythrea-Lefkonico road ( r e f e r to Map 5 .1 ) was 
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blocked by F i g h t e r s at Bey Keuy and P s i l a t o s , and the Trypimeni-
Vitsadha road was blocked at Knodhara. I n response U.N.F.I.CYP. 
increased i t s p a t r o l s i n the a r e a - a scout-car group ( Canadian ) was 
based at Bey Keuy, i n addition to a F i n n i s h i n f a n t r y platoon, plus two 
SWED.CON. ( Swedish Contingent ) observation posts between the Turkish 
v i l l a g e of Chatos and the Greek one of Trypimeni. (22) I n A p r i l 1966 
the Government began improving a track l i n k i n g Trypimeni and Vitsadha 
i n order to by-pass Knodhara. Turkish Cypriots argued that the Govern-
ment was t r y i n g to divide a T u r k i s h - c o n t r o l l e d area with the aim of over-
running i t . Thus Turkish Cypriots placed armed men along the route. 
Greeks complained that t h i s was a f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t i o n on t h e i r freedom 
of movement and increased National Guard and Cyprus P o l i c e presence i n 
the region u n t i l "the e n t i r e enclave was e n c i r c l e d by a government cordon 
(23) General Grivas was quickly at the scene, threatening punitive 
a c t i o n unless the Turks withdrew from t h e i r trenches near Trypimeni. 
Turkish Cypriots i n s i s t e d that i f Greek Cypriots were to use roads 
through t h e i r area of control they should be subject to searches by 
Turkish Cypriot p o l i c e . U.N.F.I.CYP. wanted the Trypimeni-Knodhara-
Ayios Khariton area to become a d e m i l i t a r i z e d zone wholly under U.N. 
s u r v e i l l a n c e . Unfortunately t h i s plan proved unacceptable to the Turkish 
Cypriot leadership and the area remained a p o t e n t i a l trouble-spot. (24) 
Further to the south there was trouble at Melousha and Mora. 
Communications between these two v i l l a g e s and those v i l l a g e s surrounding 
Chatos and Kalyvakia were d i f f i c u l t f o r they were separated by t e r r i t o r y 
under Greek Cypriot c o n t r o l . The events at Trypimeni made^ the National 
Guard and CY.POL. ( Cyprus P o l i c e ) more determined than ever to prevent 
f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t i o n s on Greek Cypriot freedom of movement i n the area. 
I n July 1966, a National Guard manouvre was made against Mora, where 
a l l e g e d l y new F i g h t e r p o s i t i o n s were erected. U.N.F.I.CYP. quickly i n t e r 
positioned men between opposing f i g h t e r elements. A U.N. post was set 
up i n the v i l l a g e and intercommunal trouble was averted. 
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The v i l l a g e of Melousha l i e s on the road l i n k i n g Athienou with the-
mixed v i l l a g e s of Tremethousha and Arsos to the e a s t . I t was accepted 
p r a c t i c e f o r a Cyprus P o l i c e sergeant from Athienou to pass through the 
v i l l a g e on routine rounds of other v i l l a g e s . On 23 July 1966 an armed 
CY.POL. p a t r o l from Larnaca drove through the v i l l a g e shouting abuse at 
i t s i n h a b i t a n t s , and then e s t a b l i s h e d a road-block on Melousha's eastern 
s i d e . Turkish Cypriot F i g h t e r s soon occupied p o s i t i o n s around the 
v i l l a g e to prevent any attempt by CY.POL. to re-enter i t . A n t i c i p a t i n g 
a strong Greek Cypriot reaction,U.N.F.I.CYP. placed men at the western 
edge of Melousha. U.N.F.I.CYP. a c t u a l l y used a "threat of f o r c e " to 
prevent Grivas from mounting an attack on Melousha. This " t h r e a t " was 
backed up by the presence of "blue b e r r e t s " , armoured v e h i c l e s and 
mortars, and did prevent a recurrence of f i g h t i n g . (25) 
U.N.F.I.CYP. and the Paphos Vendettas: 
During July and August 1967 a s e r i e s of murders and abductions i n 
Paphos D i s t r i c t threatened to paralyse l i f e i n the area. For a time 
a l l movement between neighbouring v i l l a g e s and these v i l l a g e s and Paphos 
town ceased. I n some areas v i l l a g e r s would not even venture outside the 
built-up areas of t h e i r v i l l a g e s to c u l t i v a t e t h e i r f i e l d s and orchards. 
U.N.F.I.CYP. escorted trucks carrying e s s e n t i a l commodities to areas 
where supplies were ge t t i n g low, or escorted a doctor oh h i s rounds. 
The major v i l l a g e s a f f e c t e d were Mandria, Stavrokono, Kourtaka, I n i a , 
and others i n various parts of Paphos D i s t r i c t . 
B r i g a d i e r Harbottle, 1970, explains how he had to tour the a f f e c t e d 
v i l l a g e s i n h i s capacity as U.N.F.I.CYP. Chief of S t a f f , He spoke to 
l o c a l mukhtars and v i l l a g e e l d e r s " i n an endeavour to discover what 
exactly were t h e i r f e a r s and how U.N.F.I.CYP. could p o s s i b l y help them." 
Harbottle describes t h i s proceedure as "a kind of p a c i f i c a t i o n hustings". 
Eventually with the permission of both leaderships i n N i c o s i a , l o c a l 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot mukhtars were brought together i n a s e r i e s of 
meetings i n various p a r t s of the D i s t r i c t . 
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The main aims of these v i l l a g e meetings were : 
(a) to seek assurances from both Greek and Turkish Cypriot mukhtars 
regarding freedom of movement through t h e i r v i l l a g e s ; 
(b) to ensure that Greek and Turkish Cypriot farmers could work i n 
t h e i r f i e l d s without f r i c t i o n or i n t e r f e r e n c e ; and 
(c) to provide a forum f o r the d i s c u s s i o n of possible s o l u t i o n s to 
intercommunal problems. (26) 
After years of prejudice, Harbottle found that v i l l a g e leaders of 
both communities were w i l l i n g to discuss t h e i r problems f r e e l y under 
the auspices of U.N.F.I.CYP. He describes the outcome of these meetings : 
" . . . i t was possibly the most s u c c e s s f u l passive achievement 
of the whole U.N.F.I.CYP. operation; f o r i t not only brought 
normal l i f e back to many v i l l a g e s , but i t pricked the bubble 
once and f o r a l l of those who perpetually c r i e d i n the market 
p l a c e s . . . that Greek and Turkish Cypriots cannot l i v e together". 
(27) 
The Paphos example i l l u s t r a t e s how t h i r d party mediation can lead to 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , and according to Harbottle i t demonstrated the- f u l l 
range of t h i r d party a c t i o n — peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace-
making. (28) To solve t h i s p o t e n t i a l l y explosive p a r o c h i a l i s s u e U.N. 
Force o f f i c e r s had to get to the grass roots of the problem, l i s t e n i n g 
to mukhtars and ordinary v i l l a g e r s of both s i d e s . The r e s u l t s were so 
encouraging that the Secretary-General wrote :-
" U.N.F.I.CYP. has been encouraged by the r e s u l t s of the mukhtars 
meetings and i t i s i t s i n t e n t i o n to extend them, i f p o s s i b l e , 
at a s u i t a b l e time, to other Zones and D i s t r i c t s as w e l l as 
repeating them i n Paphos D i s t r i c t with a view to breaking down 
the remaining b a r r i e r s and p r e j u d i c e s . . . " (29) 
By f o s t e r i n g intercommunal contacts,U.N.F.I.CYP. was helping to remove 
some of the " i n v i s i b l e psychological w a l l s " separating the two communities 
Unfortunately U.N.F.I.CYP. e f f o r t s were hindered by the i n t r a n s i g e n t 
a t t i t u d e s of both community le a d e r s h i p s , as w e l l as by the a c t i v i t i e s 
of l o c a l m i l i t a r y leaders aggravating intercommunal tension. The l a t t e r 
was c e r t a i n l y prominent i n the Kophinou i n c i d e n t of November T967. 
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Kophinou, November 1967 . 
The events at Kophinou and the immediate consequences have been w e l l 
documented by others. (30) The i n t e n t i o n here i s merely to h i g h l i g h t 
some s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r s r e l a t i n g to t h i s i n c i d e n t . F i r s t l y , there 
was the important i s s u e of freedom of movement i n the area. Kophinou 
v i l l a g e i s s t r a t e g i c a l l y s i t u a t e d where the Larnaca - Limassol road 
i n t e r s e c t s with the Limassol - Nicosia road. The Cyprus Government 
was concerned about a Turkish Cypriot p o l i c e s t a t i o n located close to 
the road j u n c t i o n and the danger of road-blocks. Secondly, the l o c a l 
s i t u a t i o n d e teriorated with the appointment i n November 1966 of a new 
Fi g h t e r commander of the Ayios Theodhoros region, who used the nom de 
guerre 'Mehmet'. Under h i s l o c a l command the Turkish Cypriots of the 
Ayios Theodhoros region refused to recognize Cyprus Government authority 
there; f r a t e r n i z a t i o n with Greek Cypriots was punished; Greek and E n g l i s h 
road signs were replaced by ones wr i t t e n e x c l u s i v e l y i n Turkish; and 
new F i g h t e r p o s i t i o n s were e s t a b l i s h e d . ( 3 1 ) Turkish F i g h t e r s set up 
road-blocks which forced the Government to suspend Cyprus P o l i c e move-
ments into Ayios Theodhoros. Even a f t e r the removal of Mehmet from the 
scene, CY.POL. p a t r o l s were blocked. Soon t h i s p a r o c h i a l freedom of 
movement dispute developed into one which, according to Richard P a t r i c k , 
symbolized " the essence of the e n t i r e intercommunal c o n f l i c t : i . e . 
the government's determination to enforce i t s authority 
throughout the i s l a n d , the Turkish Cypriot community's 
i n t e n t i o n to protect i t s e l f by c o n t r o l l i n g Greek Cypriot 
access into Turkish Cypriot c e n t r e s " . (32) 
Thi r d l y , General Grivas decided to mount a major a s s a u l t i n order to 
secure a Greek Cypriot v i c t o r y against Turkish Cypriot r e s i s t a n c e . The 
National Guard attacked Ayios Theodhoros i n b a t t a l i o n strength a f t e r 
Turkish F i g h t e r s had been provoked int o f i r i n g at a h e a v i l y armed 
Cyprus P o l i c e p a t r o l which was sent through the Turkish quarter of the 
v i l l a g e . 
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F i g h t e r s from Kophinou t r i e d to help t h e i r neighbours but only 
succeeded i n turning the National Guard on them, which l e d almost to 
the d e s t r u c t i o n of the e n t i r e v i l l a g e . I n retrospect there i s no doubt 
that U.N.F.I.CYP. was taken by s u r p r i z e and i f wiser to the event i t 
could have mounted a contingency operation, deploying a force of 
approximately b a t t a l i o n strength around the two v i l l a g e s i n advance of 
the f i r s t Cyprus P o l i c e p a t r o l s . (33) The violence at Kophinou and 
Ayios Theodhoros r e v e a l s a number of important i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to 
U.N.F.I.CYP. operations. I t i l l u s t r a t e s how important i t was for-the 
U.N. Force to keep abreast of l o c a l intercommunal r e l a t i o n s away from 
the obvious l i n e s of confrontation. I t also shows how seemingly t r i v i a l 
disputes over freedom of communications and Cyprus P o l i c e access to 
Turkish Cypriot quarters could e s c a l a t e into major intercommunal 
i n c i d e n t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y under the d i r e c t i o n of aggressive l o c a l commanders. 
F i n a l l y , i t revealed weaknesses i n U.N.F.I.CYP. deployment, although 
i t s continued observation of and presence during the f i g h t i n g probably 
"acted as a deterrent to those bent on more extreme measures". (34) 
i i ) Normalization A c t i v i t i e s : 
UiN.F.I.GYPo has been described as "a prime communication channel f o r 
the normalization of Cypriot l i f e " . (35) The Paphos example above shows 
that U.N.F.I.CYP. was c e r t a i n l y able to promote gr e a t e r intercommunal 
contact and cooperation through i t s mediation with both communities at 
the grass roots l e v e l . I t also shows the subtle i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
between p a c i f i c a t i o n and s o - c a l l e d normalization operations. U.N.F.I.CYP. 
made every e f f o r t to negotiate f o r the removal of such obstacles to i n t e r -
communal contacts as armed f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , road-blocks, and government 
economic r e s t r i c t i o n s . The Force only had l i m i t e d success i n i t s de-
f o r t i f i c a t i o n plans f o r i t was c o n t i n u a l l y f r u s t r a t e d by the' National 
Guard. (36) General G r i v a s ' "determination not to give a m i l i t a r y i n c h " 
hindered and "delayed the longed-for normalization". (37) U.N.F.I.CYP. 
was also handicapped by a b a s i c divergence of opinion* between the two 
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leaderships as to what was meant by 'normality'. Thus when Makarios 
announced a number of "measures f o r the normalization of the s i t u a t i o n " 
on 2 September 1967 (38) the Turkish Cypriots remained s c e p t i c a l because 
the Cyprus Government's a t t i t u d e remained the same regarding Turkish 
Cypriot c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . At a l l times i t i s important to remember 
th a t : - " U.N.P.I.CYP.'s achievements arer s h a r p l y constrained by 
the degree of reasonableness and good w i l l displayed by the 
two l e a d e r s h i p s . " (39) 
I n order to understand the opposite p o s i t i o n s of the two leaderships 
and immense obstacles to a return to normal conditions i n Cypriot l i f e 
i t i s necessary to understand the economic conditions p r e v a i l i n g i n 
Cyprus during the period. 
Economic Conditions of the two communities. 1964-'68. 
De facto p a r t i t i o n due to the Turkish Cypriot enclaves meant:-
( i ) Non-participation of Turkish Cypriots i n the Greek Cypriot economy 
( i i ) Government r e s t r i c t i o n s on Turkish enclaves and quarters i n an 
e f f o r t to "deny a l l b e n e f i t s of Government s e r v i c e s to "Turkish 
t e r r o r i s t s " and sympathizers who r e j e c t e d Government authority." 
(40) 
( i i i ) As a r e s u l t of ( i ) and ( i i ) there was a growing dichotomy i n 
economic fortunes. The Greek Cypriot economy prospered w h i l s t 
the i n t r o v e r t e d enclave economies of the Turkish Cypriots 
stagnated. (4T) 
" . . . f o r ten years during which the Cypriot economy boomed and 
standards of l i v i n g rose v i s i b l y - on a l l Greek s i d e s , the 
Turkish element was l e f t to stew i n i t s own j u i c e . " (42) 
( i v ) Aggravating the economic d e f i c i e n c i e s of the Turkish enclaves 
were the problems of overcrowding i n homeless refugees. 
The majority of Turkish Cypriot enclaves were simply too small to be 
economically v i a b l e units and i t i s d i f f i c u l t to appreciate the immense 
d i f f i c u l t i e s t h e i r confined populations faced. 
The economic expansion i n the Greek s e c t o r a f t e r the traumatic changes 
of December 1963-August 1964 i s quite remarkable. I n the three years 
p r i o r to 1964, gross domestic product ( G.D.P) increased at an annual 
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average rate of over seven per cent. I n 1964 i t declined twelve per cent. 
Thereafter G.D.P, increased to pre-T963 l e v e l s . I n T961, G.D.P. was 
£ 114 m i l l i o n , by T966 i t had increased to £ T 5 7 m i l l i o n , while income 
per head rose from £ 199 i n 1961 to £260 i n 1966. (43) I n 1963, Panagides 
points out :-
" the Greeks with 77.1 % of the population, had 80.2 % of 
the income, while the Turks, with 18„2 % of the population, 
had a low 1 2 . 6 % of the income." ( 4 4 ) 
Patchwork p a r t i t i o n r e i n f o r c e d the economic gap between them. As U Thant 
observed, there was a s t r i k i n g contrast between the Government-controlled 
areas and the widespread poverty ,v f a l l i n l i v i n g standards, and v i r t u a l 
c e s s a t i o n of economic a c t i v i t i e s except a g r i c u l t u r e and small r e t a i l 
business i n Turkish C y p r i o t - c o n t r o l l e d t e r r i t o r y . ( 4 5 ) 
In some senses the economic hardships of Turkish Cypriots were s e l f -
i n f l i c t e d because of t h e i r leaderships discouragement of any a c t i v i t y 
which would expose Turkish Cypriots to the aut h o r i t y of a c e n t r a l govern-
ment i t regarded as unconstitutional„ This i s not to underestimate the 
e f f e c t s of the Government's economic squeeze on Turkish enclaves. 
Economic Blockade. 
The Cyprus Government drew up a l i s t of prohibited m a t e r i a l s , which were: 
i ) Goods of d i r e c t m i l i t a r y use; 
i i ) "and those which, w h i l s t they could i n d i r e c t l y be regarded as having 
m i l i t a r y s i g n i f i c a n c e , a f f e c t p r i m a r i l y the return to economic 
normality." ( 4 6 ) 
The l i s t included e s s e n t i a l items such as p e t r o l and d i e s e l o i l ; v e h i c l e 
spare p a r t s , tyres and b a t t e r i e s ; woollen c l o t h i n g ; cement, and other 
building m a t e r i a l s . Denial of these materials l e d to a rap i d d e t e r i o r a t i o n 
of Turkish Cypriot housing, i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and means of production. ( 4 7 ) 
Professor Volkan describes t h i s v i s i b l e decay observed during a v i s i t 
to N i c o s i a i n the Summer of 1968 :-
" The contrast between one side of the green l i n e and the other 
was impressive. The Turkish side looked as though i t were i n 
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r u i n s ; the s t r e e t s were p i t t e d , and p o v e r t y was e v i d e n t 
everywhere. I l e a r n e d t h a t the d e l i v e r y of b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l 
to the T u r k i s h s e c t o r had been f o r b i d d e n f o r a long time 
l e s t the Turks use i t to f o r t i f y t h e i r e n c l a v e s , so n o t h i n g 
had been r e p a i r e d . " ( 4 8 ) 
U.N.P.I.CYP. managed to persuade Makarios to l i f t c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t i o n s . 
F o r 1 i n s t a n c e , w o o l l e n m a t e r i a l s , r a i n c o a t s , s t e e l wool, i m p o r t e d c o a l , 
s u l p h u r , ammonium n i t r a t e , f u e l i n l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s , and t y r e s were a l l 
g r a d u a l l y a l l o w e d i n t o e n c l a v e s . (49) D uring the whole p e r i o d , August 
T964 - March 1968, a s t r i c t b lockade was kept on K o k k i n a , a l t h o u g h on 
10 June 1965, r e s t r i c t i o n s on i m p o r t e d " n o n - s t r a t e g i c " m a t e r i a l s were 
r a i s e d . The Government's economic squeeze not o n l y i s o l a t e d T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t s from the i s l a n d ' s economic growth, i n some r e g a r d s i t was 
c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e , a g g r a v a t i n g intercommunal emnity, u n i t i n g T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t f a c t i o n s through common e x p e r i e n c e s of confinement and 
d e p r i v a t i o n . P a r t l y i n r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h i s the Government i n t r o d u c e d 
some " n o r m a l i z a t i o n measures" i n l a t e 1967, and l i f t e d r e s t r i c t i o n s 
c o m p l e t e l y i n 1968. Other r e a s o n s f o r t h i s were:-
a ) U.N.F.I.CYP. p r e s s u r e ; 
b) F o l l o w i n g Kophinou the Government was even more w o r r i e d about 
p r o v o k i n g a v i o l e n t r e a c t i o n by Turkey ; 
c ) Makarios was p r o b a b l y i n f l u e n c e d by the argument t h a t an e x t e n s i o n 
of Government c o n t r o l would f o l l o w from e n c o u r a g i n g T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s 
to f r a t e r n i z e w i t h Greeks', th u s i n c r e a s i n g T u r k i s h C y p r i o t dependence 
on the Greek C y p r i o t economy. 
Pa n a g i d e s a r g u e s t h a t the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s t r i e d to c r e a t e s e p a r a t e 
economic u n i t s , which l e d to an undue d u p l i c a t i o n of p r o d u c t i o n f a c i l i t i e s , 
" m i s a l l o c a t i o n s and n o n-optimal f a c t o r r e l a t i o n s . " ( 5 0 ) G r e a t e r economic 
i n t e r a c t i o n and i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e would c o n t r i b u t e to " t h e m i n i m i z a t i o n 
of the i n e q u a l i t y c o e f f i c i e n t , which i n t u r n i s ...conducive to s o c i a l 
s t a b i l i t y . " I n c o n t r a s t T u r k i s h C y p r i o t l e a d e r s argued t h a t they would 
be a c t i v e l y d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t and economic i n e q u a l i t i e s between the 
two communities would c o n t i n u e . They remained committed to a p o l i c y of 
" g e o g r a p h i c a l s e p a r a t i o n " . ( 5 1 ) Y e a r s of economic i s o l a t i o n had not l e d 
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to any change i n Turkish Cypriot p o l i c y . Moreover, Government p o l i c y 
during those years lessened the inconvenience caused by "pockets" of 
t e r r i t o r y outside i t s c o n t r o l . This meant, as Michael Drury suggests, 
" Time did not i n t h i s case heal wounds; rather, as the 
stalemate continued, so the environment of the enclave 
produced symptoms of claustrophobia, w h i l s t the environment 
-of economic boom convinced many Greek Cypriots that there was 
no longer a problem to be solved." ( 5 3 ) 
I t now remains to look at some more s p e c i f i c problems created by these 
Turkish Cypriot enclaves, and U.N.P.I.CYP.'s e f f o r t s to r e s t o r e s o c i o -
economic normality. 
Freedom of movement : 
From 1964 to 1974 the i s l a n d was c r i s s - c r o s s e d and honeycombed with 
p h y s i c a l b a r r i e r s to mobility. Greek Cypriots had to pick t h e i r routes 
c a r e f u l l y to avoid areas under Turkish Cypriot c o n t r o l , w h i l s t the Turks, 
l i k e Macbeth were 'cabin 1 d, cribb'd, confined, bound i n to saucy doubts 
and f e a r s ' . ( 5 4 ) U Thant described f u l l freedom of movement as "the 
f i r s t p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r a return to normal conditions" ( 5 5 ) , v i t a l f o r 
r e i n t e g r a t i n g the Cypriot economy. He also described freedom of movement 
as "a convenient y a r d s t i c k of p o l i t i c a l conditions i n the i s l a n d " . ( 5 6 ) 
(a) R e s t r i c t i o n s on Turkish Cypriot movement. 
Cyprus P o l i c e check-points and road-blocks e x i s t e d on many main roads 
and at the entry points to Turkish enclaves and quarters. I d e n t i t y 
checks, body searches, plus the f e a r of a r r e s t and detention, discouraged 
Turkish Cypriots from entering areas under Government c o n t r o l . The 
Government did remove Cyprus P o l i c e check-points i n the D i s t r i c t s of 
Larnaca, Paphos, and Limassol. ( 5 7 ) Furthermore, a number of National 
Guard p o s i t i o n s were removed near to the "green l i n e s " of Paphos and 
Larnaca, although i n Paphos, two armed and f o r t i f i e d Cyprus P o l i c e posts 
> s t i i l dominated the Turkish quarter. I n September 1 9 6 7 .a government 
' "normalization programme" was s t a r t e d . Permanent road-blocks on trunk 
roads connecting towns i n northern and eastern Cyprus were abolished, 
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i n c l u d i n g those along the Pamagusta - Salamis road; one a t A s t r o m e r i t i s ; 
and a t K y r e n i a , on the read l e a d i n g t o the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t v i l l a g e o f 
Temblos. C o n d i t i o n s also improved a t the Famagusta Gate i n N i c o s i a , 
where at one time delays o f t h r e e t o f o u r hours were common f o r v e h i c l e s 
e n t e r i n g the T u r k i s h q u a r t e r , but a f t e r the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f " n o r m a l i z a t i o n 
measures" delays and searches were reduced to t h r e e o r f o u r minutes. 
T r a f f i c t h r o u g h the Gate i n c r e a s e d from 350-400 v e h i c l e s per day t o an 
average o f 600-700 per day. ('58) 
The T u r k i s h C y p r i o t l e a d e r s h i p d i d not r e c i p r o c a t e government 
" n o r m a l i z a t i o n measures", i n s t e a d s t r i c t c o n t r o l was mai n t a i n e d on the 
movement o f T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s w i s h i n g t o v i s i t areas under Greek C y p r i o t 
c o n t r o l . P e r m i t s had t o be o b t a i n e d by T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s w i s h i n g t o 
t r a v e l from t h e i r q u a r t e r beyond the w a l l e d c i t y o f N i c o s i a (59) and 
sometimes "strong-arm t a c t i c s " were- used t o prevent such movements. 
Pines c o u l d be imposed on any Turk who en t e r e d the Greek s e c t o r " f a r 
promenade, f o r f r i e n d l y a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Greek C y p r i o t s , o r f o r amusement" 
(60) T u r k i s h C y p r i o t l e a d e r s j u s t i f i e d t h i s " s e l f - s e g r e g a t i o n " i n terms 
o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r the s e c u r i t y o f t h e i r community, but o t h e r s saw 
i t as a d e l i b e r a t e " i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n and enforcement o f s e p a r a t i o n " . 
(61) 
Normal communications between the s c a t t e r e d areas o f T u r k i s h C y p r i o t 
c o n t r o l were i m p o s s i b l e i n the p e r i o d 1964 t o 1968. U.N.P.I.CYP. h e l i -
c o p t e r s p r o v i d e d a monthly e s c o r t f o r a number o f l o c a l T u r k i s h C y p r i o t 
l e a d e r s i n o r d e r to f a c i l i t a t e r e g u l a r meetings w i t h t h e i r community 
le a d e r s i n N i c o s i a . U.N.P.I.CYP. e s c o r t s were a l s o arranged f o r T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t c h i l d r e n from the v i l l a g e s o f L i m n i t i s , Ghaziveran, Angolemi, 
Elea, K a l a k h o r i o , and Ambelikou t o the secondary school i n Lefka enclave. 
These c h i d r e n were denied t h i s from December T963 to November T964. 
S e r i o u s l y i l l T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s were g i v e n U.N.P.I.CYP. e s c o r t s t o the 
T u r k i s h h o s p i t a l i n N i c o s i a , w h i l s t o t h e r e s c o r t s were p r o v i d e d f o r judges 
f a r m e r s , and merchants, e n a b l i n g them t o c o n t i n u e t h e i r business. 
One s p e c i f i c example o f r e s t r i c t i o n s on T u r k i s h C y p r i o t movement was 
at Temblos, a v i l l a g e on the n o r t h e r n e x t e n s i o n o f the Geunyeli-Aghirda 
Enclave, hemmed i n by barbed w i r e fences and N a t i o n a l Guard p o s t s . (62) 
I f the v i l l a g e r s wished t o go to N i c o s i a they had to t r a v e l v i a check-
p o i n t s i n K y r e n i a . An a l t e r n a t i v e r o u t e was v i a a steep t r a c k up t o 
S t . H i l a r i o n c a s t l e ( r e f e r t o Map 3.2. ) , from t h e r e a road l e d t o the 
Ni c o s i a - K y r e n i a road. The Cyprus Government was extremely s e n s i t i v e 
about improvements t o the t r a c k up the seaward slope o f the Ky r e n i a 
range, w h i c h , i t f e l t , might enable the T u r k i s h F i g h t e r s t o t h r e a t e n 
the r e a r o f the N a t i o n a l Guard c o a s t a l defence p o s i t i o n s west o f K y r e n i a . 
I n A p r i l 1965, v i l l a g e r s a t Temblos began t o improve the t r a c k t o S t . 
H i l a r i o n . Given the p o s s i b l e s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s t r a c k , 
U.N.P.I.CYP. i n c r e a s e d i t s p o s i t i o n s a s t r i d e i t to ensure i t s use o n l y 
f o r p e a c e f u l t r a f f i c , and more "blue b e r r e t s " were place d inbetween 
Temblos and nearby N a t i o n a l Guard p o s t s . Furthermore, U.N.F.I.CYP. 
made a r u l i n g t h a t o n l y h a n d - t o o l s , r a t h e r than mechanical equipment, 
c o u l d be used to improve the t r a c k . (63) 
(b) R e s t r i c t i o n s on Greek C y p r i o t movement : 
Greek C y p r i o t s were denied access to most T u r k i s h C y p r i o t - c o n t r o l l e d 
t e r r i t o r y and co u l d o n l y t r a v e l through o t h e r s under U.N.F.I.CYP. e s c o r t , 
o t h e r w i s e long detours were necessary. Kokkina was t o t a l l y p r o h i b i t e d . 
The c o a s t a l road through L i m n i t i s was open t o Greek C y p r i o t c i v i l i a n 
t r a f f i c d u r i n g d a y l i g h t h o u r s . At n i g h t Greeks were o n l y a l l o w e d t o use 
the road i n cases o f medical emergency and p r o v i d i n g t h e r e was an U.N.F.-
I.CYP. e s c o r t . (64) F i g h t e r s and T u r k i s h C y p r i o t p o l i c e manned road -
b l o c k s a t Lefka, Ambelikou, and K a l o k h o r i o , where Greek C y p r i o t c i v i l i a n s 
were s u b j e c t to i d e n t i t y checks, and they were not a l l o w e d t o stop w i t h i n 
T u r k i s h - h e l d t e r r i t o r y . T r a v e l through the Guenyeli - Aghirda Enclave 
was r e s t r i c t e d t o the N i c o s i a - Kyr e n i a road under U.N.F.I.CYP. e s c o r t s , 
which r a n t w i c e d a i l y convoys, o f t e n e s c o r t i n g upto 4,000 v e h i c l e s per 
month. 
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Greek movements were prevented across the "green l i n e s " o f N i c o s i a , 
Famagusta, Larnaca, and Paphos. Even i n Limassol where no "green l i n e " 
e x i s t e d , n o Greek entered the T u r k i s h q u a r t e r a t n i g h t , and few d u r i n g the 
day. As mentioned i n S e c t i o n One o f t h i s c h a p t e r , t h e r e were- s e v e r a l 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on Greek C y p r i o t m o b i l i t y i n the Chatos - K a l y v a k i a area.(65) 
Moreover, any T u r k i s h C y p r i o t attempts t o c o n t r o l the P r a s t i o - N i c o s i a ; 
L y s i - A t h i e n o u - N i c o s i a ; o r Lysi-Asha-Nicosia r o u t e s would have p r e c i p i t a t e d 
armed c o n f r o n t a t i o n . I n Paphos D i s t r i c t the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t v i l l a g e s 
were s c a t t e r e d i n s m a l l " c l u s t e r s " o f T u r k i s h c o n t r o l . For i n s t a n c e , 
t h e r e was a c l u s t e r around Anadhiou ( r e f e r t o Map 3.S ) These v i l l a g e s 
were r e l a t i v e l y i s o l a t e d , away from main roads, and o f no s t r a t e g i c v a lue 
t o e i t h e r the Government o r N a t i o n a l Guard. I n o t h e r areas U.N.F.I.CYP. 
had t o arrange f o r Greek C y p r i o t s t o pass through c e r t a i n T u r k i s h v i l l a g e s . 
For example, a l o c a l agreement enabled Greek C y p r i o t s from Lyso t o t r a v e l 
t h r o u g h Pelathousa, o t h e r w i s e Lyso was t r a p p e d behind T u r k i s h C y p r i o t -
c o n t r o l l e d t e r r i t o r y . Another l o c a l anomaly e x i s t e d a t P o l i s , where the 
T u r k i s h q u a r t e r was reduced t o a narrow, congested s t r i p o f l a n d , o n l y a 
few hundred metres square, a s t r i d e the P o l i s - Paphos highway. This road 
was under U.N. Force o b s e r v a t i o n and was kept open t o a l l t r a f f i c , 
a l t h o u g h Greeks were prevented from s t o p p i n g w i t h i n the T u r k i s h q u a r t e r . 
Thus Greek C y p r i o t s had t o be c o n s t a n t l y aware o f v a r i o u s l o c a l "under-
s t a n d i n g s " o r "agreements" r e g a r d i n g t h e i r r i g h t s to move from place t o 
p l a c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y when they had t o t r a v e l across e t h n i c i n t e r f a c e s , 
c h e c k - p o i n t s and road-blocks„ As time passed these r e s t r i c t i o n s on 
Greek freedom o f movement were o f d i m i n i s h i n g importance owing to the 
f a c t t h a t the Government b u i l t new roads around the enclaves. 
C i v i l i a n Services : 
The Government a l s o d i r e c t e d e l e c t r i c i t y supply l i n e s and water 
d i s t r i b u t i o n systems around T u r k i s h Cypriot- enclaves and q u a r t e r s . I n 
f a c t the Government had e f f e c t i v e l y renounced r e s p o n s i b i l i t y towards 
the p r o v i s i o n i n g o f T u r k i s h C y p r i o t p u b l i c s e r v i c e s i n areas o u t s i d e 
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i t s de f a c t o c o n t r o l . Drury made a study o f the p r o v i s i o n o f bas i c 
s e r v i c e s i n Greek and T u r k i s h areas i n Western Cyprus. (66) He found 
t h a t T u r k i s h C y p r i o t v i l l a g e s were u n d e r - p r i v i l e g e d i n the^ p r o v i s i o n o f 
tarmac roads, e l e c t r i c i t y , telephone s e r v i c e s , tapped water supply, and 
p o s t a l s e r v i c e s , compared to Greek C y p r i o t v i l l a g e s . These m a t e r i a l 
d i s c r e p a n c i e s aggravated intercommunal bad f e e l i n g , e s p e c i a l l y i n cases 
where T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s were not o n l y being denied c e r t a i n s e r v i c e s but 
had had p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t i n g s e r v i c e s withdrawn, such as p o s t a l s e r v i c e s , 
telephone l i n e s , and even water supply i n c e r t a i n cases. 
U.N.P.I.CYP. n e g o t i a t e d w i t h the Cyprus Government i n o r d e r t o get 
s e r v i c e s r e s t o r e d t o T u r k i s h C y p r i o t areas, and i n some cases i t was 
s u c c e s s f u l . For i n s t a n c e , normal telephone and e l e c t r i c f a c i l i t i e s were 
r e s t o r e d t o the T u r k i s h q u a r t e r o f Paphos i n June 1964. (67) I n the 
Summer o f '64, U.N.P.I.CYP. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s met w i t h Greek and T u r k i s h 
members o f the E.A.C. ( E l e c t r i c i t y A u t h o r i t y o f Cyprus ) t o a s s i s t i n 
a r r a n g i n g f o r the r e s t o r a t i o n o f normal E.A.C. f u n c t i o n i n g i n the T u r k i s h 
q u a r t e r o f N i c o s i a . (6'8) U.N.P.I.CYP. t r i e d to improve b a s i c water 
supply t o T u r k i s h areas and t r i e d to f i n d ways f o r the s e t t l e m e n t o f 
b i l l s f o r f u t u r e water consumption. I n T965 an a u x i l i a r y water supply 
system was i n s t a l l e d a t Kokkina under U.N. Force s u p e r v i s i o n . (69) Where-
ever t h e r e were comp l a i n t s o f d e l i b e r a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e o f water s u p p l i e s 
U.N. Force teams i n v e s t i g a t e d the problems and endeavoured t o e l i m i n a t e 
the causes o f any water s h o r t a g e s . They i n v e s t i g a t e d the acute but 
spor a d i c shortages o f f r e s h water to the T u r k i s h q u a r t e r o f Larnaca, 
Scala, where the i n h a b i t a n t s claimed t h a t Greek C y p r i o t s , who were 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the f l o w o f water through t o Scala, were t o blame. 
O f f i c i a l s o f the Larjiaca Water Board denied any i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the 
water supply o f Scala, blaming the o l d , i n e f f i c i e n t w ater system o f the 
q u a r t e r i n s t e a d . U„N.F.I.CYP. t e c h n i c i a n s p r o m p t l y i n s t a l l e d w ater 
meters on the supply mains where they entered the q u a r t e r i n o r d e r t o 
e s t a b l i s h how much water was being a l l o w e d i n t o Scala. (70) During dry 
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summer months U.N.P.I.CYP. l i a i s e d w i t h the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t Leadership 
a t the request o f the Cyprus Government t o arrange a c o o r d i n a t e d i s l a n d -
wide r e d u c t i o n o f water consumption. (71) 
The K a n l i Keuy Dam, l o c a t e d w i t h i n the G u w i y e l i - Aghirda Enclave, 
was completed w i t h the c o o p e r a t i o n o f the U n i t e d Nations Development 
Programme ( U.N.D.P. ) and U.N.P.I.CYP. The dam was v i r t u a l l y complete 
a t the outbreak o f intercommunal c o n f l i c t i n December 1963 except f o r 
the s p i l l w a y . For the f o l l o w i n g t h r e e y e a r s , m a t e r i a l s f o r i t s maintenance 
and c o m p l e t i o n were not p e r m i t t e d i n t o the Enclave. During a p e r i o d o f 
heavy r a i n f a l l i n February 1967 the dam was i n danger o f f l o o d i n g over. 
Emergency r e p a i r s were necessary to prevent d i s a s t e r . Thus the Cyprus 
Government r e l e a s e d the r e q u i r e d m a t e r i a l s t o U.N.D.P. and U.N.P.I.CYP., 
who o r g a n i z e d the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s working on the p r o j e c t . (72) 
As regards p o s t a l services,U.N.P.I.CYP. f a i l e d i n attempts to persuade 
the Government t o r e s t o r e f u l l f a c i l i t i e s t o T u r k i s h C y p r i o t - c o n t r o l l e d 
t e r r i t o r y , a l t h o u g h l e t t e r d e l i v e r i e s were resumed f o r the T u r k i s h 
q u a r t e r s o f Larnaca, N i c o s i a , and l e f k a . (73) The op p o s i t e p o l i t i c a l 
views o f the two community l e a d e r s h i p s made i t i m p o s s i b l e f o r U.N.P.I.CYP. 
to r e s t o r e n o r m a l i t y t o such m a t t e r s as the payment o f s o c i a l insurance 
b e n e f i t s t o T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s and p u b l i c revenue t o the Government out 
o f T u r k i s h C y p r i o t c o f f e r s . The Government argued t h a t any b e n e f i t s t o 
the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s would be used f o r " i n s u r r e c t i o n a l purposes". (74) 
S i m i l a r l y , U.N.F.I.CYP. made l i t t l e progress i n us i n g i t s good o f f i c e s 
t o r e e s t a b l i s h an i n t e g r a t e d j u d i c i a l system f o r both communities 
f u n c t i o n i n g throughout the i s l a n d . (75) 
A g r i c u l t u r e : 
One obvious s p a t i a l problem r e s u l t i n g from the de f a c t o changes of 
the p o l i t i c a l geography o f Cyprus concerned l a n d ownership. According 
to T u r k i s h propaganda : 
" As a r e s u l t o f the f o r c e d d i s l o c a t i o n o f Turks from t h e i r 
homes, 300,000 donums o f T u r k i s h owned l a n d have been c u l t i v a t e d 
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f o r seven years by the Greeks w i t h o u t r e n t o r compensation."(76) 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s had abandoned some r i c h f a r m l a n d , o r l e f t o t h e r areas 
u n c u l t i v a t e d a d j a c e n t t o N a t i o n a l Guard o r F i g h t e r p o s i t i o n s . As U Thant 
p o i n t e d o u t : - " By f a r the b i g g e s t problem i n a g r i c u l t u r e i s the 
qu e s t i o n o f u n a u t h o r i z e d c u l t i v a t i o n . Large areas o f a g r i c u l -
t u r a l l a n d i n Cyprus are being c u l t i v a t e d by persons who are 
n e i t h e r the owners o f the l a n d n o r te n a n t s i n the normal sense 
o f the word." (77) 
Reponding t o U.N.F.I.CYP. pressure the Government made i t a puni s h a b l e 
o f f e n c e f o r " Greek C y p r i o t farmers t o c u l t i v a t e T u r k i s h owned l a n d w i t h o u t 
the a u t h o r i t y o f absentee owners. I n p r a c t i c e , however, T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s 
o f t e n had l i t t l e choice but t o lease t h e i r abandoned f i e l d s a t uneconomic 
r e n t s . Any com p l a i n t s r e g a r d i n g r e n t s c o u l d l e a d to l a n d being damaged 
o r l e f t c o m p l e t e l y u n c u l t i v a t e d , thus g i v i n g no r e t u r n . I n T966, about 
f i f t y per cent of T u r k i s h C y p r i o t abandoned lan d was being leased by 
Greek C y p r i o t f a r m e r s . (78) U.N.CIV.POL. prevented as f a r as p o s s i b l e 
any u n l a w f u l h a r v e s t i n g around abandoned T u r k i s h v i l l a g e s . (79) 
Greek C y p r i o t farmers were unable t o g a i n access t o l a n d they owned 
w i t h i n T u r k i s h C y p r i o t enclaves. I n the Guenyeli - Aghirda Enclave the 
Government claimed t h a t 2,700 donums ( i . e . about 9,000 acres ) o f Greek 
C y p r i o t l a n d was e i t h e r under T u r k i s h C y p r i o t c o n t r o l o r too close to 
T u r k i s h F i g h t e r p o s i t i o n s f o r i t t o be c u l t i v a t e d by Greeks. (80) L i t t l e 
progress was made over T u r k i s h C y p r i o t payment o f compensation f o r 
c u l t i v a t i n g Greek l a n d , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the area west o f Dhikomo. I n 
o t h e r d i s t i c t s U.N.F.I.CYP. e s c o r t e d Greek C y p r i o t farmers t o s e n s i t i v e 
areas close t o c o n f r o n t a t i o n l i n e s and t o f i e l d s adjacent t o T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t v i l l a g e s . I n the Mesaoria b o t h communities owned l a n d around 
the i n d i s t i n c t boundary o f the Chatos - K a l y v a k i a enclave. Intercommunal 
t e n s i o n s rose around sowing and h a r v e s t i n g t i m e s . Local Greek C y p r i o t 
c u l t i v a t o r s were a l l o w e d to e n t e r the enclave p r o v i d e d they had s u b m i t t e d 
a request t o the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t p o l i c e s t a t i o n a t Chatos. At M a t h i a t i 
and P e r i s t e r o n a i n N i c o s i a D i s t r i c t , i n f o r m a l meetings were arranged 
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by U.N.P.I.CYP., but the Force f a i l e d i n i t s "attempts t o arrange ad hoc 
meetings...on a l a r g e r s c a l e t o dea l w i t h broader aspects o f u n a u t h o r i z e d 
c u l t i v a t i o n . " (81) 
U.N.P.I.CYP. helped save many c i t r u s orchards i n abandoned and s e n s i t i v e 
areas, and i t saw t h a t these orchards were p r o p e r l y i r r i g a t e d , even 
c o l l e c t i n g i r r i g a t i o n fees from the owners and paying the i r r i g a t o r s . (82) 
The U.N. Force act e d as an i n t e r m e d i a r y between T u r k i s h C y p r i o t farmers 
and the Grain Commission. I t proved s u c c e s s f u l i n s e l l i n g a h i g h prop-
o r t i o n o f the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t wheat and b a r l e y crops through the Gra i n 
Commission i n T965 and i n 1967. (83) U.N.F.I.CYP. al s o used i t s good 
o f f i c e s t o remove r e s t r i c t i o n s on gas o i l and l u b r i c a n t s f o r t r a c t o r s ; 
f u e l f o r water pumps; and on s u l p h u r and n i t r a t e f e r t i l i z e r s ( 8 4 ) , 
a l t h o u g h most a g r i c u l t u r a l machinery remained d i f f i c u l t to o b t a i n f o r 
most T u r k i s h C y p r i o t c e n t r e s . (85) I n doing so U.N.F.I.CYP. ensured t h a t 
T u r k i s h producers c o u l d g et t h e i r s u r p l u s e s on t o expo r t markets, f o r 
w i t h o u t U.N. a s s i s t a n c e c u l t i v a t i o n would have been d i f f i c u l t . 
I n d u s t r y and o t h e r economic a c t i v i t y : 
Owing t o the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n Cyprus many i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t s were 
c l o s e d o r stood i d l e because t h e i r owners were separated from them by 
a r t i f i c i a l e t h n i c boundaries o r ' c o n f r o n t a t i o n l i n e s ' . For example, 
t h r e e v a l u a b l e Greek e n t e r p r i s e s stood i d l e w i t h i n T u r k i s h enclaves — 
a l i m e k i l n and qua r r y ; a f l o u r m i l l ; and a t e x t i l e p l a n t . (86) T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t owned e n t e r p r i s e s were c l o s e d because they were denied b a s i c raw 
m a t e r i a l s by the economic blockade, o t h e r s were l o c a t e d i n s t r a t e g i c 
areas where Turks d i d not c o n s i d e r i t safe t o e n t e r . Thus the Cypro-
St e e l w o o l Company remained clos e d owing t o r e s t r i c t i o n s on s t e e l w i r e 
and f u e l , and the T u r k i s h l i m e k i l n s o f Ambelikou were i d l e due t o the 
p r o x i m i t y o f N a t i o n a l Guard p o s i t i o n s on h i l l s o v e r l o o k i n g the l i m e k i l n s . 
(87) U.N.F.I.CYP. e f f o r t s t o r e a c t i v a t e a v a r i e t y o f i n d u s t r i a l and 
commercial e n t e r p r i s e s met w i t h o p p o s i t i o n from both l e a d e r s h i p s . (88) 
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U.N.F.I.CYP. measures to a s s i s t refugees : 
Attempts t o solve the refugee problem were hampered by the p o l i t i c a l 
stances adopted by the community l e a d e r s h i p s . On 23 September 1965, 
P r e s i d e n t Makarios s t a t e d t h a t the Government was prepared t o p r o v i d e : -
( i ) Assistance t o r e p a i r o r t o t a l l y r e c o n s t r u c t T u r k i s h homes i n 
abandoned v i l l a g e s ; 
( i i ) F i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e f o r the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n o f a l l those T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t s " f o r c e d " t o abandone t h e i r v i l l a g e s by the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t 
Leadership; 
( i i i ) F i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e t o any T u r k i s h C y p r i o t unable t o f i n d employmen 
w i t h i n the Greek C y p r i o t s e c t o r ; 
( i v ) Measures f o r T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s a f e t y and p r o t e c t i o n . (89) 
I n support o f t h i s p o l i c y T u r k i s h C y p r i o t enclaves were r e f u s e d b u i l d i n g 
m a t e r i a l s f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f permanent s t r u c t u r e s t o house r e f u g e e s . 
This p o l i c y f a i l e d t o e n t i c e many refugees back t o o l d homes. Under 
these circumstances the most U.N.F.I.CYP. c o u l d do was t o t r y to a l l e v i a t e 
some o f the hards h i p s and d e p r i v a t i o n s o f T u r k i s h C y p r i o t " d i s p l a c e d 
persons". 
V i r t u a l l y a l l the T u r k i s h enclaves were overcrowded and l a c k i n g p r o p e r 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . Furthermore, these t i n y areas o f lan d l a c k e d the basic 
resources t o p r o v i d e employment f o r more than a s m a l l p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e i r 
working p o p u l a t i o n s . Kokkina was a prime example. Since the T y l l i r i a 
f i g h t i n g i n August 1964 the Kokkina enclave was a r e s t r i c t e d zone where 
freedom o f movement o f people and goods d i d not a p p l y . Approximately 
800 refugees were l i v i n g i n caves o r ho l e s i n the h i l l s i d e . They were 
dependent on f o r t n i g h t l y Red Crescent s u p p l i e s from c e n t r a l warehouses 
i n N i c o s i a , f i r e w o o d shipments from L i m n i t i s ; p l u s an o c c a s i o n a l supply 
o f f r e s h f r u i t and vegeta b l e s from n e i g h b o u r i n g v i l l a g e s d e l i v e r e d under 
U.N.F.I.CYP. e s c o r t . (90) I n s p i t e o f U.N.F.I.CYP. success i n persuading 
the r e l e a s e o f b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s to Kokkina t o b u i l d a communal bakery 
( 9 1 ) , the enclave remained "the most u n s a t i s f a c t o r y o f a l l refugee c e n t r e s 
" For almost f o u r years t h i s s m a l l area o f i n f e r t i l e and 
uneven c o a s t a l l a n d has s h e l t e r e d a refugee p o p u l a t i o n so 
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overcrowded as t o leave no room f o r any s i g n i f i c a n t 
e x p l o i t a t i o n o f the s o i l . " (91) 
Even a f t e r the d e p a r t u r e o f 425 T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s t u d e n t s t o Turkey i n 
January 1966, the remaining 1,200 refugees c o n t i n u e d to l i v e "an 
u n c o m f o r t a b l e , un h e a l t h y and meaningless e x i s t e n c e " . ( 9 2 ) Other refugee 
c e n t r e s had s i m i l a r problems. Hamid Mandres, n o r t h o f N i c o s i a i n the 
main enclave, was one o f the l a r g e s t refugee c e n t r e s . I n i t i a l l y t h e r e 
were 3,000 persons l i v i n g i n t e n t e d accommodation u n t i l mud-brick 
d w e l l i n g s were b u i l t under a s e l f - h e l p scheme. (93) 
The T u r k i s h C y p r i o t Leadership discouraged the r e t u r n o f T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t s t o o l d homes i n areas c o n t r o l l e d by the Cyprus Government. 
The T u r k i s h Government helped t o f i n a n c e a T u r k i s h C y p r i o t rehousing 
scheme w i t h i n areas under t h e i r c o n t r o l . Meanwhile the Cyprus Government 
t r i e d to a t t r a c t T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s back t o areas i n o r d e r t o h a r v e s t 
c e r t a i n v a l u a b l e crops. M a l l i a , i n Limassol D i s t r i c t , was one o f t h e 
r i c h e s t v i n e y a r d v i l l a g e s i n Cyprus. I n December 1960 i t s p o p u l a t i o n 
i n c l u d e d 600 Turk s and 80 Greeks. I n 1963 the number o f T u r k i s h r e s i d e n t s 
was 900, a l l o f whom l e f t a f t e r intercommunal f i g h t i n g i n e a r l y 1964. 
Considerable e f f o r t s were made by D i s t r i c t a u t h o r i t i e s and U.N.P.I.CYP. 
to persuade T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s to r e t u r n f o i r the grape h a r v e s t i n 1964. 
By mid-September about 120 f a m i l i e s had r e t u r n e d . A f t e r the h a r v e s t 
the T u r k i s h p o p u l a t i o n o f M a l l i a f l u c t u a t e d a c c o r d i n g to seasonal work. 
The Government c o n t i n u e d i t s e f f o r t s ,to keep T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s t h e r e , 
spending C£ 6,719 r e p a i r i n g 103 T u r k i s h C y p r i o t homes i n the v i l l a g e . 
I n s p i t e o f these e f f o r t s M a l l i a ' s 1970-'71 p o p u l a t i o n c o n t a i n e d o n l y 
400 T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s , over 600 T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s stayed i n the s a f e t y o f 
enclaves. (94) 
U.N.F.IcCYP.'s e f f o r t s t o normalize c o n d i t i o n s by encouraging both s i d e s 
t o cooperate i n the safe r e t u r n o f T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s to t h e i r abandoned 
homes i n Government-controlled t e r r i t o r y , l i k e a l l o t h e r n o r m a l i z a t i o n 
a c t i v i t i e s , were f r u s t r a t e d by the u n d e r l y i n g m i s t r u s t and u n w i l l i n g n e s s 
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t o compromise between the l e a d e r s h i p s o f each community. 
S e c t i o n Three : P o l i t i c a l Background. November '67 t o J u l y '7'4. 
The bloodshed a t Kophinou provoked a T u r k i s h t h r e a t o f war a g a i n s t 
Greece and l e d t o a number o f agreements between the two c o u n t r i e s . (95) 
P r e s i d e n t Makarios was w i l l i n g to comply w i t h some o f these e x t e r n a l l y 
imposed agreements. For example, 6 - 12,000 Greek s o l d i e r s r e t u r n e d 
to Athens, but a number o f Greek o f f i c e r s s t i l l remained i n charge o f 
the N a t i o n a l Guard. (96) Makarios a l s o r e f u s e d t o i n c r e a s e the sc a l e 
and powers o f U.N.F.I.CYP. i n accordance w i t h the agreements. Had he 
p e r m i t t e d t h i s , t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l c o u l d have acted a c c o r d i n g l y . 
P r e s i d e n t Makarios a l s o r e f o r m u l a t e d b a s i c p o l i t i c a l g o a l s , a r g u i n g t h a t , 
" A s o l u t i o n , by n e c e s s i t y , must be sought w i t h i n the l i m i t s 
o f what i s f e a s i b l e , which does not always c o i n c i d e w i t h the 
l i m i t s o f what i s d e s i r a b l e . " (97) 
The " f e a s i b l e " s o l u t i o n was an independent, u n i t e d Republic, a l t h o u g h 
Makarios c o n t i n u e d to pay " l i p s e r v i c e " t o "Enosis as a d i s t a n t g o a l " . (98) 
Enosis w i t h a m i l i t a r y Junta i n Athens was no l o n g e r a d e s i r a b l e o p t i o n , 
e s p e c i a l l y when the Greek C y p r i o t s d e r i v e d c e r t a i n economic b e n e f i t s 
from the i s l a n d ' s independent s t a t u s , which would disappear i f the i s l a n d 
became " y e t a n o t h e r o f Greece's n e g l e c t e d p r o v i n c e s " . (99) I n s p i t e o f 
the m o d i f i c a t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t i o n Makarios had a l a n d s l i d e v i c t o r y 
i n the P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s o f 25 February 1968, s e c u r i n g 95 per cent 
o f the v o t e s , c r u s h i n g the newly formed "Enosis F r o n t " o p p o s i t i o n . 
I n December 1967 the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s renamed t h e i r l e a d e r s h i p the 
" P r o v i s i o n a l T u r k i s h C y p r i o t A d m i n i s t r a t i o n " , which r e p l a c e d the o l d 
General Committee. Moreover, w i t h the removal o f r e s t r i c t i o n s on T u r k i s h 
freedom o f movement i n March 1968, the l e a d e r s h i p , based i n N i c o s i a , was 
able t o improve i t s c o n t r o l o f the s c a t t e r e d T u r k i s h C y p r i o t community. 
The f o r m a t i o n o f the " P r o v i s i o n a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n " was " f l a g r a n t l y u n l a w f u l " 
a c c o r d i n g t o Makarios, f o r as O b e r l i n g p o i n t s o u t , i t made the Archbishop's 
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"chances o f ever again p r e s i d i n g over a u n i f i e d , bicommunal government 
...much more remote." (100) 
On 13 A p r i l 1968, Rauf Denktas r e t u r n e d to Cyprus and was nominated 
t 
spokesman o f the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t community. Mr Glafkos C l e r i d e s , 
P r e s i d e n t o f the House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , was spokesman f o r the Greek 
C y p r i o t s i n the intercommunal n e g o t i a t i o n s which began on 2-5 June 1968. 
Denktas argued f o r some k i n d o f ' f u n c t i o n a l f e d e r a t i o n ' , whereas the 
Greek C y p r i o t s were w i l l i n g t o g r a n t the Turks w i d e r l o c a l autonomy 
org a n i z e d on a c o n v e n t i o n a l g e o g r a p h i c a l b a s i s . The intercommunal t a l k s 
were not o n l y handicapped by the d i f f e r e n t v i e w p o i n t s o f Denktas and 
C l e r i d e s , but by the a c t i v i t i e s o f Greek C y p r i o t e x t r e m i s t s and o u t s i d e 
powers. 
Drawing on a q u o t a t i o n from Laurence S t e r n , Michael A t t a l i d e s argued, 
" Sihanouk o f Cambodia i s now deposed and Makarios o f Cyprus 
dead, but t o g e t h e r these two Heads o f State have been 
a c c u r a t e l y d e s c r i b e d as " s u r v i v a l a c r o b a t s s t r u g g l i n g t o 
m a i n t a i n n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y i n the shadows o f the g r e a t 
power t r i a n g l e . " " (101) 
Both the Greek Junta and the Nixon A d m i n i s t r a t i o n accused Makarios o f 
f l i r t i n g w i t h the S o v i e t Union. (102) Washington was p r i m a r i l y concerned 
about Western r e g i o n a l a l l i a n c e s i n the e a s t e r n Mediterranean; t h e 
changing s t r a t e g i c balance among the superpowers; the e f f e c t s o f the 
Arab - I s r a e l i c r i s i s i n the r e g i o n and on superpower r e l a t i o n s ; and 
the n o n - a l i g n e d tendencies o f Makarios i n a c o u n t r y w i t h a s t r o n g 
communist p a r t y , A.K.E.L., Washington appeared t o f a v o u r a s o l u t i o n 
along the l i n e s o f plans f i n a l i z e d a t the N.A.T.O. Fo r e i g n M i n i s t e r s 
Conference i n Lisbon i n June 1971, which g r a n t e d s u b s t a n t i a l r e g i o n a l / 
communal autonomy to T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s . The a c t i v i t i e s o f the Greek 
Junta i n Cyprus were i n f l u e n c e d by U.S. e f f o r t s t o " t i d y up" the 
e a s t e r n M editerranean. (T03) As Coufoudakis argues, 
" the o b j e c t i v e o f the o v e r t and c o v e r t i n i t i a t i v e s under-
taken by the U n i t e d S t a t e s , Greece and Turkey since the-
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c o l l a p s e o f the F i r s t C y p r i o t Republic was t o b r i n g about 
the p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n o f the i s l a n d . " (104) 
W i t h i n Cyprus Makarios was fa c e d w i t h growing o p p o s i t i o n from p r o -
Enosis t e r r o r i s t groups, l e d by 'E.O.K.A.-B' under General Grivas who 
s e c r e t l y r e e n t e r e d Cyprus i n September T971. I n 1972, r e l a t i o n s between 
Makarios and the Junta d e t e r i o r a t e d f u r t h e r a f t e r a consignment o f 
weapons from Czechoslovakia were d i s c o v e r e d a t the P r e s i d e n t i a l Palace 
i n N i c o s i a . (105) This was f o l l o w e d by an a b o r t i v e " e c c l e s i a s t i c a l coup" 
a g a i n s t Makarios by the bishops o f K i t i o n , K y r e n i a , and Paphos„ I n the 
Summer o f '73, the Archbishop sponsored an a n t i - J u n t a newspaper — 
' E l e f t h e r o s Laos' ( Free People ) , which c a l l e d upon King Constantine 
and f o r m e r Premier, Karamanlis, t o e s t a b l i s h a Greek g o v e r n m e n t - i n - e x i l e 
i n N i c o s i a . Meanwhile i n Athens another m i l i t a r y coup had brought the 
Chief o f M i l i t a r y P o l i c e , B r i g a d i e r D i m i t r i o s I o a n n i d e s , i n t o power, 
a l t h o u g h the a c t u a l Head o f State was General Phaedon G i z i k i s . I n a 
c u t t i n g a n a l y s i s o f t h i s t a k e o v e r H i t c h e n s , 1984, b l u n t l y remarks :-
" I f Papadopoulos was a F a s c i s t i n the M u s s o l i n i mould, 
Ioannides was more l i k e an a u t h e n t i c N a z i . . . " (106) 
The domestic p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n was v e r y u n s t a b l e i n the e a r l y 1970s, 
which m i l i t a t e d a g a i n s t r e c d n c i l i a t i o n a t the conference t a b l e d u r i n g 
the second round o f intercommunal t a l k s , which began on 8 June 1972. 
Makarios had f a i l e d t o clamp down on "the pro-Enosis d i e h a r d s " and t o 
lea d h i s community towards the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s . Any c r i t i c i s m o f 
U.N.F.I.CYP. d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d must take account o f the p o l i t i c a l 
c o n s t r a i n t s working a g a i n s t U.N.F.I.CYP.'s e f f o r t s t o n o r m a l i z e c o n d i t i o n s 
w i t h i n the i s l a n d , p a r t i c u l a r l y the complex i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between 
i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l power p o l i t i c s . 
S e c t i o n Four : U.N.F.I.CYP.'s Second Phase. November '67 t o J u l y '74. 
The U.N. Force e n t e r e d i t s second phase o f o p e r a t i o n s i n Cyprus w i t h o u t 
any e x t e n s i o n o f i t s s c a l e o r powers. Before d i s c u s s i n g i t s o p e r a t i o n s 
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d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , i t i s c r u c i a l t o c o n s i d e r whether o r n o t o r d i n a r y 
Greek and T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s s t i l l had the good w i l l t o c o e x i s t d e s p i t e 
de f a c t o s e g r e g a t i o n . U.N.F.I.CYP. had some success i n f o s t e r i n g 
c o o p e r a t i o n between mukhtars o f both communities f o l l o w i n g the Paphos 
vendettas i n 1967. ( see S e c t i o n Two ) Michael H a r b o t t l e noted t h a t — 
even " a t the h e i g h t o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s i n December 
i t was r e p o r t e d t h a t members o f bo t h communities i n Ayios 
Theodhoros were s i t t i n g t o g e t h e r i n the same c o f f e e house, 
no t o n l y exchanging c o n v e r s a t i o n but al s o Christmas g i f t s — 
a s i g n t h a t whatever the r e s t o f the w o r l d was do i n g , they 
a t l e a s t were determined t o get r e l a t i o n s h i p s back t o normal 
and l i v e i n q u i e t accord w i t h t h e i r neighbours." (107) 
I t seems f a i r to argue t h a t the overwhelming m a j o r i t y o f o r d i n a r y people 
i n Cyprus wished t o l i v e i n peace and s e c u r i t y w i t h one another. As 
H a r b o t t l e argued i n another a r t i c l e , t h e r e are p l e n t y o f examples 
"where human r e l a t i o n s and standards o f c i v i l i z e d behaviour have 
triumphed over e t h n i c d i f f e r e n c e s " . (108) I t was one o f U.N.F.I.CYP.'s 
tasks t o f o s t e r the spontaneous " r e i n t e g r a t i n g t r e n d " i n Greek and 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t r e l a t i o n s , a d i f f i c u l t task g i v e n a l l the p o l a r i z i n g 
p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s a t work i n Cyprus. (109) I n the years p r i o r t o T968 
U.N.F.I.CYP. had lessened the ha r d s h i p s o f T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s l i v i n g i n 
enclaves, and by so doing helped t o preserve a p a r t h e i d i n Cyprus. The 
presence o f t h i s Force may have reduced the urgency f o r a p o l i t i c a l 
s e t t l e m e n t by... 
" p r o v i d i n g the a l l - i m p o r t a n t f a c e - s a v i n g excuse f o r 
p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e r a t h e r than the reason f o r i t . * (110) 
C e r t a i n l y by T968 U.N.F.I.CYP. had become an i m p o r t a n t element i n C y p r i o t 
l i f e , i t s "presence became a d d i c t i v e f o r a l l the i s l a n d e r s who had grown 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y dependent ori t h i s e x t e r n a l l y a d m i n i s t e r e d p a i n k i l l i n g 
o p e r a t i o n " . (1T1) i n the s i x years up t o J u l y 1974 the U n i t e d Nations 
Force s u f f e r e d a r e d u c t i o n i n i t s numbers and kept the same mandate, never-
t h e l e s s , " U.N.F.I.CYP. was able t o p l a y a more d i r e c t r o l e i n t h e 
r e s t o r a t i o n o f normal conditions...away from the p o l i t i c a l 
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b a t t l e f r o n t i n the s o c i a l and economic f i e l d s . " (T12) 
i ) P a c i f i c a t i o n A c t i v i t i e s : 
Throughout t h i s p e r i o d t h e r e was l e s s intercommunal v i o l e n c e t h a n i n 
the p r e v i o u s f o u r y e a r s . Even so, U.N.F.I.CYP. f a i l e d t o n e g o t i a t e an 
i s l a n d - w i d e d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n programme. 1968 to J u l y T974 was a p e r i o d 
o f " n e g a t i v e s t a b i l i t y " , s u p e r f i c i a l l y q u i e t , but w i t h u n d e r l y i n g t e n s i o n 
" s t r a i n e d , abnormal and f r a u g h t w i t h the s e r i o u s danger i n h e r e n t i n the 
c o n t i n u i n g c l o s e c o n f r o n t a t i o n o f w e l l armed and t r a i n e d f o r c e s . " (113) 
Under such circumstances b o t h communities viewed w i t h a n x i e t y any 
r e d u c t i o n s i n U.N.P.I.CYP.'s s t r e n g t h , f o r as the Secretary-General puts 
i t , -U.N.F.I.CYP. was considered 
" as a guarantee o f t r a n q u i l i t y and s e c u r i t y , even i n areas 
where t h e r e have been no d i s t u r b a n c e s f o r a l o n g t i m e . " (114) 
C o n f r o n t a t i o n areas: 
(a) N i c o s i a . 
The "Green L i n e " c o n t i n u e d t o be an area o f close armed c o n f r o n t a t i o n , 
a p o t e n t i a l f l a s h p o i n t where s e r i o u s i n c i d e n t s c o u l d occur a t any t i m e . 
Successive U.N. Force att e m p t s t o arrange a mutual d e c o n f r o n t a t i o n 
programme were u n s u c c e s s f u l . (115) Another t r o u b l e spot was the suburb 
o f Ormorphita, which had been the scene o f b i t t e r intercommunal f i g h t i n g 
i n December 1>963. Since t h e n , w i t h the area being h e l d by the N a t i o n a l 
Guard, many T u r k i s h homes which had been s e r i o u s l y damaged i n f i g h t i n g 
were l e f t t o decay. The suburb was on and i n the v i c i n i t y o f the Green 
Line and so much o f i t was p a t r o l l e d by U.N. t r o o p s . 
On 26 January 1968, the C o u p i l o f M i n i s t e r s decided t o extend the 
m u n i c i p a l boundaries o f N i c o s i a t o i n c l u d e the suburbs o f P a l l o u r i o t i s s a , 
K a i m a k l i , and Omorphita. T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s argued t h a t t h i s was a 
d e l i b e r a t e attempt t o l i m i t the power o f the T u r k i s h M u n i c i p a l i t y as 
p r o v i d e d f o r i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n p r i o r t o the t r o u b l e s . (116) The 
Government' r e j e c t e d T u r k i s h p r o p o s a l s t h a t Ormorphita should be pl a c e d 
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under the e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l o f U.N.F.I.CYP. Tensions i n c r e a s e d when 
Cyprus P o l i c e p a t r o l s made f r e q u e n t v i s i t s t o Green Line areas w i t h i n 
the w a l l e d c i t y , along Ayios Demetrios S t r e e t , and i n Omorphita. 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s r e f u s e d t o move from t h e i r f o r w a r d advance l i n e s 
between the Green Line and Naousis S t r e e t unless — 
i ) The suburbs were placed under U.N.F.I.CYP. c o n t r o l ; 
i i ) N a t i o n a l Guard posts i n advance o f the Green Line near the Ledra 
Palace H o t e l , and between Omorphita and Hamid Mandres, were d i s m a n t l e d ; 
i i i ) A l l Cyprus P o l i c e p a t r o l s o f s t r e e t s on o r w i t h i n 100 metres o f the 
Green Line were stopped: 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , U.N.F.I.CYP. co u l d do l i t t l e to r e s o l v e these problems. 
The Government c o n t i n u e d t o r e s t r i c t the r e t u r n o f T u r k i s h refugees t o 
t h e i r homes i n Omorphita and Ne a p o l i s , as long as Greek C y p r i o t s were 
prevented from e n t e r i n g the p a r t s o f these suburbs under T u r k i s h C y p r i o t 
c o n t r o l . (117) 
(b) Other Areas. 
As i n the c a p i t a l no d e f o r t i f i c a t i o n was achieved along the "green 
l i n e " o f Lamaca. N a t i o n a l Guard posts remained on Pat s a l o H i l l and 
Hala S u l t a n Tekke, w h i l s t T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s m a i n t a i n e d t h e i r f r o n t - l i n e 
along Artemis Avenue. I n r e t u r n f o r the " n o r m a l i z a t i o n measures" 
i n t r o d u c e d by the Government i n March 1968, the Cyprus Government c a l l e d 
f o r a w i t h d r a w a l o f T u r k i s h p o s i t i o n s and a r e t u r n o f freedom o f movement 
along Artemis Avenue. T u r k i s h l e a d e r s argued t h a t t h i s would expose 
Scala t o a t t a c k . Furthermore the c o n t i n u e d o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e i r Muslim 
s h r i n e o f Hala S u l t a n Tekke was s a c r i l e g e , an a f f r o n t t o the T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t community. (118) T u r k i s h r e q u e s t s f o r a reopening o f the T u r k i s h 
s c h o o l w i t h i n the Government-controlled p a r t o f town on the margins o f 
Scala were t u r n e d down f o r s t r a t e g i c reasons. (119) 
Limassol d i d n o t remain q u i e t throughout t h i s p e r i o d . T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s 
c o n s t r u c t e d a r a t t a n fence across Lycourgos S t r e e t , a d j a c e n t t o a F i g h t e r 
compound, which they r e f u s e d t o remove. There was a l s o some a n x i e t y 
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regarding the use of the Greek Orthodox Church of Ayios Antonios, 
which was s i t u a t e d i n a se n s i t i v e quarter of Limassol inhabited by 
Turkish Cypriots. (120) 
Reductions i n U.N.F.I.CYP. strength. ( see Map 5:2 f o r 1968 deployment ) 
At the s t a r t of i t s second phase U.N.F.I.CYP. was over 4,700 men 
strong, but by May 1972 i t was l i t t l e more than 3,000 strong. These 
sizeable reductions led to redeployments and reductions i n the number 
of manned observation posts. A new Larnaca Zone was created w i t h 
approximately the same boundaries of those of the c i v i l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
One of the main reasons f o r these changes was the huge cost of 
financing the peacekeeping operation. I n 1969, the Secretary-General 
requested a Secretariat Survey Team to look thoroughly i n t o the f i n a n c i a l 
s i t u a t i o n of U.N.F.I.CYP. The Team concluded that — 
" While the basic problems of Cyprus remain unsolved, 
i t would seem h i g h l y unwise to make a reduction i n the 
strength and effectiveness of U.N.F.I.CYP. on the basis 
of the present degree of quiet, which i s i n large measure 
the r e s u l t of i t s presence on the i s l a n d . " (121) 
i i ) Normalization A c t i v i t i e s : 
U n t i l 8 March 1968 "the Turkish Cypriots were i n touch w i t h the out-
side world only through the personnel of the United Nations." (T22) On 
8 March the Government l i f t e d i t s economic blockade and a l l s t a t i c road-
blocks were withdrawn. Unfortunately the so-called "normalization 
measures" f a i l e d to reverse a d e f i n i t e "trend towards separate economic 
development". (123) The Turkish Cypriot Leadership held onto i t s c o n t r o l 
of scattered enclaves by continuing a p o l i c y of non-cooperation w i t h and 
non-recognition of the Cyprus Government. 
Separate economic development. 
I n 1971, a U.N. economist estimated that the average per capita income 
of Turkish Cypriots was h a l f that of Greek Cypriots. (124) The Provisional 
Administration sought to promote separate processing and manufacturing 
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i n d u s t r i e s i n s i d e Turkish Cypriot t e r r i t o r y , u t i l i z i n g finance from 
Turkey. As the Secretary-General commented i n h i s report of 2 December 
1*970 — " Depite undoubted progress i n intercommunal r e l a t i o n s i n 
The P r o v i s i o n a l Administration received an annual grant from Ankara of 
£8 m i l l i o n , which covered the costs of communal welfare and development 
programmes, as w e l l as Fighter and c i v i l servant s a l a r i e s . Some c r i t i c s 
of the Leadership argued that more funds should have been channelled 
i n t o development projects to a l l e v i a t e the chronic under- and unemployment 
w i t h i n Turkish areas. Economic conditions could have been improved by 
a reduction of Fighter strength, by inducing refugees to r e t u r n to 
abandoned v i l l a g e s , and by closer cooperation w i t h the Cyprus Government, 
both to gain more U.N.D.P. aid and to reduce unnecessary d u p l i c a t i o n 
of c e r t a i n c i v i l i a n services. (126) 
One of the c r i t i c a l problems hindering the progress of the Government's 
Second Five Year Development Plan ( 1967-'71 ) was shortage of labour. 
Despite Turkish Cypriot unemployment the Provisional Administration was 
rel u c t a n t to permit 'cheap' Turkish labour enter i n t o the Greek Cypriot 
economy. There was a slow t r i c k l e of Turkish Cypriot labour i n t o 
Government c o n t r o l l e d t e r r i t o r y , as the f i g u r e s below i n d i c a t e . 
such areas as employment, t r a i n i n g and commerce, no 
rapprochment...has been made on such basic issues as 
investment and economic p o l i c y . " (125) 
TURKISH CYPRIOT EMPLOYMENT IN T970. 
( Figures out of a t o t a l Turkish Cypriot labour force of 45,000 ) 
Greek Cypriot Enterprises 
and Others. 
Turkish Cyp-
r i o t Enterprises 
F u l l - t i m e labourers 5,000 28,000 
Seasonal labourers 3,000 1,000 
Self-employed 5,000 3,000 
T o t a l : 13,000 32,000 
Taken from: P a t r i c k , 1976, p.167 and 
A t t a l i d e s , 1979, p.94. (127) 
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The Provisional Administration argued that the f i g u r e of 13,000 Turkish 
Cypriots "cooperating" w i t h the Greek Cypriot community was over-
exaggerated. These f i g u r e s included employment f o r foreign-owned mining 
corporations and i n the B r i t i s h Sovereign Base Areas. 
Freedom of movement : 
" The opening of the enclaves' "gates" i n t o the Greek sectors 
began a second phase of l i f e there." (128) 
The^ removal of r e s t r i c t i o n s on Turkish Cypriot m o b i l i t y throughout the 
i s l a n d put an end to t h e i r s o l i t a r y confinement, but there were no moves 
by the Provisional Administration to end r e s t r i c t i o n s on Greek movement. 
According to the Provisional Administration, a Turkish Cypriot who 
entered Government-controlled t e r r i t o r y to l i v e and work was e f f e c t i v e l y 
bowing down to the Cyprus Government. Rauf Denktas^ argued :-
" The freedom of movement which the Archbishop appeared to 
have so generously granted the Turks was, i n e f f e c t , an 
extension of h i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t r o l over them," (T29) 
The Cyprus Government made a l i s t of 123 publ i c roads, the use of which 
were wholly or p a r t l y denied to Greeks. P r i o r to the outbreak of 
disturbances, f o r t y - s i x of these roads were normally used by farmers to 
gain access to t h e i r f i e l d s . (130) Some of the major roads concerned 
were:- ( i ) Nicosia - Kyrenia, under U.N.P.I.CYP. convoys ; (2) Famagusta 
Chatos - Nicosia; (3) Trypimeni - Knodhara - Nicosia/Famagusta; 
(4) Xeros - L i m n i t i s - Pyrgos - Kokkina - P o l i s ; (5) Paphos -
Stavrokonnou - Kelokedhara: (131) Turkish Cypriot r e s t r i c t i o n s meant 
considerable delays or detours. For instance, the journey from Pomos, 
on the north-west coast of Cyprus, to Nicosia, usually took only one and 
a h a l f hours, but owing to the Kokkina enclave a detour of over three 
hours was required. The main road through Kato Pyrgos was barred i n 
the westerly d i r e c t i o n by Turkish Cypriots i n Kokkina, while i n the 
easterly d i r e c t i o n i t was closed at night by Turkish Cypriots i n L i m n i t i s 
Eventually, a U.N.P.I.CYP. post was reestablished near Kato Pyrgos w i t h 
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a view to f a c i l i t a t i n g c i v i l i a n Greek t r a f f i c through L i m n i t i s during 
hours of darkness. (132) ( r e f e r t o : Map 5:3 ) 
I n October 1970, a Fighter prevented a Cyprus Police p a t r o l from 
passing through Ayios Evastathios. Up to that time the status quo had 
been that such p a t r o l s occasionally passed but di d not enter the v i l l a g e 
while t r a v e l l i n g along a track between Koni Kebir and Ayios Theodhoros. 
Turkish Cypriots i n t e r p r e t t e d t h i s change as an attempt by the Cyprus 
Government to sssert i t s a u t h o r i t y i n Ayios Evastathios. U.N.F.I.CYP. 
intervened i n the dispute and arranged a compromise. Cyprus Police 
p a t r o l s would be permitted to pass by the v i l l a g e up to s i x times per 
year, provided that the p a t r o l was accompanied by a U.N.F.I.CYP. escort 
and did not stop i n the v i l l a g e . (133) 
C i v i l i a n Services. 
For the Cyprus Government to undertake to provide most public services 
to v i l l a g e s two basic conditions had to be f u l f i l l e d : -
a) The v i l l a g e d i d not owe money to the Government. The Provisional 
Administration's non-recognition of the Government meant withholding 
money owed to i t . 
b) Half the cost of public f a c i l i t i e s had to be paid f o r by the v i l l a g e 
i t s e l f . Most v i l l a g e a u t h o r i t i e s were r e l u c t a n t to tax f e l l o w 
v i l l a g e r s . D i s t r i c t o f f i c e r s f a i l e d to persuade Turkish Cypriots 
to do t h i s . (134) 
Despite such obstacles there 1 were s i g n i f i c a n t improvements on the preceding 
period i n such matters as la y i n g new water p i p e l i n e s , r e p a i r i n g dams, 
and cleaning springs i n Turkish C y p r i o t - c o n t r o l l e d areas. U.N.F.I.CYP. 
continued to solve a v a r i e t y of disputes over intercommunal water supply. 
Turkish Cypriots could also apply f o r i n c l u s i o n i n Government water 
devlopment pr o j e c t s and f o r public f a c i l i t i e s f o r t h i s purpose. There 
was an extension of e l e c t r i c i t y supply to several Turkish Cypriot v i l l a g e s . 
U.N.F.I.CYP. also took part i n discussions p e r t a i n i n g to the proposed 
construction of a sewerage system f o r the whole of Nicosia to be funded 
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by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank f o r Reconstruction and Development. (T35) 
Unfortunately, owing to the leaderships mutual non-recognition of each 
other and Turkish Cypriot resistance to any extension of Government 
a u t h o r i t y i n t h e i r areas , the Turkish Cypriot enclaves were s t i l l 
not f u l l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the e l e c r i f i c a t i o n , water supply, road, and 
public service systems of the Cyprus Republic i n July 1974. 
Agr i c u l t u r e : 
U.N.P.I.CYP. continued to carry out a v a r i e t y of duties o u t l i n e d e a r l i e r , 
such as escorting farmers to and through s e n s i t i v e areas. The Force 
encouraged c u l t i v a t i o n i n c e r t a i n " m i l i t a r i l y r e s t r i c t e d areas", 
i n c l u d i n g those of Mansoura, Ayios Theodhoros, and Selemani ( near Kokkina), 
and i t even supervised the growing of winter crops w i t h i n twenty metres 
of National Guard posi t i o n s at Gaziveran ( Lefka D i s t r i c t ) . Greek 
Cypriot farmers of Lefkoniko ( Famagusta D i s t r i c t ) were allowed to t i l l 
t h e i r f i e l d s i n the Turkish C y p r i o t - c o n t r o l l e d area of P s i l a t o s . (136) 
U.N.CIV.POL. continued to in v e s t i g a t e l o c a l disputes a r i s i n g from the 
confusing and o f t e n poor r demarcations between areas of Turkish- and 
Greek Cypriot c o n t r o l . Many of these disputes concerned i l l e g a l encroach-
ments onto p r i v a t e land, unauthorized grazing and c u l t i v a t i o n . 
During t h i s period the Turkish Cypriot areas f e l t the benefit of 
several United Nations schemes. For instance, from i r r i g a t i o n development 
projects sponsored by the Government and United Nations Development 
Programme, as w e l l as the s o i l conservation p r o j e c t of U.N.D.P. and 
World Food Programme ( W.F.P. ) . At the end of A p r i l 1971, U.N.F.I.CYP. 
estimated that out of T,476 p a r t i c i p a n t s i n an important mixed farming 
scheme, sponsored by the Government and W.F.P., 245 were Turkish Cypriots. 
(137) I n the s o i l conservation p r o j e c t there were 1,069 Turkish Cypriots 
out of an estimated 10,000 f o r the period October 1970 - July 1971. 
Other encouraging signs of increased cooperation between the communities 
were the Government's extension of i t s drought r e l i e f scheme to Turkish 
Cypriot areas. U.N.F.I.CYP.'s good o f f i c e s were also used to e s t a b l i s h 
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cooperation i n a malaria c o n t r o l programme i n the v i c i n i t y of Nicosia. 
I n s p i t e of a l l these improvements i t should be stressed that only a 
small percentage of Turkish Cypriots were a c t u a l l y involved i n 
Government, United Nations, and W.F.P. sponsored a g r i c u l t u r a l schemes. 
(138) 
Industry and other economic a c t i v i t y ; 
The r e v i v a l of small i n d u s t r i e s w i t h i n Turkish C y p r i o t - c o n t r o l l e d areas 
was assisted by U.N.F.I.CYP., but there was l i t t l e r e a c t i v a t i o n of Greek 
enterprises i n Turkish Cypriot enclaves; The r e t u r n of these enterprises 
to f u l l production would have provided many jobs to Turkish Cypriots, but 
the Provisional Administration considered them to be an extension of 
Greek c o n t r o l i n Turkish Cypriot t e r r i t o r y . One Turkish l i m e k i l n was 
reac t i v a t e d at Ambelikou and two Greek Cypriot f a c t o r i e s ( l i m e k i l n s ) 
were reactivated i n north Nicosia, one i n the main Turkish enclave and 
the other i n 'no-man's-land' between the f r o n t - l i n e s of the National 
Guard and Turkish Fighters. (139) 
Another anomalous s i t u a t i o n a r i s i n g from the island's p e c u l i a r p o l i t i c a l 
geography was at the v i l l a g e of Zyyi. This v i l l a g e was under the de facto 
c o n t r o l of the Provisional Administration, but had no Turkish Cypriot 
Fighter u n i t . Greek Cypriots had free access to Zyyi, and both Turkish 
and Cyprus police p a t r o l l e d there, w h i l s t an U.N.F.I.CYP. camp was 
established on the v i l l a g e ' s o u t s k i r t s . Zyyi had f o u r carob-processing 
f a c t o r i e s , three of which were owned by Greek Cypriots, so foremen and 
managers commuted to the v i l l a g e from Government-controlled t e r r i t o r y . 
There was l i t t l e attempt by e i t h e r side to a l t e r the the status quo f o r 
Zyyi was not located i n a s t r a t e g i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e area. 
The refugee problem. 1968-'74; 
U.N.F.I.CYP. continued i t s e f f o r t s to ass i s t refugees w i t h i n Turkish 
enclaves by supervising the de l i v e r y of Red Crescent r e l i e f shipments 
a r r i v i n g at Famagusta to Turkish d i s t r i b u t i o n centres. U.N.F.I.CYP. 
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estimated that about 1.6 % of the t e r r i t o r y of Cyprus was included 
w i t h i n areas under the de facto c o n t r o l of the Turkish Cypriots i n 
1964. As pointed out i n Chapter Three t h i s f i g u r e does not include a l l 
Turkish Cypriot quarters and v i l l a g e s , some of which were only nominally 
under the c o n t r o l of the Cyprus Government. Patrick estimated that of 
the 135' Turkish Cypriot centres that were p a r t i a l l y or f u l l y occupied 
i n August 1964, 20 were under government c o n t r o l and accounted f o r 
approximately 8,000 Turkish Cypriots. (T40) Other' Turkish or mixed 
centres w i t h i n Government t e r r i t o r y had been completely abandoned by 
t h e i r Turkish Cypriot populations. During the period December 1963 to 
August 1964 Turkish Cypriots completely evacuated t h e i r quarters i n 
72 mixed v i l l a g e s and abandoned 24 Turkish Cypriot v i l l a g e s . Professor 
Volkan, 1979, states that "by the end of T964 the Greeks occupied 97 per 
cent of the land". (T41) This f i g u r e f a i l s to take account of the three 
per cent of land included w i t h i n the B r i t i s h Sovereign Base Areas, 
although i t does assume about three per cent of Cypriot t e r r i t o r y under 
Turkish Cypriot c o n t r o l which seems a reasonable assumption given the 
f a c t that even some Turkish Cypriot centres outside recognized enclaves 
refused to demonstrate allegiance to the Republic. 
T e r r i t o r i a l c o n t r o l was important to the p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n s of both 
sides. A f l o o d of Turkish Cypriots back i n t o areas under the a u t h o r i t y 
of the Cyprus Government would have weakened the p o s i t i o n of the Provisional 
Administration, which explains why the l a t t e r did not encourage such 
"r e t u r n migration", The Provisional Administration provided assistance 
to displaced persons by means of hardship allowances and long-term loans 
at low rates of i n t e r e s t , and i t also had i t s own r e h a b i l i t a t i o n scheme, 
i r o n i c a l l y helped by the Government's "normalization measures" which 
allowed b u i l d i n g materials back i n t o Turkish areas. Thus there was only 
a small t r i c k l e of Turkish Cypriots back i n t o Greek C y p r i o t - c o n t r o l l e d 
t e r r i t o r y . By 1971 about 2,000 refugees had returned to twenty-two 
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settlements under government c o n t r o l . (142) These included those of 
Peristerona, Ayios Sozemos, M a l l i a , Yerovasa, Potamia, and other mixed 
v i l l a g e s . According to U.N.P.I.CYP., since June 1968, some f i f t y Turkish 
Cypriot f a m i l i e s returned to the suburb of Omorphita. (143) Two Cyprus 
Police s t a t i o n s were immediately established i n the v i c i n i t y " TO PROTECT 
thousands of Greeks from 100 Turks ( mostly women and c h i l d r e n ) who 
had returned to t h e i r homes on the Greek side- of the Green Line". (144) 
The P r o v i s i o n a l Administration accused the Government of not doing enough 
to encourage a r e t u r n of Turkish Cypriots, w h i l s t the Government countered 
w i t h the arguement that the Provisional Administration a c t i v e l y discouraged 
any r e t u r n to 'normality 1. There was an element of t r u t h i n both views, 
which l a r g e l y explains why so few Turkish Cypriots had returned to ol d 
homes and v i l l a g e s by 197T. U.N.P.I.CYP. did what i t could under the 
circunstances, but i t s a c t i v i t i e s were yet again r e s t r i c t e d by the 
a t t i t u d e s of the two leaderships. 
Some Conclusions : 1968-'74 and the ro l e of the United Nations. 
In Section One, Chapter Pour i t was argued that perhaps U.N.P.I.CYP. 
could have done more to promote contacts and cooperation between the 
two communities i n the m i l i t a r i l y "dead p e r i o d " from T968 to July 1974. 
I t was also suggested that coordinated a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g a v a r i e t y of 
U.N. agencies could have helped bridge the gap between the communities. 
Regarding the f i r s t p o i n t , U.N.P.I.CYP. di d achieve some successes i n 
socio-economic l i f e , but owing to the p o l i t i c a l stalemate i t was of t e n 
d i f f i c u l t f o r the Force, with i t s l i m i t e d mandate, to do anything more 
than maintain an uneasy status quo between the two sides. 
Between 1968 and 1974 there were several United Nations programmes i n 
Cyprus, d i s t i n c t from the peacekeeping operation. The major co n s t r a i n t 
was that these schemes were not able to d i r e c t l y involve the Turkish 
Cypriot community', f o r the Cyprus Government was the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y 
recognized a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f o r the whole i s l a n d . Nevertheless, Turkish 
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Cypriots d i d p a r t i c i p a t e i n a number of U.N. sponsored schemes. Such 
as the Higher Technical I n s t i t u t e , assisted by U.N.D.P. and the United 
Nations Educational, S c i e n t i f i c and C u l t u r a l Organisation ( U.N.E.S.C.O. ) ; 
mixed farming p r o j e c t s , s o i l conservation schemes, and the h o s p i t a l and 
school feeding p r o j e c t , a l l sponsored by U.N.D.P. and World Pood 
Programme. These pro j e c t s were a l l under the administration of the Greek 
Cypriot a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and so unfortunately, they only a t t r a c t e d a small 
proportion of Turkish Cypriots. 
Michael Harbottle advocated a broadly based " m u l t i - l e v e l t h i r d party 
process" to tackle the Cyprus Problem on a l l f r o n t s , l i n k i n g the 
diplomatic endeavours of the Secretary-General to the ground l e v e l 
a c t i v i t i e s of the peacekeeping f o r c e . He argues — 
" . . . i n 1968 U.N.F.I.CYP. had f u l f i l l e d the r o l e f o r which i t 
had been created...a new approach was needed, one aimed at 
est a b l i s h i n g a new confidence and t r u s t between the two 
communities and at a s s i s t i n g i n the development of a new 
so c i a l and economic r e l a t i o n s h i p which would encourage 
improved intercommunal cooperation and peaceful coexistence 
...Had a c i v i l i a n peacebuilding 'operation* been mounted 
i n T968 the events of 1974 might never have taken place." (145) 
The Security Council did not adapt to the a l t e r e d circumstances i n Cyprus, 
so i t kept a "redundant" m i l i t a r y peacekeeping operation going. Once 
the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n i n the i s l a n d was r e l a t i v e l y s table, most of the 
U.N. Force's resources were direct e d towards a l l e v i a t i n g the problems 
created by a large Turkish Cypriot refugee population , by unequal 
c o n t r o l of the islands resources, by a breakdown i n intercommunal contacts, 
and a whole range of associated issues. These were p r i m a r i l y n o n - m i l i t a r y 
a c t i v i t i e s aimed at breaking down physical and psychological "green l i n e s " , 
which suggests that what was a c t u a l l y needed was an expansion of 
U.N.F.I.CYP.'s c i v i l i a n component and Operations Economics s t a f f . The 
scope of U.N.F.I.CYP. was l i m i t e d . I t could not implement such i n i t i a t i v e s 
as the Cyprus Resettlement Project, established by a small group of 
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Quakers and members of the Shanti Sena ( the Gandhi Peace Movement ) 
f a c i l i t a t i n g the r e t u r n of refugees to a few s p e c i a l l y selected v i l l a g e s . 
(146) This would have required m o d i f i c a t i o n to U.N.F.I.CYP.'s mandate, 
for- the Force already had the organisational a b i l i t y and personnel to 
attempt more ambitious " c i v i c action p r o j e c t s " . Unfortunately, Makarios 
was against any extension i n the size and scope of U.N.F.I.CYP. 
I n many respects the ordinary people of Cyprus have been polarized 
by the i n t e r r e l a t e d i n t e r n a l and external p o l i t i c a l f orces, c e n t r i f u g a l 
forces too powerful f o r a small peacekeeping force to put r i g h t . The 
bicommunal character of the i s l a n d has become an excuse f o r p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t i t i o n , but i n f a c t the r e a l i t y i s not so simple. As one commentator 
describes, "...animosity between Greeks and Turks" i s a myth 
"perpetuated by those who seek to convince t h e i r 
f ellows and world opinion that the two communities 
cannot l i v e together..." (147) 
I n 1974, U.N.F.I.CYP. was powerless to prevent the physical p a r t i t i o n 
of Cyprus between the two main ethnic groups. From 1964 to 1974 the 
U.N. Force had preserved an "unstable peace" or "negative s t a b i l i t y " i n 
Cyprus. (148) Had the Security Council extended i t s o r i g i n a l mandate 
U.N.F.I.CYP. could probably have done more to enhance a trend towards 
r e i n t e g r a t i o n amongst ordinary Cypriots, playing an active r o l e r a t h e r 
than a passive r o l e i n intercommunal r e l a t i o n s . The events of Summer *74 
were t r a g i c f o r the m a j o r i t y of Cypriots who, regardless of ethnic 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , wanted or preferred a r e t u r n to peaceful coexistence. 
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CHAPTER SIX. 
Daubed on the walls on the Turkish Cypriot side of the Green Line 
are mainland Turkish m i l i t a r y propaganda designs and slogans l i k e 
the one shown i n Pig. 6:1. I t was through Turkish m i l i t a r y 
i n t e r v e n t i o n that a de facto Turkish Cypriot state was created. 
Fig. 6:1 
1 
L E T MY B L O O D F L O W , 
L E T IT C O L O U R MY S H R O U D , 
L E T MY S C A R L E T S H R O U D B E C O M E MY F L A G . 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE THIN BLUE LINE AND THE "ATTILA LINE" 
" I t i s i n conversation w i t h Cypriots themselves, however, 
that the even more serious wounds i n f l i c t e d on Cyprus 
become apparent. The most casual i n q u i r y — s u c h as, ' Where 
do you come from ?* or ' Do you have a f a m i l y can be 
enough to induce a t o r r e n t of grievance or of g r i e f . " (1) 
" You t r y to f o r g e t , but the dreams of a refugee are merciless. 
They take you to places that you knew and give the delusion 
that everything there continues to be as i t was before. 
Then comes the p a i n f u l awakening." (2) 
n 
" Our relatio.ship w i t h the Greeks was always l i k e a cracked 
glass. I t was shattered i n T974 and i t cannot be glued back 
together again." (3) 
Section One : The Demographic and Economic Consequences of P a r t i t i o n . 
July - August T974 w i l l long l i v e i n the memories of many Cypriots. 
How can they f o r g e t ? There i s a permanent reminder of the losses, the 
bloodshed and a t r o c i t i e s , of years of intercommunal s t r i f e , a permanent 
scar etched across the landscape of the i s l a n d , separating Greek from 
Turkish Cypriot. 
The events of the Summer of '74 can not be e a s i l y f o r g o t t e n or d i s -
missed. Approximately one t h i r d of the Cypriot population of 650,000 
became refugees, uprooted from t h e i r land and property w i t h no immediate 
hope of a r e t u r n . V i l l a g e s were bombarded, destroyed, looted, f a m i l i e s 
slaughtered, f o r e s t s were burnt, the whole l i f e of the i s l a n d was d i s -
rupted. To catalogue such losses i s not the point of t h i s section, but 
before discussing some important demographic and economic consequences 
of the p a r t i t i o n i t i s necessary to b r i e f l y describe how Cyprus came to 
be divided i n t o two de facto micro-states. 
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The Turkish 'Peacekeeping Operation or 'Invasion'. 
Relations between Makarios and the Athens Junta went from bad to 
worse i n the f i r s t h a l f of 1974. I n July the Archbishop p u b l i c l y 
condemned the Junta's support and d i r e c t i o n of E.O.K.A.-B. He asked 
f o r a withdrawal of the 650 Greek o f f i c e r s s t a f f i n g the National Guard. 
I n r e p l y , Athens ordered the go-ahead of a coup d'etat against Makarios 
on T5 July 1 3 7 4 . The Greek o f f i c e r l ed National Guard overthrew the 
Government, announced Makarios dead, and i n s t a l l e d Nicos Sampson, a 
former E.O.K.A. anti-Turk t e r r o r i s t as the leader of the 'new regime of 
nat i o n a l s a l v a t i o n ' . 
I n an emotional diary of events i n Kyrenia, R i t a C a t s e l l i wrote afew 
days a f t e r the coup — 
" The mino r i t y which c a r r i e d out the coup has been seized w i t h 
n a t i o n a l masochism...Only the other day I read an h i s t o r i c a l 
a r t i c l e about the "Attempts to de-Hellenize Cyprus through 
the centuries". I think the most serious one took place j u s t 
three days ago." (4) 
On 18 July, Ankara sent Athens an ultimatum c a l l i n g f o r 1 the r e s i g n a t i o n 
of Sampson, a withdrawal of Greek o f f i c e r s i n Cyprus, and f i r m pledges 
of Cyprus' independence. The Junta f o o l i s h l y believed America would, 
as before i n 1964 and 1 9 6 T , prevent the Turks from invading and sent an 
equivocal answer. But both Washington and London lacked the p o l i t i c a l 
w i l l to restore Makarios, leaving the way clear f o r a Turkish i n t e r v e n t i o n . 
(5) Turkish troops landed i n Cyprus on 20 July and t h e i r f i r s t "push" 
la s t e d u n t i l 22 July, securing a bridgehead around Kyrenia and the 
Guenyeli - Aghirda Enclave. ( r e f e r to Map 6 . 1 ) The Turks opened a 
s t r a t e g i c passage west of Kyrenia running to Temblos - S t . H i l a r i o n -
Nicosia. On 23 July 1 9 7 4 , R i t a C a t s e l l i wrote:-
" Now I and my fa m i l y are refugees, v i c t i m s , and we have 
come to Limassol w i t h almost nothing. I n Kyrenia the 
Turkish f l a g f l i e s and most of the Greek Cypriots who 
have not l e f t the town are penned up i n the big ( Dome) 
Hotel. " (6) 
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Outside the main Guenyeli - Aghirda stronghold the Turkish Cypriot 
enclaves were vulnerable to Greek Cypriot r e p r i s a l s and occupation. 
U.NoP.I.CYP. had to redeploy men r a p i d l y i n order to form p r o t e c t i v e 
buffers around enclaves and quarters to protect Turkish Cypriots wherever 
possible from "...highly excitable young men of the National Guard and 
'E.O.K.A.-B' who regarded the enclaves as Trojan horses."(7) U.N.P.I.CYP. 
concentrated on arranging l o c a l cease-fires i n areas outside the narrow 
c o r r i d o r occupied by Turkish troops. Prom 2T July onwards the "blue 
b e r r e t s " were helping to evacuate f o r e i g n nationals to the Dhekelia S.B.A., 
wh i l s t p a t r o l s and manned observation posts were increased i n s e n s i t i v e 
areas. (8) At the Secretary General's request the t o t a l strength of 
the Force was increased by 2,078 to a t o t a l of 4,444 between 24 July 
and t4 August. (9) I n a major redeployment U.N.P.I.CYP. created two 
new operational d i s t r i c t s on e i t h e r side of the Turkish bridgehead i n 
a f u t i l e attempt to contain the Turkish advance. 
Meanwhile i n Athens Brigadier Ioannides wanted to attack Turkey on a l l 
f r o n t s , but he was dissuaded by h i s f e l l o w o f f i c e r s i n the Junta. "The 
colonels" handed over power to Constantine Karamanlis, who proclaimed 
the T968 C o n s t i t u t i o n n u l l and void . A wave of r e l i e f swept over Greece 
with the end of the d i c t a t o r s h i p , but 
"...the nightmare was not over, only s h i f t e d to Cyprus." (10) 
Turkish reinforcements continued to a r r i v e i n Cyprus, more Greek Cypriot 
v i l l a g e s were occupied w i t h t h e i r i n h a b i t a n t s e i t h e r taken hostage or 
forced out. The Turkish Cypriots were now i n a p o s i t i o n to r e i t e r a t e 
demands f o r "a geographical f e d e r a t i o n of two autonomous zones". (11) 
Greek Cypriots were suddenly conscious of t h e i r "small and defenceless 
m i n o r i t y " status i n the eastern Mediterranean, while Turkey was leaning 
p r o t e c t i v e l y over t h e i r Cypriot brethren. At the second Geneva Conference 
i n August, the Turkish Foreign M i n i s t e r , Professor Turan Gunes, put 
forward a plan proposing that the Turkish f e d e r a l zone be divided 
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between s i x cantons i n d i f f e r e n t parts of the i s l a n d , adding up to 
34 % of the land area. ( r e f e r to Map 6 . 2 ) The a l t e r n a t i v e proposal 
was f o r two autonomous zones, of which the Turks would gain 34 % of 
northern Cyprus. Acting President Glafkos Clerides asked f o r 36 to 
48 hours to consult w i t h Athens and Makarios i n London, but the Turks 
were not prepared to wa i t . Immediately a f t e r the Conference broke down 
the"second push" began. Between T4 and 16 August the Turkish troops 
secured 36 to 37 % of the i s l a n d , b r u t a l l y transforming the s i t u a t i o n — 
" from an argument over how the i n t e r m i n g l i n g of two 
d i f f e r e n t populations was to be regulated — by min o r i t y 
r i g h t s , by power-sharing, or by devolution — i n t o a 
d i f f e r e n t kind of argument, one about what sort of f e d e r a l 
l i n k could be b u i l t between t e r r i t o r i a l l y separate 
communities." (12) 
Christopher Hitchens argues that between the " f i r s t " major advance and 
the "second" i n August, "the Greek i r r e d e n t i s t forces had f a l l e n from 
power i n both Athens and Nicosia", Karamanlis replaced Ioannides, 
Clerides replaced Sampson, and so "the p r e t e x t f o r the o r i g i n a l invasion 
had ceased to e x i s t " . ( T 3 ) 
Demographic Consequences and U,N.F.I.CYP.'s Po s i t i o n a f t e r the 
16 August Cease-Fire. 
When an island-wide cease-fire was declared at 1600 hours on 16 August 
1974 the p o l i t i c a l and human geography of Cyprus had been a r b i t r a r i l y 
and v i o l e n t l y rearranged. An a r t i f i c i a l l i n e cut through the i s l a n d 
l i k e a cheese-wire, extending to a leng.th of approximately 180 kilometres 
from the Kokkina enclave and Kato Pyrgos i n the north-west to the east 
coast south of Famagusta i n the area of Dherinia. The single long 
confrontation l i n e , w i t h the anomalous exception of Kokkina, e f f e c t i v e l y 
forms a po l i t i c a l - c u m - e t h n i c boundary between the two Cypriot communities. 
Turkey and Greece had d i r e c t l y influenced events leading to the 
b i f u r c a t i o n of Cyprus. (14) According to Beeley,1978, the s p a t i a l 
separation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots i n 1974 was merely an extension 
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of the p o l i t i c a l i n t e r f a c e between t h e i r "motherlands", extending from 
Western Thrace through the Aegean near the Turkish coast to Cyprus. He 
argues that the only reason that Cyprus did not experience the sort of 
population exchange between Greece and Turkey i n 1923 was "because the 
i s l a n d was then under B r i t i s h r u l e . " ( 1 5 ) 
I f reference i s made to Chapter Two i t was argued that there was no 
geographical basis f o r p a r t i t i o n or even the formation of " a r t i f i c i a l 
cantons". ( T 6 ) P r i o r to the d i v i s i o n of Cyprus Turkish Cypriots owned 
j u s t 12.3 % of the t o t a l land area, 16.8 % of p r i v a t e land, and they 
formed only 18 % of the t o t a l population. (T7) Following the Turkish 
advance and p a r t i t i o n there was a massive exchange of populations. 
Between July '74 and December '75 about T82,000 Greek Cypriots moved 
southwards and 45,000 Turkish Cypriots moved northwards. (18) The 
"t r a n s f e r " of populations was piecemeal and l a r g e l y uncoordinated, 
e s p e c i a l l y f o r the Greek Cypriots. Humanitarian r e l i e f operations 
were high on U.N.F.I.CYP.fs p r i o r i t i e s i n conjunction with the United 
Nations High Commissioner f o r Refugees ( U.N.H.C.R.) and the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Committee of the Red Cross ( I.C.R.C. ), a l l providing r e l i e f f o r the 
"displaced persons" of Cyprus. 
When the cease-fire l i n e was drawn on T8 August, and a f t e r a general 
exchange of prisoners had been agreed on the 20 September, there were 
s t i l l many thousands of Greeks and Turks on e i t h e r side of the d i v i s i o n . 
The number of Greek refugees declined from about 203,000 on t September 
to 179,000 on 21 November, as some 24,000 returned to t h e i r homes i n 
Nicosia or close to the southern side of the so-called " A t t i l a Line". 
There remained about 15,000 Greek Cypriots i n the north, many of whom 
were concentrated i n the Karpass peninsula, the 'pan handle' of Cyprus 
by-passed i n the Turkish Army's dash to s p l i t the country across the 
middle. Numerous Greek Cypriot refugees from Famagusta found sactuary 
i n Dhekelia Base, which remained safe from Turkish attack. Within the 
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Sovereign Base Area boundary the Greek Cypriot v i l l a g e s of Xylotymbou 
and Ormidhia took i n many refugees. (T9) 
U.N.F.I.CYP. was able to provide some p r o t e c t i o n f o r ' t h e i s o l a t e d 
Turkish Cypriots i n the south but was unable to do t h i s f o r Greeks i n 
the Turkish-occupied north. U.N. convoys supplied food and emergency 
accommodation wherever they could f o r refugees,, (20) U.N.CIV.POL.'s 
Missing Persons Bureau had an extremely d i f f i c u l t job of t r y i n g to locate 
over 3,000 reported "missing persons", many of whom were not found and 
are presumed dead. Although U.N.F.I.CYPs access to large parts of 
northern Cyprus was r e s t i c t e d i t did make some U.N.H.C.R. d e l i v e r i e s 
to stranded Greeks i n the Krenia Dome Hotel and to the v i l l a g e r s of 
Bellapais. (21) 
For months a f t e r the cease-fire,refugee movements continued f o l l o w i n g 
"agreements" concerning the evacuation of c e r t a i n Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot v i l l a g e s . U.N. troops escorted refugees across the " A t t i l a 
Line". I n southern Cyprus U.N.F.I.CYP. proved unable to prevent some 
E.O.K.A.-B t e r r o r i s t attacks on remote Turkish enclaves, such as Ayios 
Ioannis and the Turkish quarter of Paphos. As Hitchens remarks — 
"This was, perhaps, the l a s t favour t h a t E.O.K.A.-B and i t s j u n t a a l l i e s 
were to do f o r the cause of p a r t i t i o n " . (22) A point r e i n f o r c e d by Pierre 
Oberling's comments :-
" The massacres had the e f f e c t of strengthening the resolve 
of the 42,000 Turkish Cypriots, scattered i n southern Cyprus, 
to move to the Turkish-controlled n o r t h . But the Greek 
( Cypriot ) government strenuously opposed the" exodus, 
f e a r i n g that i f the e n t i r e Turkish Cypriot population would 
move to the north i t might tempt Turkey to es t a b l i s h a 
permanent protectorate there..." (23) 
Paphos D i s t r i c t contained many Turkish Cypriots, many had crowded i n t o 
A k r o t i r i S.B.A., w h i l s t the rest entrenched themselves i n t o t h e i r most 
defensible enclaves. I n January 1375 refugees at A k r o t i r i were sa f e l y 
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tra n s f e r r e d . (24) On the 13 February T975', the Turkish Cypriots 
announced northern Cyprus as the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" 
( K i b r i s Tilrk Federe De v l e t i ) . Within t h i s de facto micro-state 
remained some f i f t y - t h r e e v i l l a g e s s t i l l w i t h Greek Cypriot 
i n h a b i t a n t s . U.N.F.I.CYP. convoys were allowed to v i s i t them w i t h a 
Turkish m i l i t a r y escort. By June 1975 there were approximately 10,700 
Turkish Cypriots i n the south, of whom 7,250 were provided w i t h food 
and allowances by Government a u t h o r i t i e s . I n the T.F.S.C. the TO,500 
Greek Cypriots and T,000 Maronites remaining were supplied w i t h food and 
allowances from the south delivered by U.N.F.I.CYP. (25) 
Following an agreement on population exchange i n Vienna on 2 August 
1975, 8,033 Turkish Cypriots t r a n s f e r r e d to the north between 2 August 
and 7 September. (26) This l e f t only 130 Turkish Cypriots, scattered 
i n twenty-two l o c a l i t i e s i n southern Cyprus. By December T9T5 there 
were s t i l l 9,000 Greeks and 1,000 Maronites i n the north , w h i l s t another 
in 
25,000 Greek Cypriots were l i v i n g / t e n t s or temporary shacks, and over 
200,000 Cypriots i n a l l parts of the i s l a n d were dependent on public 
assistance and r e l i e f supplies. (27) 
Over the next few years there wasT a steady t r i c k l e of Greeks to southern 
Cyprus. For instance, i n 1976 5,828 Greeks l e f t the T.F.S.C. As Oberling 
puts i t :- " As they came to r e a l i z e t h a t the stalemate i n Cyprus 
might be l o n g - l a s t i n g , that the Turkish Federated State of 
Cyprus was probably here to stay and that they c o n s t i t u t e d a 
very small C h r i s t i a n minority i n a Muslim n a t i o n , most of 
them decided to leave." (28) 
I n s p i t e of t h i s there i s evidence to suggest that Turkish coercion was 
behind the so-called "voluntary" t r a n s f e r s of Greeks to the south. (4.9) 
C e r t a i n l y l i f e i n the T.F.S.C. was uncomfortable f o r the enclaved Greek 
Cypriots, f o r they were denied f u l l freedom of movement, lacked proper 
educational f a c i l i t i e s , medical care, and f u l l r e l i g i o u s freedom. • By 
T980, only 1,500 Greeks remained, concentrated i n the sprawling, tobacco-
growing v i l l a g e of Dipkarpaz ( formerly Rizokarpaso ) at the t i p of the 
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Karpass peninsula. (30) 
The table given below i l l u s t r a t e s the number of refugees who l e f t each 
of the s i x administrative D i s t r i c t s of Cyprus as a r e s u l t of the t r a g i c 
events of July - August 1974 and the period immediately afterwards. 
DISTRICT GREEKS | TURKS ARMENIANS & MARONITES 
1) Famagusta 
2) Kyrenia 
3) Larnaca 
4) Limassol 
5) Nicosia 
6) Paphos 
92,000 
29,000 
700 1T.600 
14,900 
3,500 
15,400 
2,000 
60,300 1,000 
Totals 182,000 45,400 3,000 
Source: Drury,M.P. 1981', i n Change and Development 
i n the Middle East. ( Clarke & Bowen-Jones, 
e d i t o r s ) , Methuen, 1981, p.293. 
Comparison should be made w i t h Table 6.T. Both tables give s l i g h t l y 
d i f f e r e n t s t a t i s t i c s f o r numbers of refugees from d i f f e r e n t D i s t r i c t s , 
but they d o _ i l l u s t r a t e the braad spread of refugee movements i n Cyprus, 
which a f f e c t e d about 290 v i l l a g e s , that i s h a l f the t o t a l number of 
v i l l a g e s i n Cyprus 0 
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TABLE 6.2 AREA OCCUPIED BY THE TURKS BEFORE AND AFTER THE TURKISH 
MILITARY INTERVENTION 
C a t e g o r i e s of land r u r k i s h G r e e k Before ( i n donums) 
% A f t e r ( i n donums) 
% Before ( i n 
donums) 
% A f t e r ( i n donums) 
% 
P r i v a t e land 852,455 12.30 1,929,584 27.9 4,215,117 61.00 3,137,988 45.4 
F o r e s t s , l a k e s and S t a t e l a n d s 286,794 4.14 573,985 8.3 1,424,273 20.56 1 ,137,082 16.4 
Communal, v i l l a g e commission, roads & r i v e r s and p u b l i c c o r -p o r a t i o n l a n d s 23,248 0.34 59,133 0.9 113,505 1.66 77,620 1.1 
TOTAL 1,162,497 16.78 2,562,702 37.1 5,752,895 83,22 4,352,690 62.9 
TABLE 6.3 DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE LAND BY DISTRICT AFTER THE TURKISH 
MILITARY INTERVENTION 
Di s t r i c t T u r k i sh occupied l a n d s ( i n donums) 
F r e e a r e a s ( i n donums) T o t a l a r e a ( i n donums) 
1. N i c o s i a 546,412 927,725 1,474,137 
2. K y r e n i a 368,957 - 368,957 
3. Famagusta 965,168 142,778 1,107,946 
4. La r n a c a 49,047 548,367 597,414 
5. L i m a s s o l - 810,780 810,780 
6. Paphos - 708,338 708,338 
TOTAL 1,929,584 3,137,988 5,067,572 
Taken from : K a r o u z i s , G. 1977, Land Ownersh-p i n Cyprus, 
(Cosmos P r e s s - N i c o s i a ) pp.115-116. 
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Economic Consequences of the T6 August cease-fire l i n e . 
The Turkish Cypriots emerged from the p a r t i t i o n w i t h a disproportionate' 
share of the island's resources. They held roughly 37 % of Cyprus, 
although estimates range from 36.5 % to 40 % depending on whether or 
not the U.N. Buffer Zone or "dead zone", as Karouzis, T976, termed i t , 
i s taken i n t o account. A cursory glance at Tables 6.2,6.3, and 6.4 
reveal that Turkish Cypriots increased the area of valuable a g r i c u l t u r a l 
and p r i v a t e land under t h e i r c o n t r o l . The Turkish North included a l l 
the tobacco p l a n t a t i o n s of the Karpass; 79 % of the t o t a l c i t r u s f r u i t 
production; 68 % of the cereal producing area of the Mesaoria P l a i n ; 
86 % of carrot production; 32 % of other vegetables ; 65; % of green 
fodders; and 30 % of carob production. ( 3 t ) According to Greek Cypriot 
sources, "the invasion" meant that 80 % of the island's c i t r u s production 
was l o s t due to lack of i r r i g a t i o n during the t r o u b l e s , and f u l l recovery 
of these orchards would take ten or twelve years. (32) Table 6.4 shows 
a 173 % increase i n c u l t i v a b l e land held by the Turkish Cypriots 
compared to land held p r i o r to the Turkish m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n . Their 
greatest gains were i n i r r i g a t e d c i t r u s f r u i t orchards and i n i n d u s t r i a l 
crops, p a r t i c u l a r l y tobacco. 
Water Resources : 
The August '74 cease-fire l i n e e f f e c t i v e l y divided morphological, agro-
physiographic and h y d r o l o g i c a l regions. Three very important headsprings 
l i e i n the Turkish-controlled north — (a) Kythrea, (b) Lapithos, and 
(c) Karavas, each w i t h an average d a i l y output of 15,000, 5,000 and 4,000 
cubic metres r e s p e c t i v e l y . The " A t t i l a Line" alBo cut across the courses 
of a l l the major northward flowing r i v e r s from the Troodos Massif, which 
begin i n the Government-controlled t e r r i t o r y and end i n Turkish Cypriot-
c o n t r o l l e d t e r r i t o r y . This i s the case w i t h the Pyrgos, L i r a n i t i s , Kambos, 
Xeros, Setrakhos, Karyotis, Atsas, aswell as the north-west f l o w i n g streams 
from the eastern Troodos — Elea, Peristerona, Akaki, and Merika. ( r e f e r 
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to Map 6.9 ) Two important r i v e r systems are mostly contained i n 
Turkish Cyprus — these are of the Pedhieos and Y i a l i a s . 
George Karouzis,1977 , argues "that of the t o t a l i r r i g a t e d area 4 6 . 5 % 
l i e s i n the occupied areas and includes the ri c h e s t i n water and other 
n a t u r a l resources areas of Morphou, Kyrenia c o a s t l i n e , Pamagusta and 
Kythrea." ( 3 3 ) I f y i e l d s per donura of i r r i g a t e d land are TO - 12 times 
greater i n i r r i g a t e d areas than n o n - i r r i g a t e d areas, then the loss to 
Greek Cypriot a g r i c u l t u r a l production was enormous. Since 1974 the 
Greeks have been t r y i n g to make up f o r some of the loss by various 
i r r i g a t i o n and land consolidation schemes. ( see below ) They l o s t 
several important dam and water development projects i n the Morphou -
T y l l i r i a and Pentadaktylos - Kyrenia coast areas. Indeed u n t i l the 
p a r t i t i o n the water development p o l i c y followed an i n t e g r a t e d i n t e r -
regional p a t t e r n aimed at conveying water from surplus to d e f i c i t areas, 
while taking i n t o account land a v a i l a b i l i t y , domestic, i n d u s t r i a l and 
t o u r i s t needs. ( 3 4 ) 
Since the p a r t i t i o n , i t has not been possible to i n t e g r a t e water develop-
ment schemes on an island-wide basis, although cooperation over water 
supply has taken place under U.N.P.I.CYP. auspices. As i n the pre.c.eeding 
decade, water supply considerations are subject to the problems of p o l i t i c a l 
d i v i s i o n between the two leaderships. During the 1964 - ' 7 4 period the 
Turkish Cypriot enclaves were vulnerable to water supply shortages, 
owing to e i t h e r Government r e s t r i c t i o n s , or to overuse o f / d i v e r s i o n of 
streams and underground water resources shared by or running i n t o both 
communities' t e r r i t o r y . As Michael Drury , T 9 7 7 , points out :-
Turkish Cypriots "resented the way i n which new wells were 
d e l i b e r a t e l y sunk adjacent to t h e i r own t e r r i t o r y , thereby 
lowering t h e i r own water table to untappable depths..." ( 3 5 ) 
The de facto p a r t i t i o n Has solved some of the Turkish Cypriot community's 
water supply worries, but the north could s t i l l be deprived of water from 
the south during dry summer months should the Greeks decide t h i s i s 
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necessary e i t h e r f o r t h e i r own needs or as a p o l i t i c a l weapon,, 
Communications. 
With the exception of U.N.F.I.CYP. convoys and "population exchanges", 
on 16 August 1974 a l l north - south movement stopped. Main roads l i n k i n g 
Kyrenia and Pamagusta to Nicosia remained open to Turkish Cypriots but 
closed to Greek Cypriots. A l l freedom of m o b i l i t y f o r ordinary Cypriots 
ends at the U.N. Buffer Zone or the two cease-fire l i n e s crossing Cyprus. 
The c r e a t i o n of a narrow neck of Turkish Cypriote land to take i n the town 
of Louroujina necessitated a d i v e r s i o n of Greek Cypriot t r a f f i c on the 
Larnaca - Nicosia route, a detour v i a Kalokhorio or Lymbia and Perakhorio. 
The o l d main road l i n k i n g the two towns i s no longer f u l l y i n use due to 
the f a c t that about three miles of i t pass through Turkish Cyprus. ( r e f e r 
to Map 6.5) 
Before discussing U.N.P.I.CYP.'s a c t i v i t i e s since August T974,it i s 
useful to understand some of the fundamental changes i n the human 
geography of both sides of the p a r t i t i o n over the period under review. 
i ) The Greek Cypriot South. 
I n a report on Cyprus by The Guardian i n A p r i l T984 i t was argued that 
economic recovery has been rapid and ... 
" the T80.000 Greeks who came from the north are almost f u l l y 
absorbed i n the economic bloodstream. Unemployment i s down to 
3.5 % ..." (36) 
Given the r e l a t i v e prosperity of the south today i t i s easy to overlook 
the huge obstacles Greek Cypriots faced a f t e r the p a r t i t i o n . I t i s 
almost impossible to make accurate estimates of t o t a l Greek Cypriot land 
and property losses, but undoubtedly ther greatest problem f o r the Govern-
ment has been the d i s l o c a t i o n created by large numbers of refugees, many 
from close-knit v i l l a g e s w i t h strong kinship t i e s and attachments to the 
land. These refugees moved i n t o plywood and chipboard shacks or-
s p e c i a l l y b u i l t low-cost housing estates. Others b u i l t t h e i r own homes, 
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u t i l i z i n g a se l f - h e l p programme g i v i n g grants and loans, while some 
40,000 refugees moved " p r o v i s i o n a l l y " i n t o vacated Turkish Cypriot 
homes, which they are not allowed to own. The Government holds the 
abandoned Turkish Cypriot property i n t r u s t f o r them. A l l "Cypriots", 
according to law, have the r i g h t , to r e t u r n to t h e i r former-homes. 
One m u l t i p l i e r e f f e c t the massive i n f l u x of refugees did have was to 
t r i g g e r o f f a construction boom i n the south absorbing much refugee 
labour, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the construction of refugee housing and i n new 
urban developments at Limassol and to a l e s s e r extent other towns. 
I n T974 G.D.P. f e l l 44 % over the previous year. By December '74 
unemployment i n the Greek sector was nearly 30 %. Economic recovery 
was helped by the F i r s t Emergency Action Plan 1975 - '77. At the end 
of T978 Greek Cypriot unemployment was at a rate of two per cent and 
G.D.P. f o r the years T976" - '78 was growing at eleven per cent per 
year. 
Since T974 the Greek Cypriots have turned t h e i r geographical p o s i t i o n 
i n the eastern Mediterranean near to the war-torn Middle East to t h e i r 
economic advantage?. Joint ventures between Cypriots and foreigners have 
mushroomed. Over 2,000 off-shore companies have re g i s t e r e d t h e i r o f f i c e s 
i n Cyprus, i n c l u d i n g many Arab ventures. During the recent troubles i n 
the Lebanon,many Lebanese have sought temporary refuge-in Cyprus. I n 
1976 78,000 Lebanese temporarily moved to the i s l a n d . (37) With the 
continuing d estruction of B e i r u t > many i n t e r n a t i o n a l business headquarters 
have t r a n s f e r r e d to Cyprus, and Lebanese are i n v e s t i n g i n property there. 
" I f the B e i r u t i s cannot continue money making at home, 
then Cyprus has been an answer; and several of them have 
been permitted to operate t h e i r banks on the i s l a n d . " (38) 
Above a l l , the south has had the advantages of i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
r e c o gnition enabling the Government to f o s t e r trade l i n k s w i t h the E.E.C. 
and Middle Eastern states. I n t e r n a t i o n a l a i d has also flowed i n t o the 
south. I n June 1983 European f o r e i g n ministers agreed to grant Cyprus 
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44 m i l l i o n European currency u n i t s ( # 40 m i l l i o n s ) i n loans and grants 
A second Cyprus - E.E.C. protocol of December 1983, all o c a t e d c r e d i t s 
to the Cyprus Government f o r projects of p o t e n t i a l b e n e fit to the whole 
island.(39) 
Dam and i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s , such as the Yermasoyia Dam near Limassol, 
and increased i r r i g a t i o n along the coastal s t r i p of Paphos, have made 
up f o r some losses of a g r i c u l t u r a l land to the Turks. (40) Raw farm 
products s t i l l represent 22 - 25 % of the t o t a l exports of Greek Cyprus, 
while manufactured goods, incl u d i n g processed farm products,account f o r 
about 70 %, wi t h minerals making up the r e s t . Although a g r i c u l t u r e ' s 
share of G.D.P. i s f a l l i n g i t w i l l continue to be an important f o r e i g n 
exchange earner and by 1986 a g r i c u l t u r a l exports are expected to bring 
i n C£ 108 m i l l i o n s against C£ 64.5 m i l l i o n s i n 1981. (41) Land 
consolidation schemes have helped to raise a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i v i t y 
since the p a r t i t i o n . (42) 
The Turkish Cypriot exodus created problems of r u r a l depopulation i n 
c e r t a i n parts of the south, which has never been completely replaced. 
For instance, Paphos D i s t r i c t l o s t a r u r a l Turkish Cypriot population, 
and since 1974 attempts have been made to r a t i o n a l i z e t h i s disrupted 
a g r i c u l t u r a l system by land consolidation measures. I t should be noted 
that owing to the formation of a r t i f i c i a l enclaves there was " s t r a t e g i c 
over-population" i n some r u r a l areas p r i o r to 1974. Large areas of 
Turkish Cypriot land are e i t h e r farmed by Greek Cypriot refugees or by 
adjacent Greek Cypriot v i l l a g e s through a system of cooperatives. (43) 
Another r e s u l t of de facto p a r t i t i o n was that the Turks increased the 
area of coastline they held from 10.5 % to 51.5 % ( see Figure 6:2). 
This not only had s t r a t e g i c i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the Greek Cypriots l o s t 
most of t h e i r t o u r i s t accommodation ( about 65 % ) in c l u d i n g the two 
main resorts of Famagusta* and Kyrenia. To compensate fthe Greek Cypriots 
have developed resorts at Paphos, Larnaca, and Ayia Napa, and i n 
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December 1983 a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l a i r p o r t was opened at Paphos to 
complement the e x i s t i n g one at Larnaca. I n 1982, the south had 550,000 
t o u r i s t s , whereas the north had only 87,000 v i s i t o r s , of whom 65,000 
were from Turkey. (44) Tourism i s a big f o r e i g n currency earner f o r the 
Greek Cypriots, but the north earns very l i t t l e because most of i t s 
t o u r i s t s are spending Turkish l i r a , the dominant currency of Turkish 
Cyprus. Indeed many of the north's v i s i t o r s are there e i t h e r to v i s i t 
r e l a t i v e s amongst the troops stationed there or to buy western consumer 
goods unavailable back home i n mainland Turkey. 
Southern Cyprus has enhanced i t s p o s i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade since 
1374, and new port f a c i l i t i e s have been developed at Limassol and Larnaca 
i n order to replace those l o s t at Pamagusta, as w e l l as to a t t r a c t a 
Middle Eastern and Mediterranean t r a n s i t trade. As a r e s u l t of Greek 
Cypriot enterprise and i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c ognition of the Greek Administration 
i n the south the economic dichotomy between the two communities i s as 
pronounced as i t was before Summer '74. I n T981 the average per capita 
income of a Greek Cypriot was four times that of a Turkish Cypriot, i . e . 
# 4,400 per annum compared to # T,TOO p.a. (45) 
Unfortunately the economic gap between the two communities w i l l probably 
remain a f a c t o r i n t h e i r continued s p a t i a l segregation. Turkish Cypriots 
w i l l be mindful of the dangers i n allowing Greek Cypriots back i n t o the 
t e r r i t o r y they now hold f o r they do not want to be swamped by Greek Cypriot 
p r o s p e r i t y . The south has b e n e f i t t e d moreover from i n t e r n a t i o n a l a i d , 
much of which " i s r e l a t e d to the d i v i s i o n of the i s l a n d " and so "vested 
i n t e r e s t s might develop to preserve that d i v i s i o n " . (46) 
i i ) The Turkish Cypriot North. 
While the south has prospered the north has suffered from i t s de facto 
rather than de .jure status. Non-recognition of the legitimacy of the 
Denktas a d m i n i s t r a t i o n by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community has hindered 
economic development i n northern Cyprus. On T5- November 1983 Rauf Denktas 
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declared independence f o r his de facto micro-state, renaming i t the 
'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' ( T.R.N.C. ). "U.D.I." was f o r 
a l l p r a c t i c a l "a declaration of dependence on Turkey and a declaration 
of secession from the Republic". (47) I n s p i t e of the camouflage of 
self-proclaimed independence, the economic and physical v i a b i l i t y of the 
north i s b u i l t on economic, m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l assistance- from 
Ankara. Northern Cyprus has undergone a " T u r k i f i c a t i o n p o l i c y " designed 
to create new "facts on the ground", making the prospects f o r a f u l l 
r e u n i f i c a t i o n of the i s l a n d increasingly remote w i t h the passage of time. 
(48) 
There are numerous physical reminders of Turkey's p r o t e c t i o n and close 
proximity to the T.R.N.C. As Russell King describes :-
" The Turkish f l a g f l i e s on a l l public buildings and statues 
of Ataturk are prominent. The m i l i t a r y presence, w i t h an 
estimated 20 - 30,000 s o l d i e r s . . . i s also marked. Many v i l l a g e s , 
which are bases f o r the m i l i t a r y , and t r a c t s of countryside, 
which are used as t r a i n i n g grounds, are out of bounds to both 
l o c a l i n h a b i t a n t s and v i s i t o r s . Turkish symbols and slogans 
are carved i n t o h i l l s i d e s . At the 1974 landing point,west of 
Kyrenia,an extraordinary concrete monument shows a Turkish 
c l i f f leaning p r o t e c t i v e l y over l i t t l e Cyprus." (49) 
Mainland Turkish s e t t l e r s and Turkish Cypriot refugees have now been 
s e t t l e d i n places which could have been made negotiable i n t e r r i t o r i a l 
bargaining with Greek Cypriots. As Denktas puts i t :-
" You can't deal with people on a percentage basis, as i f the 
farms and v i l l a g e s were vacant. As people get more s e t t l e d i n 
the North the f l e x i b i l i t y to adjust the zones i s decreasing."(50) 
One s i g n i f i c a n t obstacle to an eventual s o l u t i o n i s the f a c t that Turkish 
Cypriots are e n t i t l e d by t h e i r de facto a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to own Greek 
Cypriot-owned but vacated property. Thus i f the i s l a n d i s ever reunited 
there w i l l be numerous disputes as to who owns what piece of land or house 
i n large parts of Northern Cyprus. 
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Since 1374 some 30 - 40,000 s e t t l e r s from the mainland— ' T u r k i y e l i '-
have entered the nor t h . O f f i c i a l l y they were described as seasonal 
workers but many continue to stay i n Cyprus on a more permanent basis, 
s e t t l i n g i n e i t h e r Nicosia or Pamagusta, or i n three r u r a l concentrations 
the Karpass peninsula, the Mesaoria, and north Morphou. Hitchens, 1 9 8 4 , 
argues that t h i s i s a deliberate c o l o n i z a t i o n p o l i c y "to a l t e r the 
demographic basis of the i s l a n d . " ( 5 1 ) Many of these T u r k i y e l i come 
from backward parts of Anatolia and the Black Sea coast, have d i f f e r e n t 
modes of dress, are less 'European' i n t h e i r behaviour, and adhere more 
f e r v e n t l y to t r a d i t i o n a l Muslim r i g h t s than do Turkish Cypriots. Such 
differences have tended to be a cause of f r i c t i o n between the "is l a n d e r s " 
and mainland s e t t l e r s . ( 5 2 ) Even Dr Kuciik, the veteran Turkish Cypriot 
leader, showed concern over the unplanned " p i l i n g of people on the i s l a n d 
e s t a b l i s h i n g " O r i e n t a l S u l t i n a t e s " i n northern Cypriot v i l l a g e s . (53) 
Furthermore, any member of the Turkish armed forces whohave served i n 
Cyprus or t h e i r f a m i l i e s , i s e l i g i b l e f o r c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s i n Northern 
Cypruso 
The d i v i s i o n of s p o i l s i n Turkish Cyprus has also been uneven. 
" Clearly, since the economy of the 'state' i s a f u p t i o n of 
Turkey...it i s businessmen connected w i t h the motherland 
who stand the best chance." ( 5 4 ) 
This i s understandable given that the T.R.N.C. has l i m i t e d commercial 
l i n k s w i t h other states except v i a Turkey. The 'Northern Republic' 
lacks access to many i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s such as the 
World Bank. I t lacks contacts w i t h the E.E.C. and i s without b i l a t e r a l 
c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s . Turkey continues moreover to pay two-thirds of the 
budget of Northern Cyprus. As M.E.E.D. put i t :-
" P o l i t i c s apart, the Turkish Cypriot. community i s aware of one 
major handicap which may continue as long as i t i s divided from 
the South: i t s i n a b i l i t y to gain access to the sources of ai d 
granted to the Cyprus Government. While the World Bank provides 
funds f o r the Paphos i r r i g a t i o n scheme i n the South, the c i t r u s 
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orchards of Morphou i n the Norih are threatened by drought." (55) 
Despite the handicap of i t s non-recognition and ambiguous i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
status Northern Cyprus coninues to trade w i t h some European countries, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y B r i t a i n . The Government of Cyprus has been unsuccessful 
i n i t s attempts to persuade the E.E.C. to bar produce from the T„R.N.C. 
from b e n e f i t s under an e x i s t i n g agreement, which would render exports 
from Turkish Cyprus so uncompetitive as to be unsellable on European 
markets. Exports from Turkish Cyprus Increased from about # 16 m i l l i o n 
i n 1979 to t 41 m i l l i o n i n 1980. (56) 
Citrus f r u i t exports are c r u c i a l to the f r a g i l e economy of the north , 
and every e f f o r t i s being made to r e h a b i l i t a t e farming based on f r u i t , 
early vegetables and l i v e s t o c k . Tt,000 hectares of r i c h orange and lemon 
groves i n Morphou, v i r t u a l l y a l l Greek Cypriot owned, are now worked by 
Turkish Cypriot grape-farmers from Paphos. Unfortunately much land 
adjacent to the Turkish cease-fire l i n e has lacked proper i r r i g a t i o n , 
which has le d to the dessication of some c i t r u s groves. (57) 
A r e v i t a l i s a t i o n of the t o u r i s t i n d u s t r y i n Northern Cyprus i s made 
more d i f f i c u l t by the Greek-ownership of numerous large hotels and the 
fa c t that only Turkish A i r l i n e s can use Ercan ( formerly Tyrabou ) A i r p o r t , 
thus r u l i n g out cheap f l i g h t s from Western Europe. (58) 
The physical separation of the two communities i n t o d i s t i n c t geograph-
i c a l areas, one i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y r a t i f i e d , the other w i t h a de facto 
existence only, has served to widen the g u l f between them. Both sides 
f u n c t i o n as separate states, duplicate economic fu n c t i o n s , w h i l s t o r d i n -
ary Greek and Turkish Cypriots remain remote from each otheir. The 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i t i o n has fundamentally a l t e r e d the human geography of 
Cyprus, an i s l a n d with two mono-ethnic zones. As King describes :-
" Northern Cyprus has been purged of i t s Greekness. Gone are 
the t a l l - h a t t e d , bushy-beared Orthodox p r i e s t s ; the 
monastries and churches are f o r l o r n l y empty...Apart from a 
few faded slogans proclaiming Makarios and Enosis, 
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North Cyprus has been l i n g u i s t i c a l l y whitewashed." (58) 
Turkish i s the language of the T.R.N.C. and accordingly Nicosia has 
become Lefkosa; Famagusta i s Gazi Magosa; Kyrenia i s Girne; Morphou i s 
Guzelyurt: These may only be names on Turkish maps or on signposts i n 
Northern Cyprus, but they represent physical impediments to the r e -
u n i f i c a t i o n of the i s l a n d . 
Section Two; U.N.F.I.CYP. a f t e r the p a r t i t i o n i n August 1974. 
The p a r t i t i o n of the i s l a n d by one l i n e of close armed con f r o n t a t i o n 
led to sudden, dramatic change i n U.N.F.I.CYP, deployment. T30 observation 
posts were established i n southern Cyprus and 36 i n the nort h , where 
Turkish troops r e s t r i c t e d the Force's m o b i l i t y . (59) Even a f t e r the 
cease-fire on 16 August,there were some Turkish m i l i t a r y manouvres, and 
U.N.F.I.CYP. f a i l e d to obtain a withdrawal of troops a f t e r minor Turkish 
advances i n the Pyroi - Louroujina area, near G a l l i n i , near Dhennia, and 
i n Yeralakkas area west of Nicosia. C r o s s - f i r i n g continued f o r some 
considerable time i n a l l these areas. ( 60 ) Permanent U.N.CIV.POL. 
sta t i o n s were established i n v i l l a g e s such as Dhali i n August ' 74 and 
i n Athienou i n October ' 7 4 , to a f f o r d greater p r o t e c t i o n f o r v i l l a g e r s 
i n ah area of p a r t i c u l a r l y close armed c o n f r o n t a t i o n . Meanwhile both 
sides consolidated t h e i r defensive p o s i t i o n s , l a i d unmarked mines, and 
erected f o r t i f i c a t i o n s . U.F.F.I.CYP. recorded the Forward Defence Lines 
( F.D.L.s ) of both sides and acted as a n e u t r a l border p a t r o l f o r c e . 
As time elapsed U.N.F.I.CYP.'s b u f f e r duties became less complicated, 
and f o l l o w i n g the t r a n s f e r of v i r t u a l l y a l l Turkish Cypriots to Northern 
Cyprus the Force was able to reduce i t s contingent strength. Instead 
of deployment on an island-wide basis i n operational zones and d i s t r i c t s , 
i t 1 deployed men i n contingent sectors along "the general l i n e of 
con f r o n t a t i o n " . ( r e f e r to Map 6 .5 ) Six operational sectors were 
formed along the southern extension of the? " A t t i l a Line". U.N.F.I.CYP. 
manned observation posts and p a t r o l l e d along tracks observing the F.D.L.s 
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of both sides. Helicopters were used whenever ground p a t r o l s were 
hampered by the danger of minefields or d i f f i c u l t t e r r a i n . (61) 
I n i t i a l l y ground p a t r o l s were not allowed f u l l freedom of movement i n 
the Buffer Zone owing to interference by Turkish s o l d i e r s on the pretext 
that p a t r o l s approached to close to the Turkish P.D.L. 
Operations i n Northern Cyprus were c u r t a i l e d to humanitarian assistance 
tasks f o r Greek and Maronite communities there. U.N.P„I.CYP. set up 
fou r l i a i s o n posts i n the Karpass and three around Kyrenia, but i t was 
permitted access to only a few main roads. U.N.P.I.CYP. continued i t s 
r e l i e f escorts between L i m n i t i s and Kokkina enclave, where there were= 
1,500 i n h a b i t a n t s . ( 6 2 ) 
During the eighteen months " t r a n s i t i o n a l period" f o r U.N.P.I.CYP. 
immediately a f t e r the p a r t i t i o n i t s main tasks can be summarized as :-
(a) Maintenance of the cease-fire and P.D.L.s; 
(b) I n t e r p o s i t i o n i n g troops between the two sides to create an e f f e c t i v e 
d e m i l i t a r i z e d zone under U.N. c o n t r o l . 
(c) To discharge functions w i t h regard to the s e c u r i t y and welfare of 
Greeks l i v i n g i n the north and Turks s t i l l i n the south. 
(d) To support the r e l i e f operations coordinated by U.N.H.C.R. and other 
United Nations organisations / programmes and I.C.R.C. (63) 
i ) P a c i f i c a t i o n A c t i v i t i e s : T974 to T984. 
I n order to understand U.N.P.I.CYP.'s operations i n t h i s period i t i s 
necessary to describe the Buffer Zone separating Greek from Turkish 
Cypriots. This U.No-controlled c o r r i d o r of land extends f o r the f u l l 
length of the Turkish cease-fire l i n e , T80 kilometres, and i t varies i n 
width from seven kilometres to j u s t twenty metres inside the c i t y walls 
of Nicosia, The zone takes up a t o t a l of about three per cent of the 
land area of Cyprus, approximately ten per cent of the a g r i c u l t u r a l land, 
although only a small proportion of the i r r i g a t e d area ( i . e . near Morphou ) 
U.N.F.I.CYP.'s main m i l i t a r y duty i s to supervise the cease-fire l i n e s . 
Buffer Zone surveillance has improved considerably over the l a s t decade. 
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In December 1982 U.N.P.I.CYP. had T37 observation posts, 66 permanently 
manned. By June 1984 there were 144 O.P.s, 7T permanently manned. 
Between these O.P.s,regular U.N. Force p a t r o l s cover the- length of each 
contingent sector. Within the c a p i t a l "the t h i n blue l i n e " has 
strengthened i t s presence by deploying more j u n i o r commanders and troops. 
U.N.F.I.CYP. continues i n attempts to persuade both sides to e f f e c t a 
"mutual unmanning" of key positions along the Green Line, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
where incidents have fre q u e n t l y occurred. (64) 
I n recent years the Force has moved more U.N.F.I.CYP. accommodation 
i n t o the Buffer Zone. Observation c a p a b i l i t i e s have improved w i t h the 
aid of night v i s i o n devices, w h i l s t m o b i l i t y has been enhanced by 
improving the p a t r o l tracks between the cease-fire l i n e s . A l l these f a c t o r s 
have enabled U.N.F.I.CYP. to reduce the number of serious i n c i d e n t s ; and 
attempts by e i t h e r side to move forward of established F.D.L.s., i n 
order to restore the status quo ante. By de l i n e a t i n g and keeping the 
opposing cease-fire l i n e s i n p o s i t i o n U.N.F.I.CYP. has helped to harden 
the ethnic i n t e r f a c e . 
There are some examples of subtle changes i n the status quo i n areas 
w i t h i n or adjacent to the Buffer Zone. For instance, during August 1983-
1, 
June 1984, i t was o,served that there had been adjustments to the perimeter 
fence of Varosha, the southern suburb of Famagusta. Moreover, some houses 
had be en inhabited i n Varosha, and i n sp i t e of U.N.F.I.CYP. e f f o r t s to 
restore the ol d s i t u a t i o n i n Varosha, the Turkish Cypriots have done 
nothing to reverse these changes. (65) Another example i s w i t h i n the 
old walls of Nicosia. I n A p r i l 1984 the Greek residents of Ayios 
Kassianos,in the eastern part of the walled c i t y , protested against a 
U.N.F.I.CYP. decision to place a number 1of barr e l s blocking Athina Avenue, 
where Greek Cypriot f a m i l i e s l i v e . A f t e r representations made by National 
Guard o f f i c e r s the barrels were removed temporarily. According to the 
residents, the U.N. decision followed the recent advance of Turkish troops 
i n t o the Buffer Zone to occupy the deserted o l d elementary school of Ayios 
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Kassianos. Such s m a l l encroachments i n t o the Buffer^Zone are an ever 
present danger, e s p e c i a l l y s e n s i t i v e i n areas where the two sid e s are 
separated o n l y by a ma t t e r o f twenty o r so metres as i n c e n t r a l N i c o s i a . 
( r e f e r to Map 6.7 ) The i n c i d e n t i n Ayios Kassianos h i g h l i g h t s the 
problems U.N.F.I.CYP. has i n t r y i n g t o keep F.D.L.s s t a t i c . (66) 
Another i m p o r t a n t a c t i v i t y undertaken by U.N.P.I.CYP. i s the m o n i t o r i n g 
o f f l i g h t s across the B u f f e r Zone, p a r t i c u l a r l y o f m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t 
c r o s s i n g the T u r k i s h c e a s e - f i r e l i n e from the n o r t h and l i g h t , c i v i l a i r -
c r a f t c r o s s i n g the N a t i o n a l Guard c e a s e - f i r e l i n e from the s o u t h . I n 
response t o the problem o f f r e q u e n t o v e r f l i g h t s o f the L o u r o u j i n a s a l i e n t 
by c i v i l i a n a i r c r a f t , the Cyprus C i v i l A v i a t i o n A u t h o r i t y have r e c e n t l y 
decided t o r e p o s i t i o n the l i g h t a i r c r a f t f l i g h t c o r r i d o r between Larnaca 
and Lakatomia f u r t h e r to the s o u t h . (67) 
To the n o r t h o f the B u f f e r Zone U.N.P.I.CYP. a c t i v i t i e s c o n t i n u e t o 
be-hindered by t i g h t , r e s t r i c t i o n s on i t s freedom o f movement. I n December 
1979, the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t a u t h o r i t i e s i s s u e d the U.N. Force w i t h a 
number o f g u i d e l i n e s ( 6 8 ) , which l i m i t e d the hours per day U.N,P.I.CYP. 
posts c o u l d be used i n the n o r t h as w e l l as the number o f roads open 
t o the Force. I n the p e r i o d T982 - '84 U.N.F.I.CYP. succeeded i n removing 
T u r k i s h r e s t r i c t i o n s on the f o l l o w i n g r o u t e s — Pamagusta - Rizokarpasso; 
Xeros - S k o u r i o t i s s a ; L i m n i t i s - Xeros; N i c o s i a - Famagusta. The l a t t e r 
had s t r i c t g u i d e l i n e s as t o the number o f U.N.P.I.CYP. v e h i c l e s a l l o w e d 
to use i t . (69) 
i i ) H u m a n i t a r i a n and Economic A c t i v i t i e s : T974 t o T984. 
These a c t i v i t i e s cover the f o l l o w i n g :-
(a) To c o n t r b u t e t o the r e s t o r a t i o n o f normal c o n d i t i o n s . 
( U.N. R e s o l u t i o n T86 / T964 ) 
(b) To c o n t r i b u t e to the h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f programme i n cl o s e c o o p e r a t i o n 
w i t h U.N.H.C.R. and World Pood Programme ( W.P.P.) 
( U.N. R e s o l u t i o n 359 / 1974 ) 
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( c ) To c a r r y out such Red Cross f u n c t i o n s as may be r e q u i r e d from time 
to time by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Committee o f the Red Cross. 
( S e c r e t a r y General Report, U.N. S/T2463 ) 
With r e g a r d t o (b) and ( c ) U.N.P.I.CYP. has co n t i n u e d t o c a r r y out 
h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f o p e r a t i o n s since the events o f Summer '74. I t 
discharges f u n c t i o n s handed over t o i t by the I.C.R.C. a t the time o f 
the l a t t e r ' s w i t h d r a w a l i n June 1977. (70) With the advancing age o f 
those Greeks and Maronites s t i l l l o c a t e d i n the n o r t h , these f u n c t i o n s 
have i n c r e a s e d , e s p e c i a l l y w i t h r e g a r d t o medical and w e l f a r e s e r v i c e s . 
(71) An emergency medical supply s e r v i c e i s p r o v i d e d , as w e l l as medical 
e v a c u a t i o n by U.N.P.I.CYP. h e l i c o p t e r should a member o f a " m i n o r i t y * 
on e i t h e r s i d e o f the p a r t i t i o n r e q u i r e urgent t r e a t m e n t on the o t h e r 
s i d e . (72) 
U.N. t r o o p s have helped i n d e l i v e r i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l , e d u c a t i o n a l and 
medical equipment under the Un i t e d Nations Humanitarian R e l i e f Programme, 
which p r o v i d e d J$ U.S. 5 m i l l i o n to f i n a n c e seventeen p r o j e c t s . This 
programme, c o o r d i n a t e d by the Cyprus Red Cross S o c i e t y , i n v o l v e s 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a g e n e r a l h o s p i t a l , the overseas 
procurement o f equipment and s u p p l i e s f o r the h e a l t h , e d u c a t i o n and 
a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r s , and p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a i n i n g . (73) 
U .NoP.I.CYP. cont i n u e s t o ensure t h a t a l l t r a n s f e r s o f Greek C y p r i o t s 
from n o r t h t o south are v o l u n t a r y . I n 1984 t h e r e were 844 Greek C y p r i o t s 
r e s i d i n g i n the T.R.N.C. The number o f permanent t r a n s f e r s i n the two 
year p e r i o d from 1 June 1982 t o 1 June 1984 was 158. (74) For Greeks 
r e s i d i n g i n the n o r t h l i f e has been s u b j e c t to many r e s t r i c t i o n s . They 
are dependent on the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s f o r medical and h o s p i t a l f a c i l i t i e s . 
Greek C y p r i o t e d u c a t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s i n the n o r t h amount t o two p r i m a r y 
schools, one a t Rizokarpasso has 51 p u p i l s and one a t Ayia T r i a s has 2T. 
(75) C h i l d r e n o f secondary school age have t o move south i f they want 
a Greek C y p r i o t e d u c a t i o n . Since A p r i l T979, i t has not been p o s s i b l e 
f o r U.N.P.I.CYP. t o arrange v i s i t s by c h i l d r e n a t t e n d i n g schools i n the 
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south t o t h e i r p a r e n t s o r grandparents i n the n o r t h . (76) 
Between June '82 - June '84, twenty-one T u r k i s h C y p r i o t e chose t o move 
from south to n o r t h Cyprus on a permanent b a s i s , and f o r t y - s e v e n Maronites 
decided t o t r a n s f e r from n o r t h t o s o u t h . There are t h r e e Maronite 
v i l l a g e s i n the n o r t h — Asomatos, Karpasha, and K o r m a k i t i — which have 
ma i n t a i n e d c o n t a c t s w i t h Maronites l i v i n g i n so u t h e r n Cyprus v i a v i s i t s 
under U.N.F.I.CYP. auspices. The Foirce has al s o arranged f r e q u e n t reunions 
o f separated T u r k i s h C y p r i o t f a m i l i e s a t the Ledra Palace H o t e l on an 
ad hoc b a s i s . (77) 
The Promotion o f Economic A c t i v i t y i n the B u f f e r Zone : 
The B u f f e r Zone cuts across v a l u a b l e a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d i n the Morphou 
Basin and Mesaoria, d i v i d e s the c a p i t a l , t r u n c a t e s pre-August '74 r o u t e -
ways, and runs over i m p o r t a n t r i v e r b a s i n s , streams, and underground 
water r e s o u r c e s . Without U.N.P.I.CYP.'s presence the t h r e e - p e r cent o f 
Cypriot' t e r r i t o r y w i t h i n the B u f f e r Zone would be a m i l i t a r y waste-ground 
o r an u n p r o d u c t i v e no-man's-land. U.N.P.I.CYP. has helped r e a c t i v a t e 
economic a c t i v i t y "between the l i n e s " . I t has t u r n e d m i n e f i e l d s i n t o 
v a l u a b l e f a r m l a n d , and safeguarded c i v i l i a n s working under the noses o f 
opposing s o l d i e r s . 
For the two years a f t e r the t r o u b l e s o f 1974 t h e r e was l i t t l e economic 
a c t i v i t y o r movement near the f r o n t - l i n e s o f e i t h e r the T u r k i s h Army o r 
N a t i o n a l Guard. (78) U.N.P.I.CYP. has i n c r e a s e d e s c o r t s f o r farmers work-
i n g i n s e n s i t i v e newly opened f i e l d s i n the B u f f e r Zone. A Farming 
S e c u r i t y Line ( F.S.L. ) has been c a r e f u l l y drawn and demarcated by 
U.N.F.I.CYP. f o r the mutual s a f e t y o f c i v i l i a n s working on e i t h e r s i d e . 
( r e f e r t o Map 6.8 ) This F.S.L. r o u g h l y c u t s through the middle o f 
the B u f f e r Zone, a l o n g s i d e U.N. Force p a t r o l t r a c k s . P e r m i s s i o n t o 
c u l t i v a t e l a n d w i t h i n the B u f f e r Zone i s g r a n t e d by U.N.F.I.CYP. a f t e r 
c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h both s i d e s . 
The U.N. Force a l l o w s c u l t i v a t i o n t o take place " w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e to 
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any e v e n t u a l p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t " u s i n g two p r i n c i p a l g u i d e l i n e s — 
( i ) S e c u r i t y and ( i i ) Ownership. (79) On the one hand, c u l t i v a t i o n 
should not be a t h r e a t t o the l e g i t i m a t e s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s o f e i t h e r 
s i d e . On the o t h e r , U.N.F.I.CYP. has t r i e d t o ensure t h a t the l a n d i s 
c u l t i v a t e d by a c t u a l owners o r t h e i r employees. Proof o f ownership must 
be handed t o U.N.F.I.CYP. before a farmer i s a l l o w e d t o c u l t i v a t e - h i s 
l a n d i n the B u f f e r Zone. 
M i n e f i e l d clearance has been necessary i n c e r t a i n p a r t s o f the B u f f e r 
Zone be f o r e any c u l t i v a t i o n was p o s s i b l e , and U.N.F.I.CYP. has c l e a r l y 
marked o t h e r known o r suspected m i n e f i e l d s . Every e f f o r t has al s o been 
made t o demarcate the Farming S e c u r i t y Line w i t h w h i t e metal drums and 
p a i n t e d boulders so t h a t i t s p o s i t i o n i s obvious t o both s i d e s , l e s s e n i n g 
the l i k e l i h o o d o f s h o o t i n g i n c i d e n t s . Frequent U.N.CIV.POL. and U.N. 
Force t r o o p p a t r o l s c a r e f u l l y m o n i t o r a g r i c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t y w i t h i n the 
whole o f the B u f f e r Zone. 
WITHIN THE BUFFER ZONE. 
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" " V s " 
• T u r k i s h Force O.P. — — . — T u r k i s h c e a s e - f i r e l i n e o r F.D.L. 
9 Greek C y p r i o t O.P. Greek C y p r i o t c e a s e - f i r e l i n e 
( N a t i o n a l Guard ) o r F.D.L. 
O U n i t e d Nations Force — Farming S e c u r i t y Line ( F.S.L. ) 
O.P. 
N.B. O.P. s are o b s e r v a t i o n p o s t s , and F.D.L. stands f o r Forward 
Defence L i n e . 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t the B u f f e r Zone i s the one area i n the 
i s l a n d where Greek and T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s c o u l d l i v e and work t o g e t h e r . 
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At p r e s e n t the F.S.L. w i t h i n the B u f f e r Zone forms an e f f e c t i v e e t h n i c 
i n t e r f a c e ( see above diagram ) , but should U.N.F.I.CYP. g a i n p e r m i s s i o n 
from b o t h sides to push Greek C y p r i o t c u l t i v a t i o n northwards and T u r k i s h 
c u l t i v a t i o n southwards the B u f f e r Zone c o u l d become an intercommunal 
f r o n t i e r zone. The Greeks own much l a n d n o r t h o f the F.S.L. w i t h i n the 
B u f f e r Zone but are as y e t unable to c u l t i v a t e i t , and t h e r e i s some p r e -
1974 T u r k i s h C y p r i o t l a n d t o the s o u t h . U n f o r t u n a t e l y the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t 
community i s l e s s i n t e r e s t e d i n f a r m i n g on t h e i r s i d e o f the P.S.L. owing 
to a r e l a t i v e abundance o f l a n d per head i n N o r t h e r n Cyprus compared to 
t h a t o f the Greek C y p r i o t s . 
Cyprus i s s u s c e p t i b l e t o l o n g d r y Mediterranean summers and acute water 
sho r t a g e s . The B u f f e r Zone has a p e c u l i a r h y d r o p o l i t i c s w i t h U . N . P . I . C Y P . 
i n charge o f i t s water su p p l y . Before a f a r m e r can d r i l l f o r water he 
must have p r o o f o f l a n d ownership to o b t a i n a d r i l l i n g l i c e n c e , then get 
U.N . P.I . C Y P o p e r m i s s i o n . N e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h both communities takes place 
b e f o r e a water bore-hole can be used. U.N . P.I.C Y P .'s economic s t a f f have 
spent c o n s i d e r a b l e time e n s u r i n g t h a t broken and damaged pumps, p i p e l i n e s 
and e l e c t r o n i c apparatus f o r the c o l l e c t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n o f w a t e r 
are m a i n t a i n e d a t an e f f i c i e n t l e v e l . J o i n t meetings between the water 
a u t h o r i t i e s o f both communities are arranged by U . N . P . I .C Y P . Such 
meetings are necessary to r e s o l v e mutual problems o f w a t e r supply i n 
N i c o s i a and a p p r o p r i a t e r e g u l a t o r y measures d u r i n g dry summer months. (80) 
U . N . P . I .C Y P . has a l s o made f r e q u e n t v i s i t s t o and i n s p e c t i o n s o f supply 
tanks and r e s e r v o i r s . I t t r i e s t o ensure t h a t the water d i s t r i b u t i o n 
system o f both sides i s f a i r l y and e f f i c i e n t l y operated f o r the b e n e f i t 
o f the Greek and T u r k i s h C y p r i o t communities. (81) 
Other U.N.P.I.CYP. a c t i v i t i e s h e l p i n g b o t h communities i n c l u d e i t s 
annual a n t i - m o s q u i t o s p r a y i n g programme i n the B u f f e r Zone. (82) The 
U.N. Force d e l i v e r s m a i l and Red Cross messages across the c e a s e - f i r e 
l i n e s as w e l l as t r a n s f e r r i n g government pensions and s o c i a l s e c u r i t y 
b e n e f i t s t o e l i g i b l e T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s i n the n o r t h . I t has a l s o 
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f a c i l i t a t e d the replacement o f o l d e r homes t h a t became u n i n h a b i t a b l e 
i n v i l l a g e s w i t h i n the B u f f e r Zone, and helped p r i v a t e owners take t h e i r 
movable p r o p e r t y from the area. 
U.N.CIV,POL. : Maintenance o f Law and Order. 
There i s e s t i m a t e d t o be over 9,000 r e s i d e n t s i n the B u f f e r Zone. The 
l a r g e s t v i l l a g e i s A t h i e n o u . ( r e f e r t o Map 6 . 5 ) UoN.CIV.POL.'s major 
task i s t o see t h a t the c i v i l i a n s and p r o p e r t y w i t h i n t h e B u f f e r Zone 
are p r o t e c t e d . I t m a i n t a i n s c l o s e c o n t a c t s w i t h the Cyprus P o l i c e and 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t p o l i c e , and f r e q u e n t l y v i s i t s v i l l a g e mukhtars and 
o r d i n a r y c i v i l i a n s on both sides o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s - c o n t r o l l e d zone a 
The c i v i l i a n p o l i c e a s s i s t the m i l i t a r y element o f U.N.F.I„CYP. i n 
c o n t r o l l i n g movements w i t h i n o r encroachments i n t o the B u f f e r Zone, and 
i n e s c o r t i n g " a u t h o r i z e d " movements across the n e u t r a l area. 
A u s t r a l i a n c i v i l i a n policemen working f o r U.N.F.I.CYP. have t h e i r 
headquarters i n Sector Two, and they " l o o k a f t e r " the area e x t e n d i n g 
westwards o f N i c o s i a towards Kato Pyrgos and Kokkina. The Swedish 
c i v i l i a n p o l i c e headquarters i s l o c a t e d i n the mixed B u f f e r Zone v i l l a g e 
o f P y l a , near t o Dh e k e l i a S.B.A., and t h e i r 1 o p e r a t i o n a l area extends 
eastwards from N i c o s i a t o south e r n Famagusta. I t should be s t r e s s e d 
t h a t a l l the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t i n h a b i t a n t s o f Pyla evacuated a f t e r the 
p a r t i t i o n o f the i s l a n d . 
U.N.CIV.POL. personnel a c t i n many ways as an i n t e r m e d i a r y f o r c e , 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g i n t o c o m p l a i n t s o f c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s h aving intercommunal 
i m p l i c a t i o n s and i n v a r i o u s r o u t i n e a c t i v i t i e s i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the 
m i l i t a r y element o f U.N.F.I.CYP. Regular p a t r o l s are made up and down 
the B u f f e r Zone t o ensure t h a t no c i v i l i a n s cross i n t o areas on the 
"wrong" side o f the Farming S e c u r i t y L i n e . A c o n t i n u a l problem i s posed 
by shepherds g r a z i n g t h e i r f l o c k s dangerously close t o the F 0S,L. 
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o s t r e s s t h a t i n the absence o f d i r e c t c o o p e r a t i o n 
and c o n t a c t between o r d i n a r y people on o p p o s i t e sides o f the B u f f e r Zone 
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both the m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n components o f U.N.F.I.CYP. a c t as the 
o n l y communication channel between them. 
S e c t i o n Three: Case Study — U.N.F.I.CYP. Sector Two ; BRIT.CON. 
Sector Two o f the U n i t e d Nations B u f f e r Zone l i e s on the western 
boundary o f Sector Pour, N i c o s i a Zone, and extends westwards o f the 
P e r i s t e r o n a , A s t r o m e r i t i s — Morphou Road. I t i n c l u d e s U.N.F„I.CYP. 
Headquarters l o c a t e d a t the former i n t e r n a t i o n a l a i r p o r t o f N i c o s i a , as 
w e l l as H.Q. CAN.CON. ( Canadian Contingent ) ; H.Q. BRIT.CON. ( B r i t i s h 
Contingent ) ; and H.Q. AUST.CIV.POL. ( A u s t r a l i a n c i v i l i a n p o l i c e ) , 
a l l s i t u a t e d near to the o l d a i r p o r t . The-headquarters o f Sector Two 
i s a t Kokkina T r i m i t h i a , j u s t south o f the N a t i o n a l Guard P.D.L. 
I n 1975 most o f the B u f f e r Zone was parched wasteland, a dangerous 
area o f c l o s e armed c o n f r o n t a t i o n , l a r g e t r a c t s o f i t mined w i t h un-
marked a n t i - p e r s o n n e l and a n t i - t a n k mines. I t r e p r e s e n t e d a more for*-
b i d d i n g b a r r i e r than the h i g h peaks o f the P e n t a d a c t y l o s , a f r u s t r a t i n g 
d i v i s i o n f o r those C y p r i o t s who can s t i l l see t h e i r o l d homes and f i e l d s 
across i t . W i t h i n c e n t r a l N i c o s i a the c e a s e - f i r e l i n e s almost coalesce, 
but even i n the c o u n t r y s i d e where the B u f f e r Zone i s up t o seven m i l e s 
wide the " o t h e r s i d e " i s always t a n t a l i z i n g l y c l o s e . The refugees now 
l i v i n g i n P e r i s t e r o n a "...have been e v i c t e d from t h e i r homes and orchards 
but a t midday they can s t i l l see the o u t l i n e s o f t h e i r o l d 
d w e l l i n g s a g a i n s t the sky, and t h e r e i s some c o m f o r t , as w e l l 
as some p a i n , i n the p r o x i m i t y . The i n v i s i b l e but s t i l l 
p a l p a b l e l i n e o f d i v i s i o n runs here, t o o . There i s no 
v i l l a g e o r town, however f a r from t h a t l i n e , which does not 
pay an i n d e m n i t y t o i t w i t h impoverished refugee housing, and 
w i t h memories." (83) 
Many Greek C y p r i o t farmers now l i v i n g i n the v i l l a g e s o f A k a k i , 
P e r i s t e r o n a o r A s t r o m e r i t i s l o s t l a n d t o the T u r k s , n o r t h o f Sector Two. 
W i t h i n t h i s p a r t o f the B u f f e r Zone t h e r e are j u s t two i n h a b i t e d v i l l a g e s 
Mammari and Dhenia, now both Greek C y p r i o t , a l t h o u g h Dhenia used t o be 
mixed, 
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The f o l l o w i n g d e t a i l s are l a r g e l y taken from f i e l d o b s e r v a t i o n s i n 
A p r i l 1984 and they should be used w i t h Map 6.8. 
Most o f the l a n d extending from the o l d N i c o s i a a i r p o r t and U.N.P.I.CYP. 
H.Q. to the v i l l a g e o f Dhenia i s very poor, w i t h l i t t l e i r r i g a t i o n and 
few c u l t i v a t e d f i e l d s . South o f the Farming S e c u r i t y Line,U.N.P.I.CYP. 
has helped extend c u l t i v a t i o n from the N a t i o n a l Guard Forward Defence 
Line northwards close t o the F.S.L.; but n o r t h o f the F.S.L. t h e r e was 
l i t t l e evidence o f any f a r m i n g o t h e r than rough g r a z i n g l a n d f o r g o a t s . 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s own l e s s l a n d i n t h i s p a r t o f the B u f f e r Zone and also 
have l e s s need t o c u l t i v a t e w i t h i n t h i s area. Moving westwards upto 
Dhenia the F.S.L. f o l l o w s a course south o f the U.N. Force p a t r o l t r a c k , 
which i n t u r n runs a d i s t a n c e o f twenty to f i f t y metres south o f the 
R i v e r Ovgos. U.N.F.I.CYP. was p l a n n i n g t o move the F.S.L. upto the 
Ovgos i n o r d e r t o extend the area o f p o s s i b l e Greek C y p r i o t c u l t i v a t i o n 
south of the F.S.L. Thus making a t i n y s e c t i o n o f the Ovgos a n a t u r a l 
boundary between Greek and T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s w i t h i n the B u f f e r Zone. 
Opening f i e l d s on the Greek s i d e o f the F.S.L. has been a piecemeal 
process. I n some areas mines have been c l e a r e d , but th e r e were s t i l l 
p a r t s o f the B u f f e r Zone fenced o f f owing to suspected m i n e f i e l d s . Much 
of the l a n d under c u l t i v a t i o n i n the " n e u t r a l zone" i s e i t h e r farmed by 
o l d owners o f leased to new tenant f a r m e r s . Refugees from the n o r t h 
have been g i v e n Government g r a n t s t o buy l a n d . Some o f these refugees 
were tempted i n t o l e a s i n g l a n d a d j a c e n t t o o r w i t h i n the B u f f e r Zone. 
P l o t s o f l a n d w i t h i n Sector Two vary i n s i z e from 5 t o 20 ac r e s . An 
averaged s i z e d p l o t of TO to 13 acres costs about C£ 2,000 p e r annum t o 
farm . 
West o f Dhenia t h e r e were improvements i n the area o f l a n d v i s i b l y 
under c u l t i v a t i o n , a l t h o u g h n o r t h o f the F.S.L. sc r u b l a n d and dead c i t r u s 
t r e e s were v i s i b l e . The F.S.L. gets very c l o s e t o the T u r k i s h c e a s e - f i r e 
l i n e near Avlona and westwards t o the end o f Sector Two. I n t h i s area 
t h e r e were many w e l l - t e n d e d c i t r u s orchards and l e s s dry c u l t i v a t i o n . 
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A r b i t r a t i o n o f water usage and s u p e r v i s i o n o f water bore-holes are 
c r u c i a l r o l e s f o r U.N.P.I.CYP. i n Sector Two where underground water 
s u p p l i e s are needed by both s i d e s . U.N.P.I.CYP. has allowed the 
r e s i d e n t s o f Avlona, behind the c e a s e - f i r e l i n e w i t h i n the T u r k i s h 
s e c t o r , to use a water bore-hole w i t h i n the B u f f e r Zone so t h a t the 
v i l l a g e has a ready water supply. U.N.P.I.CYP.'s Economics Branch 
i n S e c t o r Two was t r y i n g to work a compromise between the T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t s and Greek C y p r i o t s over the use o f two more water- bore-holes 
and the r i g h t s o f Greeks t o c u l t i v a t e l a n d j u s t t o the west o f the 
Akaki Riverbed, c l o s e t o the P.S.L., T u r k i s h Army o b s e r v a t i o n p o s t s , 
and Avlona v i l l a g e . I n o t h e r words U.N.P.I.CYP. has t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h 
both s i d e s before water bore-holes can be used and before f i e l d s i n 
s t r a t e g i c areas can be opened f o r - c u l t i v a t i o n . 
The o v e r a l l i m p r e s s i o n o f Sector Two was o f an area o f l a n d , much o f 
i t n e g l e c t e d since the p a r t i t i o n i n August '74, s l o w l y coming back to 
l i f e under U.N.P.I.CYP. auspices. North o f the Farming S e c u r i t y Line 
U.N.P.I.CYP. has t r i e d t o encourage g r e a t e r T u r k i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n , 
a l t h o u g h l a r g e t r a c t s o f the B u f f e r Zone a d j a c e n t t o the T u r k i s h F.D.L. 
belongs t o Greek C y p r i o t s and t h e r e f o r e can not be farmed by the Turks. 
S i m i l a r l y , the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s once owned l a n d south o f the F.S.L. i n 
some p a r t s o f the B u f f e r Zone. Thus the U.N. F o r c e - c o n t r o l l e d area 
r e p r e s e n t s an a r t i f i c i a l g e o g r a p h i c a l s t r i p o f l a n d where intercommunal 
a c t i v i t y c o u l d e v e n t u a l l y take place w i t h U.N.F.I.CYF. a s s i s t a n c e and 
m e d i a t i o n , a l t h o u g h each s i d e w i l l r e q u i r e c o n s i d e r a b l e guarantees / 
compromises from the o t h e r i f i t i s t o a l l o w the B u f f e r Zone t o become 
an area o f intercommunal e x i s t e n c e . I n the meantime U.N.F.I.CYP. 
co n t i n u e s t o ensure the s a f e t y o f Greek C y p r i o t farmers working w i t h i n 
one hundred yards o f T u r k i s h r i f l e s i n areas such as Avlona, where t h e 
the P.S.L. passes close t o the v i l l a g e . Some semblance o f n o r m a l i t y i s 
thus r e t u r n i n g t o an i m p o r t a n t s t r i p o f l a n d t h a t would o t h e r w i s e be 
wasted "no-man's-land". 
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Se c t i o n Four : Some Conclusions concerning U„N.F.I.CYP.'s Second Decade. 
I n June 1984 the d e f i c i t o f the Un i t e d Nations Force i n Cyprus Account 
was e s t i m a t e d t o be g 117.7 m i l l i o n . I n s p i t e o f t h i s huge d e f i c i t 
the S e c r e t a r y General concluded t h a t :-
"...the c o n t i n u i n g presence o f U.N.F.I.CYP. remains 
i n d i s p e n s a b l e i n h e l p i n g t o m a i n t a i n calm i n the i s l a n d 
and i n c r e a t i n g the c o n d i t i o n s i n which the d i f f i c u l t 
search f o r a p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t can be pursued." (84) 
Although the B r i t i s h and Canadians and t o a l i m i t e d e x t e n t s e v e r a l o t h e r 
s t a t e s have been w i l l i n g t o pay the costs o f m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i r c o n t i n g e n t 
the major share o f U.N.F.I.CYP.'s f i n a n c i n g has been the v o l u n t a r y 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s the S e c r e t a r y General was able to e l i c i t , p a r t i c u l a r l y from 
the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Nevertheless the U.N. Force has b u i l t up a c h r o n i c 
d e f i c i t s i n c e T964 when U Thant complained t h a t "the method o f f i n a n c i n g 
the Force i n Cyprus as d e f i n e d by the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n o f 
4 March 19&4, i s most u n s a t i s f a c t o r y 0 " (85) I t i s beyond the scope o f 
t h i s study t o discuss a l t e r n a t i v e methods o f f i n a n c i n g , o r indeed t o g i v e 
an e l a b o r a t e a p p r a i s a l o f U.N.F.I.CYP.'s c o s t s , but as Adams and C o t t r e l l 
1968, argued "U.N.F.I.CYP. cannot go on i n d e f i n i t e l y . " (86) They added 
t h a t _ " i t _ c a n end su c c e s s f u l l y - o n l y - w h e n - a p e r m a n e n t _ p o l i t ~ i c a l "settlement 
f o r Cyprus i s somehow achieved." 
Apart from the s t a t u s quo t h e o p t i o n s appear t o be :-
( i ) Withdrawal o f U.N.F.I.CYP. before a s e t t l e m e n t ; 
( i i ) Reduction i n s t r e n g t h o f the Force. 
Given the c u r r e n t p o l i t i c a l stalemate i n Cyprus the former choice would 
p r o b a b l y aggravate the s i t u a t i o n by r e a c t i v a t i n g intercommunal v i o l e n c e . 
As f o r the l a t t e r p o i n t , U.N.F.I.CYP.'s s t r e n g t h i n June T984 was 2,348 
c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s than i t s e a r l i e r days i n Cyprus. A token presence 
o f a few hundred "blue b e r r e t s " would reduce i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s and 
c r e d i b i l i t y as a peacekeeping f o r c e . E i t h e r o p t i o n , complete w i t h d r a w a l 
o r a f u r t h e r s c a l i n g down o f o p e r a t i o n s , c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d as an 
admission by the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l o f the i n t r a c t a b i l i t y o f the Cyprus 
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Problem. The T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s would see a U.N.F.I.CYP. w i t h d r a w a l 
almost as i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f the de f a c t o p a r t i t i o n and the 
m i c r o - s t a t e they have c r e a t e d w i t h the a s s i s t a n c e o f Turkey. The l e a s t 
one can say about the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f U.N.F.I.CYP.'s c o n t i n u e d s t a y i n 
Cyprus i s t h a t i t i s a v i s i b l e reminder o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r m e d i a r y 
e f f o r t s by the S e c r e t a r y General t o b r i n g the two sides t o g e t h e r around 
the n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e . More s i g n i f i c a n t l y , U.N.F.I.CYP. a c t s as a 
communication channel between the communities, p r o v i d i n g not o n l y a 
sense o f s e c u r i t y but a ray o f hope t h a t one day the de f a c t o boundary 
s e p a r a t i n g them w i l l b r i d g e d . 
This c h a p t e r has d e a l t w i t h the d i s l o c a t i o n s and socio-economic 
upheavals c r e a t e d by the p a r t i t i o n o f Cyprus, subsequent changes i n 
human geography on both sides o f the d i v i d i n g l i n e , and the a c t i v i t i e s 
o f U.N.F.I.CYP. i n r e l a t i o n t o these new f a c t s on the ground. Chapter-
Seven examines i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l the Kyprianou - Denktas impasse; r e c e n t 
proposals f o r a s e t t l e m e n t and/or concessions o f f e r e d by e i t h e r s i d e ; 
and the p o s s i b l e f u t u r e r o l e o f U.N.F.I.CYP. g i v e n t h a t i t i s l i k e l y t o 
remain i n Cyprus f o r some c o n s i d e r a b l e t i m e . U.N.F.I.CYP. i t s e l f p l a y s 
a passive r o l e i n the p o l i t i c s o f the Cyprus Problem, unable t o i n f l u e n c e 
the main a c t o r s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the d i v i s i o n . But i t s a c t i v i t i e s i n 
the B u f f e r Zone have helped t o b r i n g v a l u a b l e a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d back 
i n t o c u l t i v a t i o n . One p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o a " r e t u r n to n o r m a l i t y " 
i n f u t u r e c o u l d be r e s t o r a t i o n o f intercommunal a c t i v i t y w i t h i n t h a t 
n e u t r a l zone. U.N.F.I.CYP. e s c o r t s are s t i l l the o n l y means by which 
t h e r e i s any movement o f C y p r i o t s across the p a r t i t i o n l i n e s . F i n a l l y , 
U.N.F.I.CYP. has i n j e c t e d s u b s t a n t i a l amounts o f money i n t o the l o c a l 
economy i n the form o f demand f o r l o c a l l y produced goods. As Greek 
C y p r i o t s o c c a s i o n a l l y remark the "blue b e r r e t s " are "the best t o u r i s t s 
i n Cyprus". 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION. 
POLITICAL IMPASSE AND U.N.F.I.CYP. TWENTY YEARS ON. 
" Phobias w i l l have t o be overcome on bo t h s i d e s . . . t i m e i s 
r u n n i n g out,...as years pass and new g e n e r a t i o n s grow- up 
fewer people w i l l have any p e r s o n a l experience o f l i v i n g 
w i t h members o f the o t h e r C y p r i o t community..." (1) 
" The weight o f the past i s i n d i c a t e d by symbols, such as 
f l a g s and b e l i e f s about h i s t o r y , and the present i s 
c i r c u m s c r i b e d by d i v i d i n g l i n e s , l e a d e r s and the i n s t i t u t i o n s 
they impose on f o l l o w e r s , barbed w i r e and m i l i t a r y o r g a n i s a t i o n 
. . . . r e l a t i o n s between Greek and T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s i s the dua l 
one, o f h i s t o r y and power p o l i t i c s . " ( 2) 
" Generations o f c h i l d r e n w i l l grow up i n mutual ignorance o f , 
and a n t i p a t h y towards, the o t h e r s i d e . At p r e s e n t , amongst 
l a r g e s e c t i o n s o f the o r d i n a r y p o p u l a t i o n and educated c l a s s e s , 
t h e r e i s s t i l l some g o o d w i l l . This g o o d w i l l may be played 
down by the Turks who see t h i n g s from a p a r t i t i o n i s t v i e w p o i n t , 
and exaggerated by the Greeks, who hanker a f t e r an unrepeatable 
U t o p i a n view o f a p e r f e c t l y i n t e g r a t e d s o c i e t y , but i t e x i s t s . " ( 3 ) 
Many g e o p o l i t i c a l lessons have been l e a r n t by the Greek C y p r i o t community. 
Enosis i s dead. The T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s h o l d the upper hand i n the p o l i t i c a l 
arena owing t o the e x i s t e n c e o f the s o - c a l l e d " A t t i l a f a c t o r " . ( 4 ) They 
have t h e i r own de f a c t o m i c r o - s t a t e , e c o n o m i c a l l y weak and dependent on 
Turkey f o r i t ' s s u r v i v a l , but a s t a t e p r o t e c t e d by a b r u t a l l y e f f e c t i v e 
boundary, which has stood for over a decade as an u n r a t i f i e d p o l i t i c a l 
i n t e r f a c e between Greeks and Turks. Greek C y p r i o t s can n o t escape t h i s 
p h y s i c a l and p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y . W h i l s t P r e s i d e n t Kyprianou c o n t i n u e s 
to keep the Cyprus Problem a l i v e i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l sphere, backed up 
by r e i t e r a t e d U n i t e d Nations r e s o l u t i o n s , the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s are s l o w l y 
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p u t t i n g t h e i r "pseudo s t a t e " on the map. (5) As the years pass by the 
l e g i t i m a c y o f t h i s T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s t a t e w i l l seem l e s s e q u i v o c a l and 
the l i k e l i h o o d o f a comprehensive s o l u t i o n t o the Cyprus Problem 
d i m i n i s h e s . 
I n some r e s p e c t s U.N.F.I.CYP.'s presence i s c o n t r i b u t i n g t o a p a c i f i c 
p e r p e t u a t i o n o f p a r t i t i o n , but e q u a l l y i t s p o s i t i o n as a " b u f f e r f o r c e " 
seems assured f o r as lo n g as the Secretary-General c o n t i n u e s h i s e f f o r t s 
t o keep both l e a d e r s h i p s n e g o t i a t i n g . Before d i s c u s s i n g the a t t i t u d e 
o f community l e a d e r s towards U.N.P.I.CYP. since the d e c l a r a t i o n o f an 
independent Republic by the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s on 15 November T983, some 
d i s c u s s i o n o f proposed concessions and/or s e t t l e m e n t s i s r e q u i r e d . 
Since August T974, most intercommunal p o l i t i c a l debate has been over 
t h r e e fundamental i s s u e s :-
(a) T u r k i s h C y p r i o t t e r r i t o r i a l concessions; 
(b) The type o f bicommunal f e d e r a l s t a t e t o emerge from a s e t t l e m e n t ; 
( c ) The problem o f ref u g e e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those from n o r t h e r n Cyprus: 
I n February 1977 Makarios - Denktas t a l k s l e d t o a number o f Greek 
b 
C y p r i o t compromises. Makarios agreed w i t h the i d e a o f an independent, 
no n - a l i g n e d and bicommunal Feder a l R e p u b l i c . He a l s o agreed t o 
p r o p o r t i o n s - o f t e r r i t o r y ~ t o — b e - under the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n - o f ~ e a c h community, 
the p r o p o r t i o n s to be agreed i n terms o f economic v i a b i l i t y o r 
p r o d u c t i v i t y and land-ownership. As the 1984 M i n o r i t y R i g h t s Group 
Report on Cyprus p o i n t e d o u t , f e d e r a t i o n i s not an easy form o f government 
anywhere, l e a s t o f a l l on a s m a l l i s l a n d o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y 700,000 people, 
" o n l y two u n i t s , d i s p u t e d t e r r i t o r i e s and d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e numbers". (6) 
I t i s beyond the scope o f t h i s study t o examine f e d e r a l s o l u t i o n s i n 
d e t a i l and t o apply them t o Cyprus, but i t i s w e l l t o be aware o f some 
o u t - s t a n d i n g q u e s t i o n s which would need t o be answered. For example, 
how i n t e g r a t e d would the s t a t e be ? Would t h e r e be f u l l freedom o f move-
ment f o j r C y p r i o t s a l l over the i s l a n d ? Would refugees be a l l o w e d t o 
r e t u r n t o o l d homes and p r o p e r t y 0 There are numerous o t h e r s . 
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An a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n t o bicommunal f e d e r a t i o n i n two g e o g r a p h i c a l 
zones has been suggested by George Kar o u z i s ( 1976 ) , who c a l c u l a t e d 
a m u l t i - r e g i o n a l f e d e r a l system based on seven T u r k i s h C y p r i o t " r e g i o n s " . 
( 7 ) ( r e f e r t o Map.2.4 ) These " r e g i o n s " were worked out from a d e t a i l e d 
study o f pre - 1 9 7 4 v i l l a g e , v i l l a g e boundary, l a n d ownership and p o p u l a t i o n 
d i s t r i b u t i o n p a t t e r n s f o r b o t h communities. Although Karouzis notes the 
e x i s t e n c e o f T u r k i s h C y p r i o t enclaves from December T963 t o July-August 
T974, h i s " T u r k i s h r e g i o n s " are based l a r g e l y on the T960 Census o f 
P o p u l a t i o n and A g r i c u l t u r e . He argues:-
"...as i t has been proved, t h e r e e x i s t s no g e o g r a p h i c a l b a s i s 
i n Cyprus f o r the c r e a t i o n o f T u r k i s h C y p r i o t r e g i o n s " , whatever 
c r i t e r i o n i s used- " p h y s i o a g r i c u l t u r a l , m o r p h o l o g i c a l , h ydro-
l o g i c a l , economic, town p l a n n i n g " . He compares h i s " T u r k i s h 
r e g i o n " t o the Swiss cantons,"which a l s o extend i n t o 
g e o g r a p h i c a l areas o f o t h e r r e g i o n s and o f t e n i n c l u d e enclaves 
s i t u a t e d i n o t h e r cantons." (8) 
Karouzis f a v o u r s a loose form o f f e d e r a t i o n w i t h f u l l freedom o f movement 
and s t r o n g c e n t r a l government, but he admits the need f o r " p r o t e c t i o n 
and s e c u r i t y " o f T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s "under a system o f broad l o c a l autonomy" 
Such a m u l t i - r e g i o n a l s o l u t i o n o r c a n t o n a l system would r e q u i r e an end 
to fundamental intercommunal phobias and the development o f some sense 
o f " n a t i o n a l u n i t y " . As P r o f e s s o r Pechoux argues, the Swiss developed 
"a Swiss n a t i o n a l f e e l i n g " over and above l i n g u i s t i c , r e l i g i o u s , and 
c u l t u r a l f a c t i o n a l i s m . 
" There c e r t a i n l y l i e s the main d i f f e r e n c e w i t h Cyprus where 
the C y p r i o t n a t i o n a l f e e l i n g , i f i t has even e x i s t e d , was always 
s u b o r d i n a t e t o d i s t i n c t Greek o r T u r k i s h n a t i o n a l i s m . " ( 9 ) 
The events o f the Summer o f '74 has l e d many Greek C y p r i o t s t o change t h e i 
minds about the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f Enosis. as one r e p o r t p o i n t s out :-
" I t i s a paradox t h a t a genuine sense o f C y p r i o t n e s s seemed 
t o emerge on the Greek C y p r i o t s i d e a f t e r the d i s a s t r o u s coup 
engineered by the F a s c i s t j u n t a i n Athens. Not u n t i l t h ey were 
fa c e d w i t h de f a c t o p a r t i t i o n and e x c l u s i o n from t h e i r 
t r a d i t i o n a l v i l l a g e s i n the N o r t h o f the i s l a n d d i d Greek C y p r i o t 
value t h e i r C y p r i o t n e s s above t h e i r - G r e e k n e s s . . . " (TO) 
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This g e o p o l i t i c a l change o f h e a r t on the Greek s i d e o f the p a r t i t i o n has 
not made the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s m o r e - w i l l i n g t o compromise. Even though 
EnosiB i s no l o n g e r heard... 
" . . . t h e T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s are so i s o l a t e d from c o n t a c t w i t h 
Greeks t h a t they f i n d t h i s v e r y d i f f i c u l t to accept." (TT) 
Neve r t h e l e s s , under a b i z o n a l f e d e r a l system the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s would 
p r o b a b l y have t o make generous t e r r i t o r i a l concessions t o the Greek 
C y p r i o t s . 
I n 1978 - '79, Kyprianou and Denkta| discussed p o s s i b l e t e r r i t o r i a l 
concessions. A Greek map o f a b i z o n a l Cyprus was produced ( see Map 7.1 ) . 
This envisaged a T u r k i s h C y p r i o t zone c o v e r i n g about twenty per cent o f 
the i s l a n d i n s t e a d o f the t h i r t y - s e v e n p er cent now h e l d . Such a s e t t l e -
ment would enable a s u b s t a n t i a l number o f Greek C y p r i o t refugees t o 
r e t u r n t o form e r homes and p r o p e r t y . T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s would be l e f t 
w i t h a s m a l l p a r t o f the Mesaoria, the P e n t a d a k t y l o s , and K y r e n i a c o a s t -
l i n e . According t o Rauf D e n k t a s , t h i s was a Greek C y p r i o t attempt t o 
c o n f i n e " T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s on a dry ro c k y s t r e t c h o f mountain where- even 
goats can't l i v e . " (12) 
A T u r k i s h map o f proposed t e r r i t o r i a l r e a d j u s t m e n t s was pre s e n t e d f o r 
n e g o t i a t i o n i n August 1981. S i x s p e c i f i c t e r r i t o r i a l concessions were> 
o f f e r e d ( r e f e r t o Map 7.2 ) , an area c o v e r i n g about t h r e e p er cent o f 
the t o t a l l a n d s u r f a c e o f Cyprus. These s i x areas were :-
i ) Varosha, the southern suburb o f Pamagusta, p l u s D e r i n i a . 
i i ) A l a r g e area o f l a n d n o r t h o f the B r i t i s h Sovereign Base at D h e k e l i a . 
This area i n c l u d e s the v i l l a g e s o f K o u k l i a , Kalopsidha, Kandea, L y s i , 
Makrasyka and Athna, which were p r i m a r i l y Greek C y p r i o t w i t h the 
e x c e p t i o n o f K o u k l i a b e f o r e T974. 
i i i ) The L o u r o u j i n a s a l i e n t , i n c l u d i n g the v i l l a g e s o f L o u r o u j i n a and 
P y r o i , as w e l l as the segment o f the N i c o s i a - Larnaca road which 
passes thr o u g h i t . 
i v ) The v i l l a g e o f Avlona and v i c i n i t y . 
v ) The L i m n i t i s r e g i o n , west o f Lefka, i n c l u d i n g v a r i o u s s m a l l v i l l a g e s 
upto/and i n c l u d i n g Ambelikou - K a r o v o s t a s i . 
v i ) Kokkina enclave, w i t h i t s aging T u r k i s h C y p r i o t p o p u l a t i o n , i r o n i c a l l y 
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a piece o f l a n d t h a t has been p u r e l y T u r k i s h t e r r i t o r y f o r l o n g e r 
than two decades. 
Since 198T t h e r e have been no breakthroughs i n intercommunal n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t l e a d e r s have pushed f o r - t h e reopening o f N i c o s i a A i r p o r t , 
which since 1974 has been used as a U n i t e d Nations parade ground. The 
Greeks i n t e r p r e t the Denkta^ demands as 50:50 use- o f the a i r p o r t w i t h 
separate approaches from each side and separate customs arrangements, 
t h e r e f o r e the p r o p o s a l i s unacceptable t o them. (T3) On s e v e r a l 
occasions the Turks have o f f e r e d t o reopen Varosha to Greek C y p r i o t s 
under the aegis o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . This once wealthy Greek suburb 
was sealed o f f by the T u r k i s h Army i n T974. I t s 35,000 Greek C y p r i o t 
occupants evacuated, l e a v i n g behind an u n i n h a b i t e d ghost r e s o r t , w i t h 
a b a r r e n s t r e t c h o f beach f r o n t e d by empty h o t e l s , a l l guarded by h i g h 
fences and T u r k i s h s o l d i e r s . I n T978 p l a n s t o reopen Varosha were-
r e j e c t e d by the Cyprus Government on the grounds t h a t the Greek C y p r i o t 
r e t u r n e e s would e f f e c t i v e l y be c o n f i n e d t o a narrow enclave- along the 
c o a s t . I n e f f e c t the Greek C y p r i o t owners and s t a f f would r u n the h o t e l s 
f o r the economic and p o l i t i c a l advantage o f the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t zone. 
Since T978,parts o f Varosha have been opened f o r T u r k i s h C y p r i o t 
o c c u p a t i o r i , jmd^n_ej»?ly_T98_4_a number o f — a d j u s t m e n t s were-made t o the -
suburb's p e r i m e t e r fence and t e n t o twenty houses were r e p o r t e d t o be 
i n h a b i t e d by T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s . (T4) 
As i s the case w i t h Varosha, T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s e t t l e m e n t p o l i c y i s 
t e n d i n g t o m i l i t a t e a g a i n s t a s e t t l e m e n t . Greek C y p r i o t l e a d e r s remain 
s c e p t i c a l about a c c e p t i n g T u r k i s h concessions i n the b e l i e f t h a t by doing 
so they would be somehow r e c o g n i z i n g the l e g i t i m a c y o f the r e s t o f T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t - h e l d t e r r i t o r y , thus moving a step c l o s e r t o a de j u r e b i z o n a l 
s o l u t i o n between two d i s t i n c t s t a t e s . .^ 
Another worry f o r the Greek C y p r i o t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s the massive 
refugee problem. As Karouzis c o r r e c t l y p o i n t s o u t : -
" I t would not be r e a l i s t i c . . . t o t h i n k t h a t the refugees o f the 
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North w i l l , i n due course, s t i f l e t h e i r g r i e f , t h e i r anger, 
t h e i r b i t t e r n e s s and t h e i r disappointment and w i l l be f o r c e d 
t o c a p i t u l a t e by a c c e p t i n g t o l i v e i n s m a l l v i l l a g e s o r towns 
away from the place where they were born, where they grew up, 
where they b u i l t t h e i r houses and p r o p e r t i e s , o f t e n w i t h much 
t o i l and m o i l . " (15) 
At pre s e n t i t seems h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s w i l l 
accept a n y t h i n g o t h e r than a bicommunal, b i z o n a l f e d e r a l s o l u t i o n w i t h 
power i n v e s t e d i n the two f e d e r a l powers r a t h e r than a s t r o n g c e n t r a l 
f e d e r a l government. They are not keen t o open up the de f a c t o border 
between the two C y p r i o t communities and have c a r r i e d out p o l i c i e s 
m i l i t a t i n g a g a i n s t a r e u n i f i c a t i o n o f the i s l a n d even under some type 
o f f e d e r a t i o n . For i n s t a n c e , some Greek C y p r i o t p r o p e r t y has been 
bought by T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s i n the n o r t h , even though t h i s i s i l l e g a l 
a c c o r d i n g t o the Cyprus Government i n the so u t h . Furthermore, the 
presence o f mainland T u r k i s h s e t t l e r s i n the n o r t h has c r e a t e d another 
o b s t a c l e t o an e v e n t u a l s o l u t i o n . T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s have a l s o s e t t l e d 
i n some areas o f f e r e d as t e r r i t o r i a l concessions t o the Greeks. As 
mentioned i n Chapter S i x , T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s are a l s o w o r r i e d t h a t i f 
the ' b o r d e r ' i s opened up they w i l l be swamped n u m e r i c a l l y and commercially 
by Greek C y p r i o t s . 
I n August 1983, Senor J a v i e r Perez de C u e l l a r , S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l , 
attempted t o i n i t i a t e new f o r w a r d moves i n intercommunal d i s c u s s i o n s by 
sugges t i n g a set o f ' i n d i c a t o r s ' o r o p t i o n s t o be considered as a frame-
work f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s by both s i d e s . These i n d i c a t o r s were :-
( i ) Would both s i d e s accept t h a t the Turks should keep a minimum 
o f 23 % o f the i s l a n d and a maximum o f 30 % ; 
( i i ) There should be a c o n s t i t u t i o n w i t h l i n k s between the f e d e r a l 
government and two p r o v i n c i a l governments. Perez de C u e l l a r 
advocated a f u l l p r e s i d e n t i a l system, the P r e s i d e n t being i n 
charge o f the southern ( Greek C y p r i o t ) p r o v i n c e l e a v i n g the 
Vi c e - P r e s i d e n t to be the n o r t h e r n p r o v i n c i a l p r e s i d e n t ( i . e . 
T u r k i s h C y p r i o t ) , i n which case the members o f the C o u n c i l o f 
M i n i s t e r s would be i n a 6:4 r a t i o . 
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( i i i ) A l t e r n a t i v e l y t h e r e c o u l d be a Presidential-cum-Prime M i n i s t e r 
system, these two top e x e c u t i v e posts should be r o t a t e d 
between the p r e s i d e n t s o f the two p r o v i n c e s , w i t h a 7:3 r a t i o 
on the f e d e r a l e x e c u t i v e i n f a v o u r o f the Greek C y p r i o t s . (16) 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y Mr Spyros Kyprianou o n l y gave these proposals a luke-warm 
r e c e p t i o n , whie Rauf Denktas prepared f o r U.D.I., thus k i l l i n g "another 
6 
U n i t e d Nations p l a n f o r Cyprus a t b i r t h . " (17) 
On 15 November 1983 Rauf Denktas and the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t Assembly 
pr o c l a i m e d the independence o f the " T u r k i s h Republic o f No r t h e r n Cyprus". 
I n a summary o f the d e c l a r a t i o n concerning the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f the 
T.R.N.C. i t was s t a t e d :-
" A l l t h a t i s being done today i s the c o n f i r m a t i o n and 
d e c l a r a t i o n o f an e x i s t i n g r e a l i t y and the renaming o f 
our s t a t e . " 
Rauf Denktas made h i m s e l f non-party P r e s i d e n t o f the new Re p u b l i c . 
The Times r e p o r t e d the f o l l o w i n g day :-
" . . . t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t the p r o c l a m a t i o n o f independence 
i s an event o f g r e a t symbolic and emo t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . . . 
and undoubtedly does r e f l e c t the d e s i r e o f the T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t community as a whole t o have i t s separate i d e n t i t y 
r e cognized and be t r e a t e d on an equal f o o t i n g w i t h the 
Greeks." (16) 
This a c t i o n has c o n s o l i d a t e d a decade o f de f a c t o p a r t i t i o n and two 
decades o f s e p a r a t i o n from the Republic o f Cyprus. Or as Denktas p r e f e r s 
b 
t o put i t :- " We have not seceded from the Republic o f Cyprus, we have 
been thrown out o f i t and we have had t o put the r o o f o f s t a t e -
hood over our Heads." (T9) 
Some Greek C y p r i o t l e a d e r s argue t h a t Denktas has never wanted a f e d e r a l 
s o l u t i o n but j u s t p r e s i d e n c y over h i s ' L i l l i p u t i a n S t a t e ' , and they f e a r 
t h a t 'U.D.I.' i s a permanent a p p r o p r i a t i o n by the Turks. I n c o n t r a s t , 
Denktaa argues t h a t "U.D.I, does not preclude f e d e r a t i o n 'on a f a i r b a s i s ' 
b 
(20) 
F o l l o w i n g the announcement o f an independent N o r t h e r n Republic the 
Greek C y p r i o t s went to the U n i t e d Nations which d e c l a r e d the T.R.N.C. as 
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Greek C y p r i o t c a r t o o n d e p i c t i n g Rauf Denktas, the s e l f - p r o c l a i m e d 
P r e s i d e n t o f the T u r k i s h Republic o f N o r t h e r n Cyprus, c u t t i n g o f f 
No r t h e r n Cyprus from the r e s t o f the i s l a n d . 
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" i l l e g a l " . I n s p i t e ^ o f t h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l condemnation o f T u r k i s h 
C y p r i o t independence P r e s i d e n t Kyprianou was unable t o persuade the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community t o impose economic s a n c t i o n s on No r t h e r n 
Cyprus. (21) Only Turkey re c o g n i z e d the T.R.N.C., but time i s on the 
side o f the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s . 
" We have de f a c t o s u p p o r t , de f a c t o sympathy from many 
c o u n t r i e s we expected t o g i v e us r e c o g n i t i o n . . . R e c o g n i t i o n 
may have t o w a i t a l i t t l e l o n g e r . " (22) 
I n A p r i l 1984, U n i t e d Nations s p e c i a l Cyprus envoy Hugo Gobbi met the 
le a d e r s o f both communities i n an attempt t o defuse the t e n s i o n t h a t had 
b u i l t up over T u r k i s h C y p r i o t moves t o ' s o l i d i f y ' t h e i r breakaway s t a t e . 
E a r l i e r , Turkey and the s e l f - p r o c l a i m e d T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s t a t e f o r m a l l y 
cemented d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s by exchanging Ambassadors i n Ankara and 
N i c o s i a . U n f o r t u n a t e l y Hugo Gobbi was unable t o move e i t h e r s i d e c l o s e r 
t o g e t h e r o r t o preve n t Denktas from h i s plans t o e s t a b l i s h a C o n s t i t u t i o n 
i n the n o r t h and t o h o l d e l e c t i o n s . (23) 
U.N.F.I.CYP.'s F u t u r e . 
The Cyprus Problem should not o n l y be viewed a t the p a r o c h i a l l e v e l o f 
intercommunal p o l i t i c s . ( r e f e r t o Chapter One ) The i n t e r a c t i o n between 
o r d i n a r y Greek and T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s has never been f r e e from o u t s i d e 
i n t e r f e r e n c e o r i n f l u e n c e . Since U.D.I, r e l a t i o n s between Greece and 
Turkey over Cyprus have hardened. Ozal's f i r s t speech as Prime M i n i s t e r 
o f Turkey i n November T983 mentioned Cyprus as "a dagger p o i n t e d a t the 
b e l l y o f Turkey". Greece has al s o t h r e a t e n e d t o send more mainland 
t r o o p s t o so u t h e r n Cyprus t o s t r e n g t h e n the Greek C y p r i o t s ' b a r g a i n i n g 
p o s i t i o n . (24) Thus U.N.F.I.CYP.'s p o s i t i o n on Cyprus as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
peacekeeping f o r c e i s as i m p o r t a n t as ever. 
The d e c l a r a t i o n o f independence by Denktas has r e i n f o r c e d "psycho-
l o g i c a l green l i n e s " t o p r o g r e s s . Many Greek C y p r i o t s b e l i e v e t h a t 
Turkey i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y an e x p a n s i o n i s t c o u n t r y and they are conscious 
o f Ankara's support o f the Denkta^ regime. On the o t h e r hand, many 
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T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s now f e e l a sense o f s e c u r i t y they d i d not f e e l p r i o r 
t o the T u r k i s h m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n , a l t h o u g h some o f them may be d i s -
i l l u s i o n e d by t h e i r 'pseudo-state's' c o n t i n u e d dependence on Turkey. As 
Hitchens admits the T u r k i s h C y p r i o t community " w i l l not.„.voluntarily 
r e v e r t t o the p o s i t i o n they occupied before 1974." (25) Continued 
s e p a r a t i o n o f the two C y p r i o t communities m i l i t a t e s a g a i n s t any meeting 
o f minds and a p e r p e t u a t i o n o f intercommunal "phobias" about each o t h e r . 
Greek C y p r i o t s are w o r r i e d t h a t one day a l l o r p a r t o f the i s l a n d w i l l 
be annexed by Turkey, w h i l s t T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s s t i l l b e l i e v e t h a t Greek 
C y p r i o t s want Enosis. P i e r r e O b e r l i n g , 1982, argues t h a t the two s i d e s 
can never c o e x i s t i n a u n i f i e d o r l o o s e l y f e d e r a t e d s t a t e , so the o n l y 
way f o r w a r d i s f o r Greek C y p r i o t l e a d e r s t o reco g n i z e the n o r t h , t o 
exchange freedom o f t r a d e f o r t e r r i t o r i a l concessions. (26) 
Given the p o l i t i c a l deadlock U.N.F.I.CYP. can do l i t t l e more than 
m a i n t a i n the s t a t u s quo, expand i t s economic and h u m a n i t a r i a n a c t i v i t i e s 
w i t h i n the B u f f e r Zone, and con t i n u e i t s v i s i t s t o " e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s " 
i n the " T u r k i f i e d " n o r t h . U n f o r t u n a t e l y i t s m o b i l i t y i n Cyprus may be 
c u r t a i l e d even f u r t h e r by T u r k i s h C y p r i o t p o l i c y . As Rauf Denktas s t r e s s e s 
"...we s h a l l have t o review the presence o f U.N. t r o o p s . 
We don't want a d i r e c t c o n f l i c t w i t h the U n i t e d Nations 
o r any o f i t s organs, but we don't want the U.N. t o 
co n t i n u e t o m i s i n f o r m i t s e l f on Cyprus..." (27) 
U.N.P.I.CYP. c a r r i e s out i t s e s s e n t i a l m o n i t o r i n g i n N o r t h e r n Cyprus as 
"guests" o f the Denktas regime. I f the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l c o n t i n u e s i t s 
n o n - r e c o g n i t i o n o f the 'T u r k i s h Republic o f N o r t h e r n Cyprus' U.N.P.I.CYP. 
c o u l d f i n d i t s o p e r a t i o n s i n f u t u r e r e s t r i c t e d t o the Greek s i d e o f the 
p a r t i t i o n . With 20 - 30,000 T u r k i s h t r o o p s i n the T.R.N.C., Greek C y p r i o t s 
f e e l t h a t U.N.P.I,CYP.'s presence a c t s as a d e t e r e n t t o another T u r k i s h 
m i l i t a r y push southwards. Even i n a u n i f i e d Cyprus t h e r e would need t o 
be i n t e r n a t i o n a l guarantees o f d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n . The complete de-
m i l i t a r i z a t i o n o f the i s l a n d , s t a r t i n g w i t h a complete w i t h d r a w a l o f 
T u r k i s h t r o o p s f o l l o w e d by the disbandment o f the N a t i o n a l Guard, would 
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require the supervision of a 'neutral* peacekeeping f o r c e . 
Cyprus holds a coveted s t r a t e g i c postion i n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l struggle 
f o r influence i n the eastern Mediterranean between two N.A.T.O. powers, 
and at a higher l e v e l , the i s l a n d i s viewed as an important base f o r 
the defence of western i n t e r e s t s i n the Mediterranean and Middle East. 
As such, ordinary Cypriots remain pawns i n a s i t u a t i o n e n t i r e l y beyond 
t h e i r c o n t r o l , w h i l s t U.N.F.I.CYP. acts as an i n t e r i m force helping to 
preserve a s p a t i a l status quo not only w i t h i n Cyprus, but given the 
vested i n t e r e s t s of outside powers, i n the eastern Mediterranean region. 
I t i s s t i l l d i f f i c u l t to disagree w i t h one of Stagenga's (1968) conclusions 
i n s p i t e of U.N.P.I.CYP.•s i n t e r i m status :-
"U.N.F.I.CYP. has consequently become indispensable to continued 
calm and has perhaps earned a place as a permanent part of the 
Cyprus landscape." (28) 
Conclusion; The Geography of Peacekeeping. 
U.N.P.I.CYP. has not o n l y become a feature of the Cyprus landscape f o r 
i t has also t r i e d to a l t e r abnormalities i n that landscape r e s u l t i n g from 
the a r t i f i c i a l physical separation of the two communities. I t s presences 
has helped to maintain the status quo, i . e . the geographical separation 
of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but i t s humanitarian and economic duties 
helping to break down psychological b a r r i e r s between them should not be 
overlooked. 
As mentioned i n Chapter One, the main aim of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n i s to 
stress the "geographical aspects" of U.N.F.I.CYP.»s operations i n Cyprus. 
Many of the United Nations Force's r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s were/are r e l a t e d to 
physical ethnic i n t e r f a c e s separating the two communities. As such i t 
was necessary to examine the numerous changes i n the p o l i t i c a l geography 
of the i s l a n d since i t s independence i n August 1960 to the present. 
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Wherever l i n e s of close c o n f r o n t a t i o n were formed U.N. troops were 
placed in-between the Forward Defence Lines of the opposing armed 
elements. Before the de facto p a r t i t i o n of Cyprus i n t o two mono-ethnic 
(29) u n i t s U.N.F.I.CYP.'s i n t e r p o s i t i o n a r y r o l e was complicated by the 
confusing p a t t e r n of Turkish Cypriot t e r r i t o r i a l c o n t r o l scattered over 
d i f f e r e n t parts of the i s l a n d . U.N. troops protected these enclaves 
from the more numerous National Guard and Greek forces i n the i s l a n d , 
but they also attempted to remove f o r t i f i c a t i o n s and other physical 
evidences of intercommunal c o n f l i c t , and to prevent new conf r o n t a t i o n 
l i n e s from emerging. Unfortunately, an island-wide d e f o r t i f i c a t i o n 
programme was never i n i t i a t e d owing to the p o l i c i e s and mutual mistrust 
displayed by the leaders of both communities. 
Prom 1968 to July T974, the removal of Government economic r e s t r i c t i o n s 
on Turkish C y p r i o t - c o n t r o l l e d areas made U.N.P.I.CYP.'s "normalization" 
duties easier and some progress was made towards greater intercommunal 
cooperation over the use of the island's resources and i n various economic 
a c t i v i t i e s . At the v i l l a g e l e v e l there were numerous i n t e r l i n k a g e s 
between peacekeeping operations and geography, both p o l i t i c a l and human. 
For example, wherever an a r t i f i c i a l t e r r i t o r i a l "boundary" or defence l i n e 
crossed over a main road or divided a stream, U.N.F.I.CYP. o f t e n had to 
negotiate w i t h l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s of each side i n order to prevent serious 
incidents from occurring. I n t h i s way U.N.P.I.CYP. s e t t l e d many disputes 
concerning the use of resources and movement of people/supplies i n areas 
bisected by conf r o n t a t i o n l i n e s or w i t h i n "grey areas" of disputed 
t e r r i t o r i a l c o n t r o l . U.N.F.I.CYP.'s presence helped to break down some 
" i n v i s i b l e w a l l s " separating the Greek and Turkish Cypriot people. 
Nevertheless, the Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration was determined 
to maintain i t s de facto a u t h o r i t y over parts of Cyprus and the Greek 
Cypriots were not permitted to enter the Turkish enclaves. Furthermore, 
Turkish Cypriots remained cautious of moving f r e e l y outside t h e i r own 
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strongholds. Given the problems of p o l i t i c a l deadlock and posed by the 
persistence of pro-Enosis t e r r o r i s t groups i n Cyprus, U.N.P.I.CYP. could 
do l i t t l e more than maintain an unusual p a t t e r n of ethnic separation on 
the i s l a n d . The " v i s i b l e " and " i n v i s i b l e " walls between the two communities 
remained, which made i t necessary to keep a t h i r d force i n Cyprus to 
contain the armed forces of the two communities. 
Following the Turkish m i l i t a r y manouvres of July - August T974, the 
geography of U.N.P.I.CYP.'s operations was completely a l t e r e d . Instead 
of deploying men near to ethnic i n t e r f a c e s i n various parts of the i s l a n d 
U.N.P.I.CYP. placed v i r t u a l l y a l l i t s observation points and p a t r o l s 
along the southern side of the Turkish cease-fire l i n e of 16 August 1974. 
I t s a c t i v i t i e s i n the Turkish-controlled part of the i s l a n d are 3 r e s t r i c t e d 
to humanitarian v i s i t s to a t i n y m i n o r i t y of Greeks s t i l l i n Northern 
Cyprus and to a small community of Maronites. U.N. Force operations are 
concentrated w i t h i n the Buffer Zone ( r e f e r to Chapter Six ) between the 
Forward Defence Lines of both sides. Within t h i s United Nations-
c o n t r o l l e d s t r i p of land U.N.P.I.CYP. a r b i t r a t e s between the two communities 
over the use of land and water resources therer, i n a d d i t i o n i t has helped 
bring t h i s zone back i n t o c u l t i v a t i o n . 
Without U.N.P.I.CYP,, bloody c i v i l war between Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
would probably have led to a s i m i l a r de facto p a r t i t i o n of the i s l a n d . 
U.N.P.I.CYP. has helped to r e s t i c t the a c t i v i t i e s of extremists and the 
armed elements of both communities. I t s endeavours to'normalize' conditions 
i n areas located near to confrontation l i n e s has returned l i f e to areas 
which would otherwise have remained barren, and many resource disputes 
or p o t e n t i a l disputes have been s e t t l e d by U.N.P.I.CYP. mediation. 
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